A servant of the defendant summoned the plaintiff, a physician, to attend McD, a fellow workman who had been seriously injured while engaged in his night work in the defendant's mill. He continued to care for McD for a period of two months. A few days after the accident one C, the defendant's bookkeeper, visited the plaintiff to obtain information for the defendant regarding McD's injuries, in order to make report thereof to an insurance company, and in the course of the interview told the plaintiff that the defendant would be responsible for his services; and the defendant's president knew of said injuries and that the plaintiff was attending McD, and frequently talked with the plaintiff about McD's condition. The plaintiff having rendered to the defendant a bill for his services, sent by mail in a letter addressed to the defendant, received in reply a letter upon the defendant's letter-head, with the defendant's name thereto signed by C, requesting a detailed bill, and stating that "if you can modify this bill in any way it would be much appreciated as it looks now as though we would be forced to stand the full charge ourselves." The only evidence offered by the defendant in its behalf was that its board of directors had never voted to authorize or to ratify the employment of the plaintiff or to pay for his services. Held that the trial court was justified in finding that the defendant knew of C's representation to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff's letter was received by the officer in charge of the defendant's business, that the reply letter was written by C by the direction and authority of such officer, that the plaintiff rendered his services under circumstances which justified him in believing that the defendant would pay him therefor, and that the officers of the defendant had knowledge of these circumstances, and in holding upon such facts found that the defendant had obligated itself to pay the plaintiff for his services by the assumption as its own of the assurance of its responsibility for the care of its servant which was given by its bookkeeper and upon the faith of which the plaintiff acted. The testimony disclosing C's conversation with the plaintiff, the interviews between the plaintiff and the defendant's president, and the contents of the letter above recited, was properly received as having a material bearing upon the defendant's knowledge and conduct.
PRENTICE, J.
The facts stated in the two concluding paragraphs of the finding having been found, the court's judgment was properly rendered. The situation thus presented is in such striking analogy to that in General Hospital Society v. New Haven Rendering Co., 79 Conn. 581, 65 A. 1065, that the reasoning by which the judgment in that case was supported is conclusive of the correctness of this. It need not be repeated. The foundation of the defendant's liability is not to be found in any express promise or direct assumption of obligation. The court has found none, and has carefully avoided resting its judgment upon one. What the court has found, and what it made the basis of its judgment, is certain knowledge and conduct on the part of the defendant leading to the ultimate conclusion that it had assumed as its own the assurance of its responsibility for the care of its servant given by its bookkeeper to the plaintiff, and upon the faith of which he acted. General Hospital Society v. New Haven Rendering Co., 79 Conn. 581, 586, 65 A. 1065.
The testimony objected to was properly received. No part of it, of course, was competent to show an express promise by the defendant to pay for the plaintiff's services, or an obligation to do so directly assumed by ratification or otherwise, since no authority to make such promise, or to incur such obligation, was shown in any person who undertook to speak upon the subject. But it was neither received nor used for any such purpose. Its relevancy arose from the fact that it had, as was shown in the case cited, a material bearing upon the pertinent matter of knowledge and conduct, and as furnishing a basis for material inferences in respect thereto. Each matter was "one link in a chain of circumstances which establishes a liability in the defendant not founded on its direct promise."
Upon the evidence, the court's ultimate conclusion, embodied in the last two paragraphs of the finding, which we are asked to correct, was justified. The opinion in the case cited sufficiently demonstrates that fact. One other paragraph of the finding which we are asked to correct is fully supported by the testimony. The changes asked for by reason of the court's failure to incorporate in the finding certain paragraphs of the defendant's draft-finding would not, if made, materially alter the situation as we have presented it. The requests to correct are denied.