KEEGAN, J.
The matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss, filed by the defendant, dated August 18, 2008. The plaintiff has filed an objection to the motion. No other motion is before the court, or has been filed, with respect to the issues raised in the motion to dismiss.
The present action arises out of an alleged injury to the plaintiff's child, by the defendant's child, at the daycare run by the defendant. The plaintiff seeks money damages and declaratory relief for the injuries caused to the child which resulted from the defendant's alleged negligent supervision of her child at the daycare. The writ, summons and complaint was filed with the court on July 15, 2008 and alleges that the injury to the plaintiff's child occurred in April 2006. The court is mindful that the parties represent themselves in this action. Where a layman appears pro se, the court follows a liberal policy and carefully considers the party's claims as far as they are fairly presented upon the record to ensure that no injustice has been done under the law. See Goldstein v. Fisher, 200 Conn. 197, 198 (1986). Nevertheless, while the self-represented individual is afforded this latitude, the court is equally cognizant that "the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedure and substantive law." New Haven. v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 498 (2004); see also Rodriguez v. Mallory Battery Co., 188 Conn. 145, 149 n. 8 (1982) (nothwithstanding leniency accorded pro se litigants, "we cannot, and will not, entirely disregard the established rules of procedure").
The defendant's motion to dismiss cites three grounds for dismissal: defective process, lack of jurisdiction and statute of limitations. The defendant's claim of defective process is without merit, as the complaint is, in fact, signed by the clerk of the court. The claim that the case was brought outside of the statute of limitations in not properly raised in a motion to dismiss. Rather, it is properly raised as a special defense; Practice Book § 10-50; or in a motion for summary judgment. CT Page 17367
The defendant's final argument for dismissal is lack of jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's lack of standing to bring the suit. The writ, summons and complaint are in the name of the plaintiff, Jimmy Smith. A fair reading of the complaint makes clear that the relief sought is for the alleged injuries sustained by the minor child.
The complaint also cites to various sections of the United States Code, which have no relevance or bearing on this action sounding in negligence.
"Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 153 (2004).
"The issue of standing implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction." Fish Unlimited v. Northeast Utilities Service Co., 254 Conn. 1, 31, 755 A.2d 860 (2000). Once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is before the court, that issue must be resolved before the court can move onto other matters." Sockwell v. Farias-Barret, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 054004892 (October 19, 2005, Matasavage, J.) ( 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 136).
"Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury [that] he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy . . . The requirement of directness between the injuries claimed by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert the claim at issue . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, supra, 254.
CT Page 17368
It is well settled Connecticut law that a minor cannot bring a civil action before the court except through his parent or guardian and next friend. Carruba v. Moskowitz, 81 Conn.App. 382, 401 n. 11, aff'd, 274 Conn. 916 (2004). The reason behind the rule is that the guardian or next friend has the responsibility to ensure that the interests of the child are well represented, which a minor cannot do for his or herself. Newman v. Newman, 235 Conn. 82, 95 (1995). See also Seabrook v. Greater Bridgeport Transit, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-05-0326366 (April 9, 1998, Skolnick, J.), 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 657 ("[w]here summons names as plaintiff the mother ppa the minor child, the infant child is not a party to the action").
The court finds that the suit has not been brought in the name of the injured party as required by law.
For all the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
CT Page 17369