PER CURIAM.
Apollo Hair Systems of Seattle, Inc. (Apollo), Lonnie Gilbert, and Rosaleen Gilbert appeal from a judgment entered to enforce an arbitration award. We affirm.
Nick Austin and Karen Taylor brought suit against Apollo and the Gilberts in King County Superior Court regarding a stock purchase agreement between the parties. The agreement stipulated that disputes would be resolved in arbitration governed by the Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The trial court granted the motion by Apollo and the Gilberts to remove the case to arbitration.
The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Austin and Taylor, who timely moved to confirm the award. Apollo and the Gilberts objected and moved to modify the award. The trial court remanded the case to the arbitrator "for clarification of his decision." Austin and Taylor moved to vacate the order remanding the case and again moved to confirm the award, but the trial court denied the motion. The trial court also denied two Apollo/Gilbert motions to vacate the award. The arbitrator issued a clarification on December 27, 2006. On Austin and Taylor's motion, the trial court entered judgment on the award.
On appeal, Apollo and the Gilberts contend that the "award on remand" was untimely, because it was filed more than 30 days after the trial court's order of remand. We disagree because (1) the original award was never vacated, and (2) and the clarification issued by the arbitrator — which Apollo and the Gilberts call the "award on remand" — is not part of the award.
Arbitration is a statutory procedure and judicial review of arbitration awards is strictly limited. Courts will not review an arbitration award on its merits. A court may only vacate, modify, or correct an award on grounds enumerated by statute, and only where such grounds appear on the face of the award. If none of those grounds appear on the face of the award, the court must confirm the award upon the timely motion of a party. A party may request a statement of reasons for an award, but a post-award clarification statement is not part of the award for purposes of vacation or modification.
Northern State Constr. Co. v. Banchero, 63 Wn.2d 245, 249, 386 P.2d 625 (1963).
Barnett v. Hicks, 119 Wn.2d 151, 156-57, 829 P.2d 1087 (1992).
Westmark Properties, Inc. v. McGuire, 53 Wn. App. 400, 402, 766 P.2d 1146 (1989) (citing Hatch v. Cole, 128 Wash. 107, 113, 222 P. 463 (1924)).
RCW 7.04A.230, .240; Westmark, 53 Wn. App at 402.
Barnett, 119 Wn. App. at 157.
Westmark, 53 Wn. App. at 403 (citing Lent's, Inc. v. Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc., 29 Wn. App. 257, 265-66, 628 P.2d 488 (1981)).
The trial court's order remanding the case for clarification did not vacate the award, but rather ordered the arbitrator to clarify his decision. Moreover, when Austin and Taylor moved to vacate the order of remand, the trial court denied the motion and restated that the purpose of the remand was for "the arbitrator to clarify whether he received and considered all evidence presented." The court went on to say, "It very well may be that the arbitrator will confirm that he had considered all the evidence presented, and that the award will eventually be confirmed upon subsequent motion by plaintiffs." Thus, the record does not support the contention that the award was vacated.
Once the clarification was received and Austin and Taylor again moved to confirm the award, the trial court entered judgment on the award. Contrary to Apollo's contentions, the clarification was neither part of the award nor a newly issued award. Therefore, Apollo's argument that the "award on remand" was untimely is without merit. Apollo and the Gilberts also contend that the award should be vacated under RCW 7.04A.230 because evident partiality occurred when attorney fees were awarded based on evidence not produced to all parties. It is undisputed that neither party produced its evidence regarding attorney fees to the other party.
Apollo and the Gilberts now claim that this violated due process and the AAA Rules. They cite one case in support of this contention, which has nothing to do with an arbitrator's award of attorney fees. AAA Rule 39(c), as quoted by Apollo, requires parties to provide documents to the other party "[u]nless otherwise instructed by . . . the Arbitrator." In the award, the arbitrator states that the parties provided evidence of their attorney fees "[p]ursuant to [the arbitrator's] request." The record reflects that the arbitrator found that Austin and Taylor were the prevailing parties, considered evidence of the parties' attorney fees, and accordingly awarded reasonable fees. We find no evidence of partiality and affirm the judgment on the award.
Apollo cites Van Blaricom v. Kronenberg, 112 Wn. App. 501, 50 P.3d 266 (2002), which holds that prejudgment attachment of real property without notice and hearing violates due process.
The arbitration agreement between the parties provides that the prevailing party shall be awarded its reasonable attorney fees. As the prevailing party on appeal from the judgment on the arbitration award, Austin and Taylor are entitled to reasonable attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: