SAMUEL J. SFERRAZZA, JUDGE.
The defendant, Alan Williams, moves to strike the plaintiffs' claim for a jury trial. The complaint alleges conversion; violations of the Uniform Partnership Act, General Statutes §§ 34-300 thru 34-400; and breach of fiduciary duty. The remedies sought are an accounting, the imposition of a constructive trust, injunctive relief, the enforcement of partner and partnership rights under § 34-339, and monetary damages. The defendant's counterclaim also seeks an accounting from the plaintiff, the appointment of a receiver, dissolution of the partnership, and imposition of a constructive trust.
General Statutes § 52-215 states, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll cases . . . in which an account is demanded and judgment rendered that the defendant shall account . . . shall, with all issues of law and issues of fact . . . which may be joined in actions entered on the docket as jury cases, be disposed of as court cases." (Emphasis added.) This language has been part of our statutory law at least since 1888, see General Statutes (1888 Rev.) § 1030, and it was probably part of the great reform of our legal system known as the Practice Act of 1879, which, among other modernizations, allowed legal and equitable jurisdiction to obtain in the same action. E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 1997), § 31, pp. 95-96.
The court construes § 52-215 to specify that if legal claims, which might otherwise carry the right to a jury trial, are joined with a claim for an accounting, and the accounting will have a bearing on any judgment rendered on the other claims, there is no statutory right to a jury trial of any issues, and the case will "be disposed of as [a] court [case]."
This interpretation finds support in case law where the equitable claim of an accounting is joined with legal claims. In Bristol v. Pitchard, 81 Conn. 451 (1908), the plaintiff requested both equitable relief and monetary damages for alleged fraud and filed a jury claim. CT Page 1984 The trial court refused to afford a jury trial, and the plaintiff appealed from this denial. Citing the predecessor to § 52-215, our Supreme Court held that, by statute, it was within the trial court's discretion whether to try issues or claims to the jury because the essence of the relief sought was equitable. Id., 453.
In 1930, our Supreme Court considered a case in which the plaintiff sought monetary damages for conversion as well as an accounting. Bennett v. United Lumber and Supply Co., 110 Conn. 536 (1930). Recounting the length and complexity of the evidence and observing that the conversion count was contingent on the outcome of any accounting, the Court stated, "No action for an accounting, or one of this character, should be tried to the jury." Id., 538 (emphasis added).
A trial court decision in 1938 held that if "the predominant issue presented is whether or not the defendant should account to the plaintiff and, if so," whether such accounting "is necessary in order that any judgment of a proper amount be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, or . . . in favor of the defendant," the case ought to be tried to the court and not a jury. Stow v. Groton Savings Bank, 6 Conn.Sup. 193, 194 (1938). This was so even though the complaint contained counts asking for monetary damages for breach of contract and conversion, id., and even though the complaint was "skillfully drawn so as to set forth issues of law and not issues in equity, thus apparently giving the plaintiff the constitutional right to a trial by jury." Id. Close scrutiny of the pleadings entitled the court to conclude that the equitable remedy of an accounting was at the core of the case. Id.
A similar conclusion was reached in Kapitzke v. Mills Co., 7 Conn.Sup. 46 (1939), where the trial court found no right to a jury trial despite the presence of a claim for monetary damages as well as an accounting. Id.
More recently, our Supreme Court reiterated the principle that where the predominant issue in a case is the outcome of an accounting, no jury trial is available. United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34 (1985). In a six-count counterclaim, the defendant sought monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty in the management of a trust and for the failure to disburse trust assets. Id., 36. The original complaint sought approval of an accounting. Id. The trial court refused to allow a jury trial on the counterclaims, and the defendant appealed on that issue, among others. Id., 37.
The Supreme Court ruled that the jury claim "is defeated by the CT Page 1985 essentially equitable nature of the counterclaim." Id., 44. The Court noted further that "[w]hen legal and equitable issues are combined in a single action, whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims." Id., 45. The weighing of relative importance "must be performed in the context of the pleadings when read as a whole." Id. "The form of the relief demanded is not dispositive." Id., 45.
Applying these principles to the present case, both the plaintiff and the defendant demand an accounting from each other. Whether partnership assets are missing or were misused will depend greatly on the result of such an accounting, as will the amount misappropriated or misapplied, if any. Clearly, any "proper judgment" rendered for either side of this litigation will depend on the outcome of the accounting. The resolution of the other, statutory claims will also be contingent on that outcome. It should be noted that the imposition of a constructive trust, the appointment of a receiver, the dissolution of the partnership, and the issuance of an injunction are also equitable or special statutory remedies for which no jury trial obtains.
Because the nonjury issues predominate, the motion to strike the jury claim is granted.
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