BRYANT, Judge.
Crystal Nicole Bullock (defendant) appeals from a judgment dated 5 February 2007 and entered consistent with a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of felony larceny. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court's judgment.
Facts
On 25 May 2006, Mr. Kenneth Thigpen was working as a plain-clothes security officer for the Wal-Mart store in Wilson, North Carolina. Mr. Thigpen observed defendant and two other women push two shopping carts into the electronics department of the store, load 15-inch LCD TV's into the carts, and push the carts into the ladies' clothing department of the store. Mr. Thigpen testified that he observed defendant leave the ladies' department, and return after a few moments carrying a large storage container. Mr. Thigpen watched as defendant and her two companions loaded the TV's into the storage container. After the women finished loading the TV's, defendant began to remove clothing from the ladies' department racks and place the items into large, white Wal-Mart shopping bags. When defendant finished removing the clothing items, she pushed one of the carts towards the front of the store, through an unoccupied check-out line, and exited the store into the parking lot where defendant and the two other women loaded the items from the shopping cart into a vehicle.
After the vehicle drove out of the Wal-Mart parking lot, Mr. Thigpen observed a police car follow the vehicle into a nearby gas station and stop the vehicle. Officer Michael Siegel was patrolling near the Wal-Mart when he received a call from dispatch describing the vehicle and the three women. After Officer Siegel stopped the vehicle, Mr. Thigpen arrived at the gas station to recover the merchandise he observed the three women take from Wal-Mart. Randy Galloway, the Wal-Mart manager-on-duty, determined that the total value of the merchandise recovered from the vehicle was $1,958.42.
Defendant testified that she traveled with her friends Angela Brown and Cytrina Perry from Henderson, North Carolina to the Wal-Mart in Wilson, North Carolina on 25 May 2006 in Brown's vehicle to purchase some items for Brown's small child. While the women were in Wal-Mart, defendant noticed Mr. Thigpen watching them. Defendant separated herself from the two other women because she was concerned that Mr. Thigpen "didn't look right." Defendant testified that she did not place any merchandise other than a plastic tote into either shopping cart. Defendant also denied pushing either shopping cart outside or helping her companions load the merchandise into Brown's car.
Procedural History
This case came on for trial on 5 February 2007, in Wilson County Superior Court before the Honorable Milton F. Fitch, Jr. on an indictment alleging one count of larceny. On that same day, the jury returned its verdict, finding defendant guilty of felony larceny. In a judgment dated 5 February 2007 and entered consistent with the jury verdict, the trial court sentenced defendant to eight to ten months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
The dispositive issue is whether the indictment in this case was fatally defective where the named owner-entity, "Wal-Mart Superstore," does not indicate it is an entity capable of owning property. We agree with defendant that the indictment was fatally defective and vacate her felony larceny conviction.
Defendant failed to contest the sufficiency of the indictment before the trial court. However, "a motion in arrest of judgment may be made at any time in any court having jurisdiction over the matter, even if raised for the first time on appeal," State v. Wilson, 128 N.C. App. 688, 691, 497 S.E.2d 416, 419 (1998), when a fatally defective error is present in the indictment.
"To be sufficient, an indictment for larceny must allege the owner or person in lawful possession of the stolen property." State v. Downing, 313 N.C. 164, 166, 326 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985). "If the property alleged to have been stolen . . . is the property of a corporation, the name of the corporation should be given, and the fact that it is a corporation stated, unless the name itself imports a corporation." State v. Thornton, 251 N.C. 658, 662, 111 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1960) (internal citation and quotation omitted). "`A larceny indictment which does not indicate the legal entity is a corporation or the name of the legal entity does not import a corporation is fatally defective.'" State v. Brown, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 646 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2007) (quoting State v. Cathey, 162 N.C. App. 350, 353-54, 590 S.E.2d 408, 410 (2004)).
The indictment at issue here does not specify that "Wal-Mart Superstore" is a legal entity capable of owning property, nor does the name import that it is a corporation. The indictment merely states that the entity is a store. Although the State urges us to review the indictment under a harmless error analysis because of the "notoriety of Wal-Mart as a corporation" and requests this Court to take judicial notice of Wal-Mart's legal status as a corporate entity, we decline to do so. "[H]armless error analysis is generally not appropriate in cases where the indictment is fatally defective, and we decline the State's invitation to apply it to the facts of this case." State v. Partridge, 157 N.C. App. 568, 570, 579 S.E.2d 398, 399 (2003). Whether or not a legal entity is commonly known as a corporation capable of owning property, "a larceny indictment which does not indicate the legal entity is a corporation or the name of the legal entity does not import a corporation is fatally defective." Cathey, 162 N.C. App. at 353-54, 590 S.E.2d at 410.
Vacated.
Judges WYNN and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).