PER CURIAM.
OPINION Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.Crim.App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to life imprisonment. Applicant contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to timely file a written notice of appeal. We remanded this application to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court has determined that at the end of Applicant's trial his appointed counsel gave oral notice of appeal and moved to withdraw, but did not file a written notice of appeal or provide Applicant with a written notice to file pro se. Although Applicant was properly advised of his right to appeal and the deadlines to file notice of appeal, counsel failed either to file written notice of appeal or to provide Applicant with a written notice to file himself before counsel withdrew, even though counsel had previously given oral notice of appeal for Applicant. We find, therefore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time appeal of the judgment of conviction in Cause No. 3748 from the 154th Judicial District Court of Lamb County. Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). Applicant is ordered returned to that time at which he may give a written notice of appeal so that he may then, with the aid of counsel, obtain a meaningful appeal. All time limits shall be calculated as if the sentence had been imposed on the date on which the mandate of this Court issues. We hold that, should Applicant desire to prosecute an appeal, he must take affirmative steps to file a written notice of appeal in the trial court within 30 days after the mandate of this Court issues.
Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion.
The trial court found as a matter of fact that applicant's attorney advised him of his right to appeal, and that counsel cannot recall applicant telling him that he wanted to appeal. The court also found that in applicant's application for court-appointed trial counsel, he failed to disclose some $40,000 to $50,000 in his retirement account. Applicant never indicated that he was unable to access this money or that he was having difficulty obtaining funds to pursue an appeal. The court considered those amounts in determining that applicant was not indigent for purposes of appeal. The court found that applicant did not tell his attorney that he wanted to appeal. The court also found that, though applicant filed a notice of appeal, he took no apparent action for over a year and a half, in spite of the court's letter to him informing him that his right to appeal might soon pass if he did not take steps to employ counsel. Finally, the court found:
Applicant may or may not have pursued an appeal if it were provided to him without cost, but when he was required to use his own funds he did not make any effort to seek an appeal.
This Court rejects these findings and concludes that applicant is entitled to appeal, with the aid of counsel no less. I see no basis for this decision, which is contrary to the trial court's findings of fact and recommendation. There is nothing in the record to refute the trial court's belief that applicant had access to the funds in his retirement account, nor is there anything in the record that conclusively controverts the court's finding that applicant decided to refrain from appealing because he would have to pay for it himself. This Court's decision that applicant is entitled to counsel on appeal shows a surprising disregard for the role of the trial court in indigency determinations and is, furthermore, not supported by the record. I would deny relief. I respectfully dissent.