Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In order to vacate her default in appearing at a scheduled court conference, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear and a meritorious cause of action ( see Francis v Long Is. Coll. Hosp., 45 AD3d 529; McClaren v Bell Atl., 30 AD3d 569; Rein v Zeno, 23 AD3d 351). What constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the trial court ( see Hegarty v Bailee, 18 AD3d 706; Beizer v Funk, 5 AD3d 619), and in exercising this discretion the trial court may accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse ( see CPLR 2005; White v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 41 AD3d 709). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in accepting the plaintiffs explanation for her default in appearing at a scheduled court conference with substitute counsel. Moreover, there was no evidence that the plaintiff intended to abandon the action, that the default was willful, or that the appellant was prejudiced ( see White v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 41 AD3d 709; Beizer v Funk, 5 AD3d 619). Further, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated a meritorious cause of action.
Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs motion to vacate her default in appearing at a scheduled court conference and to restore the action to the calendar. Fisher, J.P., Ritter, Florio and Carni, JJ., concur.