CHEW v. SHELDON, N.Y., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Edmund B. Jenks and Eugene Clinton for appellant. Jared T. Newman for Herbert C. Sheldon, respondent. Milo C. Paige for Carrie A. Sheldon, respondent.

Judges

William H. Cuddeback
Willard Bartlett

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Anson S. Sheldon died in 1907, leaving a will made in 1903 that devised all his property to his wife Juliaette, while providing that his daughter Carrie A. Sheldon should have a home and support in the house on the farm owned at his death, or elsewhere if the wife moved. At the time of his death, the estate consisted primarily of a 103-acre farm and personal property. The plaintiff, Ida A. Chew, and defendant Herbert C. Sheldon were heirs at law but not mentioned in the will, while defendant Carrie A. Sheldon was provided for in the will.

After the testator's wife died, Carrie resided alone on the farm and received support therefrom with the acquiescence of the other parties until April 1909. Carrie had minimal personal property and relied on the will’s provision for support. The plaintiff brought an action seeking a sale of the farm and division of proceeds, alleging that partition could not be made without prejudice. Defendants resisted, arguing that a sale would violate the will’s provision granting Carrie a home and support.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a sale of the farm and division of proceeds despite the will’s provision granting the daughter a home and support on the farm.
Whether the directions in the will for the daughter's support and maintenance are void or repugnant to the devise of the farm to the wife.
Whether the daughter's interest in the farm constitutes a lien or charge that binds the property and precludes partition or sale free of her claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The farm should be sold and proceeds divided among the parties because actual partition is impractical.
The provision for the daughter’s support is void or repugnant to the prior fee devise to the wife.
The bequest to the daughter lapsed with the lapse of the devise to the wife, thus freeing the property from her claim.

Respondents' Arguments

The sale of the farm would violate the will’s provision granting Carrie a home and support, thus should be denied.
The daughter’s interest constitutes a personal lien or charge on the property, binding it and preventing partition or sale that cuts off her claim.
The testator intended to provide for both his wife and daughter, and the will should be construed to give effect to both provisions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Smith v. Smith, 10 Paige 470	Right to partition among tenants in common at common law and by statute	Established the general right to partition where parties do not wish to hold property in common
Van Arsdale v. Drake, 2 Barb. 599	Same as above regarding partition rights	Supported the principle that partition is a right absent restrictions
Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116	Partition rights and limitations imposed by conditions or restrictions	Reinforced that equity will not order partition violating conditions imposed on the estate
Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 338, 354	Equity will not award partition violating conditions imposed on estate	Supported refusal to partition when conditions or restrictions exist
Kepley v. Overton, 74 Ind. 448	Same principle as Dee v. Dee	Used to affirm equitable limitations on partition
Serena v. Moore, 69 N.J. Eq. 687	Equitable restrictions on partition	Supported the court’s approach to partition limits
Holden v. Rush, 119 App. Div. 716	Equity’s refusal to partition violating restrictions	Applied to uphold the daughter’s claim against partition
Tucker v. Tucker, 122 App. Div. 308	Same as above	Supported court’s reasoning
Buschmann v. McDermott, 154 App. Div. 515	Equity’s role in partition disputes with restrictions	Reinforced principles applied
Thurber v. Chambers, 66 N.Y. 42	Daughter’s personal interest constituted a lien or charge on the land	Cited to support the characterization of the daughter’s interest and its binding effect
Borst v. Crommie, 19 Hun 209	Tenants in common subject to partition or sale with conditions	Supported the court’s view on rights of tenants in common
Kelsey v. Western, 2 N.Y. 500, 508	Characterization of daughter’s interest as a lien	Used to affirm the binding nature of the daughter’s claim
Kingman v. Kingman, 121 Mass. 249	Daughter’s interest as an easement or servitude	Referenced in dissent to analogize the nature of the daughter’s interest
Matter of Title G. T. Co., 195 N.Y. 339	Will construction to give effect to all parts	Applied to reject argument that provisions were repugnant
Scott v. Stebbins, 91 N.Y. 605, 615	Same as above	Supported favorable construction of the will
Sherrer v. Bartlett, 45 App. Div. 135	Will construction principles	Reinforced court’s interpretive approach
Birdsall v. Hewlett, 1 Paige 32	Independence of the daughter’s lien from the devise to the wife	Confirmed that the lien did not lapse with the devise

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recognized the general right of tenants in common to partition or sale of property but emphasized that equity will not allow partition that violates a condition or restriction imposed upon the estate by the party through whom the claimant derives title. The will devised the farm to the wife but charged it with the burden of providing a home and support for the daughter Carrie. Since the wife predeceased the testator, the daughter's right to a home and support became enforceable against the farm itself as a personal lien or charge.

The court found that selling the farm would defeat the testator’s clear intention to provide for Carrie’s support and home. The proceeds of sale would be insufficient to provide the intended support, whereas the farm itself, occupied and maintained by Carrie, could provide adequate support. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the daughter’s bequest was void or lapsed, holding that the provisions were harmonious and should be construed to give effect to all parts of the will.

Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff’s demand for a sale free of the daughter’s claim must be denied, but that the complaint should not be dismissed entirely. Instead, a sale subject to the daughter’s lien and right to possession for her support should be allowed, as the parties were tenants in common with partition rights subject to equitable restrictions.

Holding and Implications

The court reversed the judgment appealed from and granted a new trial with costs to abide the final award. It held that the farm could be sold, but only subject to the daughter Carrie A. Sheldon’s personal lien and right to possession for her maintenance and home. The decision enforces the testator’s intent to provide for the daughter’s support through a charge on the property and limits the plaintiff’s right to partition accordingly.

No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming established principles regarding equitable restrictions on partition and the interpretation of testamentary provisions as liens or charges on property.

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IDA A. CHEW, Appellant, v. HERBERT C. SHELDON et al., Respondents.

CUDDEBACK, J.

Anson S. Sheldon died in the year 1907, leaving a last will and testament made in 1903, whereby he devised all his property, both real and personal, to his wife Juliaette, and made the following provision for his daughter Carrie A. Sheldon:

" Second. My daughter Carrie shall have a home and support in the house on the farm that I shall own at my decease, or, if after my decease, my wife shall deem it necessary to remove to some other place, my daughter shall be provided with a home and support by my wife Juliaette."

At the time of making the will, the testator was the owner of a farm containing about 103 acres, and worth about $1,800. His estate at the time of his death consisted of the farm and of personal property of the value of about $550. His heirs at law were the plaintiff, Ida A. Chew, the defendant Herbert C. Sheldon, neither of whom is mentioned in the will, and the defendant Carrie A. Sheldon in whose favor provision for a home and support was made.

The defendant Carrie A. Sheldon was about fifty years old when her father died. She had never married but had always resided at home with her parents. The testator's other children, the plaintiff and the defendant Herbert C. Sheldon, left home when comparatively young. The testator's wife died before her husband and thereafter and until the demise of the testator the daughter Carrie resided alone with him on the farm referred to in the will. After her father's death she continued to occupy the farm as her home and had her support therefrom with the acquiescence of all the other parties to the action until April, 1909. She had no property except about three or four hundred dollars, which she had saved, and that, together with the provision in the will, were her only means of support.

The plaintiff brings this action for a sale of the farm and a division of the proceeds of the sale among the parties to the action, and for an accounting. It is alleged in the complaint, and the court has found as a fact, that the farm is so situated that actual partition thereof cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners. The action is resisted by the defendant Carrie A. Sheldon on the ground that a sale as demanded in the complaint would be in violation of the provisions of the will giving her a home on the farm and maintenance therefrom, and the defendant Herbert C. Sheldon joins in that defense.

It is a well-settled rule that at common law, as well as by statute, partition among tenants in common of real property is a matter of right, where they do not desire to hold and use the property in common. ( Smith v. Smith, 10 Paige, 470; Van Arsdale v. Drake, 2 Barb. 599; Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116.) But it is an equally well-settled rule that "equity will not award partition at the suit of one in violation of his own agreement, or in violation of a condition or restriction imposed upon the estate by one through whom he claims." ( Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 338, 354; Kepley v. Overton, 74 Ind. 448; Serena v. Moore, 69 N.J. Eq. 687; Latshaw's Appeal, 122 Penn. St. 142; Swaine v. Denby, L.R. [14 Ch. Div.] 326; Holden v. Rush, 119 App. Div. 716; Tucker v. Tucker, 122 App. Div. 308; Buschmann v. McDermott, 154 App. Div. 515; and cases cited in 30 Cyc. 185.)

It is apparent from a reading of the will that the especial objects of the testator's bounty were his wife and the daughter who had remained at home. He makes no mention of his other children who went away early in life. He gave all his property, real and personal, to his wife, but charged the real estate with the burden of providing a home and means of support for the daughter. The home was to be in the house on the farm, and the support was to come from the farm. The only way in which the daughter could be deprived of this home and means of support was by the act of the mother, who might remove from the farm, in which case she was required to provide a home and support for her daughter in some other way. The death of the mother took away the only person who could defeat the daughter's claims upon the land. The daughter took no estate in the land but a personal interest or bequest which constituted a lien or charge thereon. ( Thurber v. Chambers, 66 N.Y. 42; Borst v. Crommie, 19 Hun, 209; Kelsey v. Western, 2 N.Y. 500, 508; Kingman v. Kingman, 121 Mass. 249.)

The amount and value of the testator's estate were proved, as has been mentioned, and it is manifest that if the farm were sold and the entire proceeds devoted to the purpose of providing a home and support for the daughter, they would be entirely inadequate; whereas, the farm itself now provides a home, and with the personal exertions of the daughter it can be made to provide sufficient for her support.

A sale of the farm which carries with it and cuts off the claim of the testator's daughter Carrie to support and maintenance, will entirely defeat the scheme and intention of the testator, and the plaintiff's demand for relief to that extent should be denied.

The plaintiff argues further that the property may be sold free from the claim of the defendant Carrie A. Sheldon, upon the ground that the directions in the will for her support and maintenance are void as being repugnant to the prior devise of the farm in fee to the testator's wife. And also that the bequest in favor of the daughter lapsed with the lapse of the devise to the wife. That argument again runs counter to the manifest intention of the testator. As has been already said, the testator was desirous not only of properly caring for his wife, but of providing a home and means of support for his daughter as well, and his will should receive the most favorable construction to accomplish the purpose intended. There is nothing repugnant between the provisions of the will giving the testator's property to his wife, and charging the property in her hands with the maintenance of the daughter. Full effect can be given to every part of the instrument, and that the law requires in every case. ( Matter of Title G. T. Co., 195 N.Y. 339; Scott v. Stebbins, 91 N.Y. 605, 615; Sherrer v. Bartlett, 45 App. Div. 135. ) The bequest to the daughter of a lien on the farm was not so dependent on the devise to the wife as to lapse with the lapse of the devise. It was independent, and was binding on the farm in whosesoever hands the land might come. ( Thurber v. Chambers, 66 N.Y. 42, 48; Birdsall v. Hewlett, 1 Paige, 32.)

The complaint of the plaintiff, however, should not have been dismissed altogether, but judgment should have been given for a sale of the farm subject to the personal lien and claim of the defendant Carrie A. Sheldon for her maintenance and a home thereon with the right to possession of the farm for the purposes of her lien and claim. The plaintiff and her sister, the defendant Carrie, and her brother Herbert C. Sheldon, were the owners as tenants in common of the farm, and their interests as such tenants in common were subject to partition or to a sale and division of the proceeds if actual partition could not be made. ( Borst v. Crommie, supra; Code C.P. § 1539.)

I recommend that the judgment appealed from be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the final award of costs.

WILLARD BARTLETT, Ch. J. (dissenting).

In Kingman v. Kingman ( 121 Mass. 249) the testator gave to his daughter "the use and improvement of so much of my house as she may need during her life, and also a privilege at the fire, which I have made for my wife, while they live together." The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the daughter took an interest in the nature of an easement or servitude under this provision of her father's will. I think that Carrie Sheldon took a similar easement or servitude under the will in the present case. As our brother CUDDEBACK has correctly said, equity will not award partition in violation of a condition or restriction imposed upon the estate by one through whom a party claims. I think such a condition is imposed by the second paragraph of the will. Carrie was to have a home and part in the house on the farm that her father owned at his decease. The facts proved upon the trial show that she can obtain adequate support by remaining on the farm and living in the house; but that if the property is sold the income from the proceeds will not suffice to support her. Under these circumstances in order to carry out the intention of the testator and give the daughter the support which he clearly contemplated, it is essential that the farm should remain in her possession and that she should live there. Such possession on her part and residence there are inconsistent with the idea of any partition and sale of the premises during her lifetime unless such sale is made with her consent. If she has the right, as I think she has, to remain there and receive all the rents and profits to her own use as long as she lives, it is unreasonable to suppose that any bidder at a partition sale would give anything for the property except what it might be worth after the termination of the easement or servitude in her favor. This value would be so difficult to ascertain that it seems to me preferable to hold that the nature of the charge upon the estate precludes a partition during her lifetime without the daughter's consent. If this view is correct the judgment should be affirmed instead of being reversed.

HISCOCK, COLLIN, HOGAN, CARDOZO and SEABURY, JJ., concur with CUDDEBACK, J.; WILLARD BARTLETT, Ch. J., reads dissenting memorandum.

Judgment reversed, etc.

CHEW v. SHELDON