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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Virginia L. Ricketts, administratrix of the estate of Mary Lenore Williamson, filed suit on September 20, 2005, alleging negligence, gross negligence, violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act, and survival and wrongful death claims arising from Ms. Williamson's residency at Christian Care Center of Cheatham County. Ms. Williamson was admitted June 20, 2002; on August 13, 2003 Ms. Ricketts signed a new admission agreement as her mother's "representative," which contained an arbitration provision. Ms. Williamson resided at the facility until April 6, 2005, and died May 12, 2005. The defendants moved to compel arbitration; the trial court initially denied the motion (citing Raiteri), later reconsidered (citing Owens) and ordered arbitration. Ms. Ricketts obtained permission to bring an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding the signer lacked authority to bind the decedent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in reconsidering and reversing its December 9, 2005 order denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Ricketts had the authority to sign the admission agreement on behalf of her mother.
  3. Whether the arbitration provisions were unconscionable.
  4. Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-101 prevents enforcement of an arbitration agreement executed by a health care surrogate on behalf of an incompetent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Ms. Ricketts)

  • Ms. Ricketts raised the four issues summarized above on appeal, including that she lacked authority to sign the admission agreement and questions about unconscionability and statutory limits on enforcement.

Appellees' Arguments (Christian Care and Care Centers Management)

  • Defendants argued the admission agreement's arbitration provision was enforceable and relied on Owens to justify reconsideration of the initial denial to compel arbitration.
  • They argued Ms. Ricketts had authority to sign under the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act (Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1806(c)(1)) and that the Act should be applied retroactively.
  • They alternatively argued that Ms. Williamson was a third-party beneficiary of the admission agreement (or that a contract between Ms. Ricketts and the facility made Ms. Williamson an intended third-party beneficiary).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raiteri ex rel. Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413 Held that the patient's husband did not have authority to bind her and that mediation and arbitration terms were unenforceable. Cited as precedent finding lack of authority to sign admission agreements; discussed similarity and distinction (defendants argued Raiteri was distinguishable).
Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., No. M2005-01272-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1865009; aff'd in part, vacated in part, M2005-01272-SC-R11-CV, 2007 WL 3284669 Court of Appeals reversed trial court that found attorney-in-fact lacked authority; Supreme Court agreed attorney-in-fact had authority but remanded to consider unconscionability. Defendants relied on Owens to support reconsideration and ordering arbitration; opinion notes Owens influenced trial court's reversal of its initial denial.
Thornton v. Allenbrook Nursing Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. W2007-00950-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2687697 Discusses requirement of some basis of authority (express/oral/POA) for family member to bind patient. Cited to support conclusion that, as in Thornton, the family member who signed in this case did not have authority to act as the patient's agent.
Necessary v. Life Care Ctrs. of America, Inc., No. E2006-00453-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 3446636 Example where wife had oral express authority to sign admission documents for husband. Used to contrast situations where express authority exists with the present case where no such evidence existed.
Benton v. Vanderbilt Univ., 137 S.W.3d 614 Arbitration provision enforceable against third-party patient seeking to enforce a contract between a hospital and an insurance company. Defendants relied on Benton to argue third-party beneficiary binding; court distinguished Benton because there is no valid contract here to bind the decedent.
J.P. Morgan Chase Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596 Example from other jurisdiction recognizing third-party beneficiary theory as alternative to binding a resident. Cited as one of several out-of-jurisdiction authorities; court found such authorities unpersuasive for circumventing the requirement of surrogate authority.
Alterra Healthcare Corp v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574 Example of state appellate court finding resident to be third-party beneficiary of residency agreement. Cited among authorities the court declined to follow in applying third-party beneficiary doctrine to circumvent lack of surrogate authority.
Trinity Mission Health Rehab. of Clinton v. Estate of Johnson, No. 2006-CA-01053-COA, 2008 WL 73682 Example finding mother to be third-party beneficiary of contract between nursing home and daughter. Cited and rejected as persuasive authority for circumventing threshold requirement of valid contract between resident and facility.
Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL 2421720 Case finding no authority for son to bind mother but finding mother a third-party beneficiary of contract between son and nursing home. Cited among cases from other jurisdictions; court declined to adopt third-party beneficiary approach here.
Grenada Living Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 961 So.2d 33 (Miss. 2007) Reasoning that where nobody had authority to speak for the patient, there is no binding written contract and thus no arbitration clause enforceable against wrongful death beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals agreed with Grenada's reasoning and applied it to reject defendants' third-party beneficiary argument.
Nutt v. Champion Int'l Corp., 980 S.W.2d 365 Presumption that statutes operate prospectively unless legislature indicates otherwise; exception for remedial/procedural statutes. Used to analyze whether the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act could be applied retroactively.
Shell v. State, 893 S.W.2d 416 Authority for the exception that remedial or procedural statutes may operate retroactively. Cited in the retroactivity analysis to discuss the remedial/procedural exception.
Cabany v. Mayfield Rehab. Special Care Ctr., No. M2006-00594-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 3445550 Referenced regarding the standard of review and recognition that the Health Care Decisions Act affects personal autonomy. Applied in review standards and cited to support the conclusion that the Health Care Decisions Act implicates fundamental rights and is not remedial/procedural for retroactivity purposes.
Spann v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 224 S.W.3d 698, 706 Referenced for standards applicable to review of arbitration-related rulings. Cited in setting forth appellate review standards.
Reagan v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., No. M2006-02191-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4523092 Authority on reviewing factual findings when trial judge did not make specific findings; preponderance standard. Cited to explain the court's approach to weighing the record where trial court findings are limited.
Hardcastle v. Harris, 170 S.W.3d 67, 78-79 Discusses review when trial judge makes no specific findings of fact. Used in explaining review standard.
Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680, 682 Credibility determinations by trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal. Cited to note deference to trial court credibility findings where appropriate.
King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 318 Questions of law are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Cited regarding standard of review for legal questions.
State v. McKnight, 51 S.W.3d 559, 562 Quoted for the proposition regarding de novo review of legal questions. Used as authority for appellate review principles.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied Tennessee law (per the choice-of-law clause) and reviewed the arbitration denial under standards applicable to bench trials, citing appellate review authorities. It addressed only whether Ms. Ricketts had authority to sign the admission agreement. The court found she had no power of attorney or guardianship. It explained that, to bind the resident, the signer must have authority (express, apparent, or via POA), citing Raiteri, Thornton, and Necessary. The defendants' reliance on the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act (Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1806(c)(1)) failed because that Act did not take effect until July 1, 2004, while the agreement was signed in August 2003. The court rejected retroactive application of the Act, reasoning the statute contains no retroactivity indication, is not remedial or procedural, and affects fundamental rights (personal autonomy). The court also rejected the defendants' third-party beneficiary theory, distinguishing Benton and adopting reasoning like Grenada Living Ctr. that without a valid contract (because the signer lacked authority) there can be no arbitration clause binding the resident or wrongful death beneficiaries.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order compelling arbitration, holding that Ms. Ricketts did not have authority to sign the admission agreement on behalf of Ms. Williamson and therefore the arbitration provisions are not enforceable against Ms. Williamson's estate and wrongful death beneficiaries. Costs of appeal were assessed against the appellees. The opinion identifies the direct effect on the parties (no enforceable arbitration and reversal of the trial court) and does not purport to establish a broader new precedent beyond its analyzed holdings.

VIRGINIA L. RICKETTS ET AL. v. CHRISTIAN CARE CENTER OF CHEATHAM COUNTY, INC. ET AL.

OPINION

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE.

This is an interlocutory appeal concerning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement included in a nursing home's admission agreement. The trial court ruled that the arbitration agreement was enforceable. Because we find that the person who signed the admission agreement did not have the authority to act for the decedent, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

Virginia Ricketts is the daughter of Mary Lenore Williamson and the administratrix of Ms. Williamson's estate. Ms. Williamson was admitted to the Christian Care Center of Cheatham County ("Christian Care") on June 20, 2002. The nursing home's license holder and manager changed in 2003. On August 13, 2003, Ms. Ricketts was asked to sign a new admission agreement to readmit her mother into the facility under the new management. Ms. Ricketts signed as her mother's "representative." The admission agreement contained an arbitration provision requiring that "all disputes and disagreements between the Facility and Resident (or their respective successors, assigns or representatives) arising out of the enforcement or interpretation of this Agreement or related hereto or to the services provided by Facility . . . shall be submitted to binding arbitration. . . ." Ms. Williamson was a resident of Christian Care until April 6, 2005. She died on May 12, 2005.

On September 20, 2005, Ms. Ricketts filed this lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Williamson's estate and her wrongful death beneficiaries against Christian Care and Care Centers Management of Cheatham County, Inc., the company that owned and managed the Christian Care facility. The complaint alleged negligence; gross negligence, willful, wanton, reckless, malicious, and/or intentional conduct; negligence pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act; violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act; and survival and wrongful death claims. The complaint included the allegation that "[a]t all times during her residency, Mary Lenore Williamson was incapable of taking care of herself and incapable of attending to any business; thus she was of unsound mind as that term is used in Tenn. Code. Ann. § 28-1-106 (1999)."

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 provides:

If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either within the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or such person's representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability.

The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was initially denied by the trial court on December 9, 2005, based upon Raiteri ex rel. Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec. 30, 2003). On January 8, 2007, Christian Care filed a motion to reconsider based upon Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., No. M2005-01272-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1865009 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 30, 2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, M2005-01272-SC-R11-CV, 2007 WL 3284669 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2007) (pet. for cert. filed May 2, 2008). The trial court granted the motion to reconsider, reversed its previous decision, and ordered the parties to attend arbitration. On August 31, 2007, the court granted Ms. Ricketts' motion for permission to file this interlocutory appeal.

In Raiteri, the court held that the patient's husband did not have the authority to bind her to the admission agreement and that the mediation and arbitration terms of the agreement were unenforceable. Raiteri, 2003 WL 23094413, at *9.

The Court of Appeals in Owens reversed the trial court's decision that the patient's attorney-in-fact did not have the authority to sign the arbitration agreement and remanded for an order compelling arbitration. Owens, 2006 WL 1865009, at *10. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the patient's attorney-in-fact had authority to sign the arbitration agreement, but remanded for further proceedings on the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Owens, 2007 WL 3284669, at *12.

Ms. Ricketts has raised a number of issues on appeal, which can be summarized as follows: (1) Whether the trial court erred in reconsidering and reversing its order of December 9, 2005, denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Ricketts had the authority to sign the admission agreement; (3) whether the arbitration provisions were unconscionable; and (4) whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-101 prevents the enforcement of an arbitration agreement executed by a health care surrogate on behalf of an incompetent.

Analysis

This court reviews the denial of a motion to compel arbitration under the same standards applicable to bench trials. Cabany v. Mayfield Rehab. Special Care Ctr., No. M2006-00594-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 3445550, *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 15, 2007); Spann v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 224 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2006) (perm. app. denied Jan. 29, 2007). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed "de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). If the trial judge did not make specific findings of fact, we review the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. Reagan v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., No. M2006-02191-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4523092, *8 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec. 20, 2007); Hardcastle v. Harris, 170 S.W.3d 67, 78-79 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2004). Our consideration of "the preponderance of the evidence is tempered by the principle that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses; accordingly, such credibility determinations are entitled to great weight on appeal." Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998). Review of a question of law is also de novo, but "`with no presumption of correctness afforded to the conclusions of the court below.'" King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting State v. McKnight, 51 S.W.3d 559, 562 (Tenn. 2001)).

We need address only one of the issues: whether Ms. Ricketts had the authority to sign the admission agreement on behalf of her mother. We have concluded that she did not.

The parties agree that Tennessee law, not federal law, applies in this case since the admission agreement provided that "the laws of the State in which the Facility is located" would govern.

In order to bind Ms. Williamson to the arbitration agreement, Ms. Ricketts must have had authority to act as her agent or surrogate. See Thornton v. Allenbrook Nursing Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. W2007-00950-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2687697, *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 3, 2008); Raiteri, 2003 WL 23094413, at *9. It is undisputed that Ms. Ricketts did not possess a power of attorney or guardianship over her mother's affairs. In Raiteri, the deceased patient's husband signed the admission forms. Raiteri, 2003 WL 23094413, at *1. The patient had not been determined to be incompetent. Id. There was no evidence that the husband had express or apparent authority to sign for the patient. Id. at *9. The court concluded that the evidence preponderated "against the trial court's implicit decision that [the husband] had authority to sign the admission agreement on behalf of his wife." Id. The defendants argue that Raiteri is distinguishable because the patient in Raiteri was still mentally competent and Ms. Williamson was not. Even if we assume that Ms. Williamson was not competent at the time that Ms. Ricketts signed the agreement, that fact does not make a difference in the result. Ms. Ricketts must have some basis of authority. In Raiteri, the patient could have given her husband express or apparent authority to sign for her, but there was no evidence that she had done so. See Necessary v. Life Care Ctrs. of America, Inc., No. E2006-00453-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 3446636, *1 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 16, 2007) (wife had oral express authority to sign admission documents for husband). If Ms. Ricketts was not competent at the time she was readmitted, she no longer had the ability to give authority to her daughter.

In Thornton, the patient's daughter signed the admissions documents, including an arbitration agreement, at the time of the patient's admission to the nursing home. Thornton, 2008 WL 2687697, at *1. At that time, the patient had not given her daughter a durable power of attorney or a power of attorney for health care decisions. Id. at *6. The nursing home conceded that the patient was mentally competent at all relevant times. Id. The court described Raiteri and later cases as "finding authority if given expressly, either through oral expression or via a Power of Attorney document, and finding no authority if the principal did not exhibit some sort of act to convey the authority." Id. at *7. In the present case, as in Raiteri and Thornton, the family member who signed the arbitration agreement did not have authority to act as the patient's agent.

The trial court accepted the defendants' argument that Ms. Ricketts had authority to sign for her mother pursuant to the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1801, et seq. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1806(c)(1) provides:

In the case of a patient who lacks capacity, has not appointed an agent, has not designated a surrogate, and does not have a guardian, or whose agent, surrogate, or guardian is not reasonably available, the patient's surrogate shall be identified by the supervising health care provider and documented in the current clinical record of the institution or institutions at which the patient is then receiving health care.

A major problem with this argument is that the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act did not take effect until July 1, 2004. 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 862. The agreement at issue was signed by Ms. Ricketts in August 2003.

The defendants maintain that the trial court did not err in applying the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act retroactively. Article 1, section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that "no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, shall be made." The presumption is that a statute operates prospectively "unless the legislature clearly indicates otherwise." Nutt v. Champion Int'l Corp., 980 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1998). There is an exception to the rule of prospective-only application for statutes considered remedial or procedural in nature. Id. at 368 (citing Shell v. State, 893 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tenn. 1995)). A procedural or remedial statute "does not affect the vested rights or liabilities of the parties." Id.

We find nothing in the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act evidencing an intent for the statute to operate retroactively. We further find that this statute is neither remedial nor procedural. Rather, the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act affects what our courts have described as a fundamental right: personal autonomy, which includes the ability to make one's own decisions about health care. Cabany, 2007 WL 3445550, at *5. Moreover, as a matter of contract law, retroactive application of the surrogacy provisions of the statute could lead to the anomalous result of validating the contract even though, at the time when the contract was signed, Ms. Ricketts did not have authority to act for her mother.

We conclude that Tennessee's Health Care Decisions Act does not apply retroactively. Thus, Ms. Ricketts was without authority to sign the admission agreement for her mother.

The defendants also argue that Ms. Williamson was a third party beneficiary of the admission agreement and is therefore bound by the agreement. In the case upon which the defendants rely, Benton v. Vanderbilt Univ., 137 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2004), an arbitration provision was held to be enforceable against a third party patient seeking to enforce a contract between a hospital and an insurance company. That case involved a valid contract between the hospital and an insurance company. There is no valid contract in this case because Ms. Ricketts had no authority to bind her mother.

The defendants' argument appears to be based upon the premise that, even if Ms. Ricketts lacked authority to act on behalf of her mother, there was a contract between Ms. Ricketts and Christian Care. Relying on this premise, the defendants assert that Ms. Williamson was an intended third party beneficiary of the contract. We are aware of caselaw from other jurisdictions in which a nursing home contract signed by a family member on behalf of the resident or as a "responsible party" has been characterized as a contract between the family member and the nursing home, with the resident being a third party beneficiary of the contract. See J.P. Morgan Chase Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 2007) (mother found to have authority to sign as surrogate for daughter, but third party beneficiary theory cited as alternative theory to bind daughter); Alterra Healthcare Corp v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574 (Fla.Dist.App.Ct. 2007) (finding resident to be third party beneficiary of residency agreement); Trinity Mission Health Rehab. of Clinton v. Estate of Johnson, No. 2006-CA-01053-COA, 2008 WL 73682, *3 (Miss.Ct.App. Jan. 8, 2008) (finding mother to be third party beneficiary of contract between nursing home and daughter); Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL 2421720, *6 (Miss.Ct.App. Aug. 28, 2007), cert. granted, 977 So. 2d 1144 (Miss. Mar. 13, 2008) (finding no authority for son to bind his mother to admission agreement, but finding mother to be third party beneficiary of contract between son and nursing home).

We do not find these authorities persuasive here. Third party beneficiary concepts should not be used to circumvent the threshold requirement that there be a valid arbitration agreement. Ms. Ricketts signed the admission agreement as Ms. Williamson's "representative." She was not entering into a contract on her own behalf, but as her mother's representative. The issue in this case is whether Ms. Ricketts had authority to act as her mother's agent and to enter into a contract on her behalf. If she did not have authority, there is no valid contract. Without a valid contract, there can be no third party beneficiary. Rejecting a similar third party beneficiary argument, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:

Here, the trial court reasoned in accordance with the stipulations of the parties that "nobody had the authority to speak for [the patient] except himself," and therefore "there is no binding written contract between [the patient] and the nursing home requiring arbitration." We find this reasoning persuasive. Any wrongful death beneficiaries of [the patient] can be bound only to the extent he would be bound. Because there was no contract between [the patient] and the nursing home in the first place, no arbitration clause exists to be enforced against the wrongful death beneficiaries of [the patient].
Grenada Living Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 961 So.2d 33, 38 (Miss. 2007). We agree with this reasoning. Application of the defendants' theory would effectively negate the requirement that a surrogate must have authority in order to bind a patient.

Conclusion

Because Ms. Ricketts did not have authority to sign the admission agreement on her mother's behalf, the arbitration provisions are not enforceable against Ms. Williamson's estate and wrongful death beneficiaries. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court. Costs of appeal are assessed against the appellees.

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RICKETTS v. CHRISTIAN CARE, M2007-02036-COA-R9-CV (Tenn.App. 8-15-2008)
(Aug 15, 2008)