Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree for the shooting death of the victim. The defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury became deadlocked. At the conclusion of the second trial, the defendant was convicted of both murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, his retrial did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. A retrial is not barred by the double jeopardy clause if it is granted after a trial judge discharges a genuinely deadlocked jury. "Generally, the declaration of a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury is a matter of discretion for the Trial Judge, who is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is required under the circumstances of the case, and this decision must be accorded great deference" ( Matter of Jeffrey v Firetog, 45 AD3d 770, 770, quoting Matter of Martin v Hynes, 259 AD2d 547, 548; see Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, 63 NY2d 243). Here, the jury in the defendant's first trial deliberated for three days, and reported its inability to reach a verdict a total of four times.
After receiving the jury's third note indicating their inability to reach a unanimous verdict, the trial court provided an Allen instruction ( see Allen v United States, 164 US 492). Only after the jury sent its fourth note stating that the jurors were resolute in their decisions and remained deadlocked did the court declare a mistrial. Under these circumstances, the jury appeared to be genuinely deadlocked, and it would have served no purpose to require it to continue deliberations ( see CPL 310.60 [a]; Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, 63 NY2d 243; Matter of Smith v Marrus, 33 AD3d 708, 709; Matter of Brown v Brown, 263 AD2d 455; Matter of Martin v Hynes, 259 AD2d 547). Accordingly, the court providently exercised its discretion in declaring a mistrial, and no bar to the defendant's retrial existed.
We reject the defendant's contention that the court should have declared a mistrial during his second trial because a witness was identified as a "Corrections Counselor," and thereafter made a brief reference to "inmates." Although the defendant alleges that this evidence implied that he had a criminal record, any prejudice was alleviated by the court's prompt curative instructions ( see People v Young, 48 NY2d 995; People v Smith, 299 AD2d 500; People v Carillo, 297 AD2d 288; People v Boston, 296 AD2d 576).
The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel at his second trial ( see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147).