Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously-entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court ( see People v Seeber, 4 NY3d 780; People v Mann, 32 AD3d 865; People v Kucharczyk, 15 AD3d 595), and this determination generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion ( see People v DeLeon, 40 AD3d 1008). Here, the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his negotiated plea of guilty with the assistance of competent counsel, in exchange for a favorable sentence promise ( see People v Mann, 32 AD3d 865). Moreover, contrary to the defendant's arguments, his attorney was not obligated to "participate in a baseless pro se motion to withdraw a plea of guilty which was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made" ( People v Caple, 279 AD2d 635, 635). Nor is there any merit to the defendant's contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel ( see People v Brooks, 36 AD3d 929, 930; People v Grimes, 35 AD3d 882, 883).