Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant's challenge to the judgment convicting him of a single count of criminal contempt in the first degree ( see Penal Law § 215.51 [c]), upon his plea of guilty, is barred because the plea encompassed a waiver of the right to appeal, and the waiver was knowingly, voluntary, and intelligently made ( see People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 11).
There is no merit to the defendant's challenge to the judgment convicting him of three counts of criminal contempt in the first degree ( see Penal Law § 215.51 [b], [c]), two counts of endangering the welfare of a child ( see Penal Law § 260.10), and resisting arrest ( see Penal Law § 205.30), upon a jury verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v Calabria, 3 NY3d 80, 81-82). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power ( see CPL 470.15), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643).
The sentences imposed were not excessive ( see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).