Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract lack merit in view of the unambiguous language of their contracts and the employee handbook plainly making bonus awards solely and completely a matter of defendant's discretion ( see Kaplan v Capital Co. of Am., 298 AD2d 110, 111, lv denied 99 NY2d 510; cf. Caruso v Allnet Communication Servs., 242 AD2d 484, 484-485). Language that bonuses would be contingent on criteria such as performance and profitability cannot be interpreted as a limitation on defendant's discretion, since doing so would render the clear language of discretion meaningless ( see Beal Sav. Bank v Sommer, 8 NY3d 318, 324). The claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even assuming they can coexist in this context with a right of unfettered discretion ( but cf. Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 304-305 ), are not supported by any evidence of bad faith ( see Richbell Info. Servs. v Jupiter Partners, 309 AD2d 288, 303). The claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are not viable since an express contract governs the subject matter ( see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs Co., 5 NY3d 11, 23). Unpaid bonuses do not constitute "wages" under Labor Law § 193 ( see Truelove v Northeast Capital Advisory, 95 NY2d 220, 224), plaintiffs' "commission" nomenclature notwithstanding.
[ See 2007 NY Slip Op 33668(U).]