JOHN SCHWARTZ, Bankruptcy Judge
This matter comes before the court on the motion filed by plaintiff Andrew J. Maxwell, as Trustee of the estates of marchFirst, et. al. ("Trustee") for summary judgment on his complaint against defendant Premier Systems Consulting Services, Inc. ("Premier"). The complaint alleges that marchFirst, Inc. and its subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively, "Debtor") made a preferential transfer to Premier in the amount of $25,200 as such transfers are defined under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq.
The court has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and Fed.R.Bank.P. 7001 et seq. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2), (A) (F) and (O) in which this court is empowered to enter final judgment. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
Findings of Fact
The following facts are uncontested. On April 12, 2001 ("Petition Date"), the Debtor commenced its bankruptcy cases in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ("Delaware Court") by voluntarily filing petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor moved to convert its cases to cases under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and on April 26, 2001, the cases were converted. By order dated July 10, 2001, the Delaware Court transferred the cases to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. On July 16, 2001, the Trustee was appointed to serve as successor Chapter 7 trustee.
Premier is an Oklahoma corporation doing business at 2223 Terra Ridge Drive, Vienna, Virginia. During the 90 days preceding the Petition Date, the Debtor made one transfer to Premier in the amount of $25,200 ("Transfer"). The Transfer was made via Debtor check no. 163887. The check cleared on February 8, 2001. The Transfer was made to pay Premier's invoice no. 46, dated December 22, 2000.
The Transfer was made to or for the benefit of Premier. The Transfer was made to pay an antecedent debt owed by the Debtor to Premier. By operation of § 547(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is presumed to have been insolvent during the 90 days preceding the Petition Date. Under the agreement between Premier and the Debtor, payment of Premier's invoices was duc upon receipt. The Transfer was made at least 48 days after the date of the relevant invoice.
Because the Debtor is presumed to have been insolvent at the time of the Transfers, by definition holders of non-priority general unsecured claims against the Debtor at the time of the Transfers would not have received full payment on account of their claims had the Debtor been a debtor in Chapter 7 at that time and had the Transfers not been made. Based on the information presently known, pre-petition general unsecured creditors cannot reasonably be expected to receive full payment of their claims in the Debtor's case. Had the Transfer not been made, Premier would have held a non-priority general unsecured claim against the Debtor's estate for the amount of the Transfer.
The Trustee made a written demand upon Premier to repay the Transfer by letter dated September 27, 2002. Premier did not repay the Transfer at that time and has not repaid the Transfer since that time.
This proceeding was commenced by the filing of an adversary complaint on February 22, 2003. Premier filed its answer on August 16, 2004.
This motion for summary judgment was filed on September 27, 2007, including a Statement of Uncontested Facts pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 7056-1. A briefing schedule was set by order entered on October 25, 2007. Premier did not respond to the motion for summary judgment and did not appear at the last scheduled hearing.
Conclusions of Law
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), applicable to adversary proceedings by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056; Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Wade v. Lerner New York. Inc., 243 F.3d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 2001).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) also provides that "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere . . . denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party."
Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 7056-1, the moving party is required to file with its motion a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue, including specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts. The party opposing a summary judgment motion is required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 7056-2 to respond "to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement" and to make "specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." Local Bankr. R. 7056-2A(2)(a). Most importantly, "[a]ll material facts set forth in the [7056-1] statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party." Local Bankr. R. 7056-2B.
Premier has not filed any response at all to the Trustee's Statement of Uncontested Facts. The Seventh Circuit has upheld strict application of local rules regarding motions for summary judgment. See Dade v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 128 F.3d 1135, 1139-1140 (7th Cir. 1997).
Compliance with the Local Rules is not a mere technicality. The Court relies greatly upon the information presented in these statements in separating the facts about which there is a genuine dispute from those about which there is none.
American Ins. Co. v. Meyer Steel Drum, Inc.,
1990 WL 92882 at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1990). This Court "should not be required to guess whether the facts asserted by the opposing part[y] are in direct conflict or scour the record in search of a party's evidence."
Fotsch v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
1995 WL 238677 at *1, n.l (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1995).
In re Szombathy,
1996 WL 417121, *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 9, 1996) (discussing Local Bankr. R. 402, the predecessor to Local Bankr. R. 7056),
rev `d on other grounds by Szombathy v. Controlled Shredders. Inc.,
1997 WL 189314 (N.D. Ill. April 14, 1997). Because the Debtors failed to comply with Rule 7056-2, all material facts set forth in the Trustee's 7056-1 statement arc deemed admitted.
Nevertheless, a federal court may not grant summary judgment without first determining if the moving party has met its burden to show that no material issue of fact remains for trial. Amaker v. Foley. C.O., 274 F.3d 677 (2nd Cir. 2001), citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970). See also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) with the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1963 Amendments and E.E.O.C. v. Scars, Roebuck Co., 839 F.2d 302, 354 (7th Cir. 1988).
Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs avoidable preferential transfers, requires that the Trustee demonstrate five elements to avoid a transfer: (1) the transfer was to a creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor prior to the transfer; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) on or within 90 days before the Petition Date, and (5) that enables the creditor to receive more than it would receive if the case had already been a case under Chapter 7, the transfer had not been made and the creditor received what it would have received under the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to § 547(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer by a preponderance of the evidence. See Field v. Lebanon Citizens National Bank (In re Knee), 254 B.R. 710, 712 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000).
The unrebutted evidence submitted by the Trustee demonstrates the following. During the 90 days preceding the Petition Date, the Debtor made the Transfer. The Transfer was made in payment of the invoice. The Transfer was made to Premier. The Transfer was made to pay an antecedent debt owed by the Debtor to Premier. By operation of § 547(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is presumed to have been insolvent during the 90 days preceding the Petition Date. The presumption has not been rebutted.
Because the Debtor is presumed to have been insolvent at the time of the Transfer, by definition holders of non-priority general unsecured claims against the Debtor at the time of the Transfer would not have received full payment on account of their claims had the Debtor been a debtor in Chapter 7 at that time and had the Transfer not been made. Based on the information presently known to the Trustee, pre-petition general unsecured creditors cannot reasonably be expected to receive full payment of their claims in the Debtor's case. Had the Transfer not been made, Premier would have held only a non-priority general unsecured claim against the Debtor for the amount of the Transfer.
Accordingly, the Trustee's motion for summary judgment is supported as required by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056 and Premier failed to set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Trustee's motion will be granted by separate order.