JAMES WHITTEMORE, District Judge
BEFORE THE COURT is the Report and Recommendation submitted by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins recommending that Defendants School Board, Norris, and Lempe's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15) and Defendants Alexander and Houston's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 16) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Dkt. 30). Specifically, the magistrate judge recommends that Count I of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed with leave to amend and Counts II and III be dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. 30). The magistrate judge recommends Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts IV and V be denied because these counts sufficiently state claims against Alexander and Houston. (Dkt. 30).
Neither party filed written objections to the Report and Recommendation and the time for doing so has expired. After careful consideration of the Report and Recommendation in conjunction with an independent examination of the file, this Court is of the opinion that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted, confirmed, and approved in all respects. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
1) The Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 30) is adopted, confirmed, and approved in all respects and is made a part of this Order for all purposes, including appellate review.
2) Defendants School Board, Norris, and Lempe's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15) is GRANTED. Counts II (defamation) and III (negligent training) are DISMISSED with prejudice. The School Board, Norris, and Lempe are entitled to immunity from Plaintiff's defamation and negligent training claims. Count I (impairment of contract on the basis of race) is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff shall have seven (7) days from the date of this Order to file a Second Amended Complaint amending Plaintiff's Section 1981 claim to reference the proper federal remedial statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1983, and to meet the heightened pleading requirements for civil rights cases that implicate qualified immunity.
3) Defendants Alexander and Houston's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 16) is DENIED. Counts IV (tortious interference) and Count V (slander/libel) sufficiently state claims for relief against Defendants Houston and Alexander. Assuming Plaintiff properly pleads her Section 1981 claim, these claims arise from the same nucleus of operative fact and thus this court has the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida.