Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
To prevail in an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession, and that the attorney's breach of that duty proximately caused the plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages ( see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442). To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the attorney's negligence ( id. at 442). To make a prima facie showing on a motion for summary judgment, the attorney must present admissible evidence that the plaintiff cannot prove at least one of the essential elements of a legal malpractice claim ( see Levy v Greenberg, 19 AD3d 462; Crawford v McBride, 303 AD2d 442; Shopsin v Siben Siben, 268 AD2d 578; Ippolito v McCormack, Damiani, Lowe Mellon, 265 AD2d 303).
Here, on their motion, the defendants Pena Kahn, Steven L. Kahn, and Jesus Pena (hereinafter the defendants) demonstrated their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324), by establishing, prima facie, that their conduct was not a proximate cause of any loss to the plaintiff ( see Goldberg v Lenihan, 38 AD3d 598, 599). Since, in opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324), the Supreme Court correctly granted the defendants' motion ( see Goldberg v Lenihan, 38 AD3d at 599).