McCULLOUGH, Judge.
On 19 February 2007, defendant Andrew Bernard Matthews was indicted for possession of a stolen motor vehicle and being an habitual felon. The case was tried at the 1 May 2007 Criminal Session of Guilford County Superior Court.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following:. On 21 January 2007, Ricky Levon Wall reported to police that his car, a 1993 Nissan Sentra, was stolen from his apartment complex in Greensboro, North Carolina. That same day, police sent out an alert to be on the lookout for the stolen automobile. Early in the morning of 22 January 2007, Officer Jeff Kropelnicki of the Greensboro Police Department was on patrol in an area near Wall's apartment. While he was stopped at a stoplight, Officer Kropelnicki observed a vehicle similar to the one reported stolen by Wall stopped at the stoplight in the opposite direction. As the light turned green and the car passed by him, Officer Kropelnicki observed defendant operating the vehicle and a white female in the passenger seat. He looked in his side view mirror and saw the first three numerals on the vehicle's license tag were the same as on the stolen vehicle. Officer Kropelnicki turned his patrol car around to follow the vehicle. He then verified that the tag matched the license tag of the stolen vehicle.
Officer Kropelnicki followed the stolen car until it abruptly pulled into the parking lot of the Raleigh Street Pool Room. The business was closed at the time and the parking lot was empty. Defendant immediately exited the vehicle. Officer Kropelnicki activated his blue lights, approached defendant and ordered him to "get on the ground." Defendant jumped back into the vehicle. Officer Kropelnicki ordered both defendant and the passenger to raise their hands and get out of the car and told defendant he was under arrest. Defendant refused to exit the car, and Officer Kropelnicki sprayed him with pepper spray. Defendant then attempted to go out the passenger door, yelling at his passenger to get out of the car while he tried to push her out of the car. Officer Kropelnicki ran to the passenger side of the vehicle, at which time defendant exited back out of the driver's side door and began to run. Officer Kropelnicki chased after him. Defendant eventually fell and Officer Kropelnicki got on top of him. Defendant continued to resist, and Officer Kropelnicki struck him two to three times in his right thigh with a "mag light." He then handcuffed defendant. After arresting defendant, Officer Kropelnicki examined the interior of the stolen vehicle. He described the ignition, steering column, and plastic trim as "busted," and testified that there was a black and yellow handled screwdriver "stuck" in the remnants of the ignition.
Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. Defendant testified that a friend asked him to take the friend's girlfriend to the store to get some beer or cigarettes. Defendant stated he had only been driving the car for less than five minutes when he was stopped by police. Defendant further stated that he ran from police because he was driving without a license and did not want to go to jail.
Defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and pled guilty to being an habitual felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 107 to 138 months' imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At trial, counsel elicited from defendant that he had prior convictions in 1994 for possession of cocaine, driving while license revoked, and possession of drug paraphernalia, as well as a 1996 conviction for forgery and uttering. Counsel further elicited from defendant that he was imprisoned in 1996 and released in December of 2005 and that he used crack cocaine. Defendant concedes that the State could have questioned him regarding the 1994 possession of cocaine conviction and the 1996 conviction on cross-examination. Defendant asserts, however, that counsel was ineffective by eliciting the other convictions, the length of his sentence, and his drug use because it undermined his credibility.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that his counsel's performance was deficient and that his case was prejudiced from his counsel's alleged deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984); State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985). In the case sub judice, defendant contends that counsel was ineffective by eliciting evidence of his prior convictions and drug abuse. We disagree. It is apparent from the record that counsel employed a strategy of minimizing defendant's weak points by preemptively bringing forward defendant's prior record on direct examination, knowing that much of the information was open to the State during cross-examination. "Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not intended to promote judicial second-guessing on questions of strategy and trial tactics." State v. Brindle, 66 N.C. App. 716, 718, 311 S.E.2d 692, 693-94 (1984). Therefore, this Court does not second-guess trial counsel's decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy. State v. Lowery, 318 N.C. 54, 68, 347 S.E.2d 729, 739 (1986); State v. Campbell, 142 N.C. App. 145, 152, 541 S.E.2d 803, 807 (2001). Accordingly, we find no error.
No error.
Judges HUNTER and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).