MYRON THOMPSON, District Judge
Defendants Blue Ridge Piedmont, LLC, Blue Ridge Capital, LLC, Fritz McPhail, and Eric Wilensky, suggested in a proposed pre-trial order that this court does not have diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 over the state-law claims of plaintiffs Penmont, LLC and Penman Group, LLC against defendants. Because, "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action," Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), the court asked the parties to brief the issue. For the following reasons, the court concludes that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Plaintiffs' complaint invokes the jurisdiction of this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), which authorizes federal district courts to exercise original jurisdiction in civil actions between citizens of different States "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs." Defendants do not challenge the complete diversity of the parties, but rather whether the jurisdictional amount is satisfied. Defendants concede that the complaint asserts an amount in controversy in excess of the jurisdictional minimum, but they challenge whether the amount in controversy actually exceeds $75,000, contending that plaintiffs "have no good faith or legitimate claim" for any of the damages they assert. Def. Br. at 5-6.
The Supreme Court has instructed that, "The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith." St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). "It must appear to a legal certainty," the Court added in St. Paul, "that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal." Id. at 289. "The inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction" and "the fact that the complaint discloses the existence of a valid defense to the claim" do not show plaintiff's "bad faith or oust the jurisdiction." Id. The Court concluded that, "if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed." Id. "Events occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction." Id. A defendant challenging whether the minimum is met must therefore prove "to a legal certainty," as that phrase is expounded upon in St. Paul, that the jurisdictional amount is not met. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, 329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003).
The court may rely on extrinsic evidence in determining whether the amount in controversy is satisfied. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2003). A court does not, however, inquire into the merits of the case; that is, where the jurisdictional challenge implicates the merits of the plaintiff's claims, it is inappropriate for the court to decide the merits of the claim in the course of its analysis of the jurisdictional challenge. Id.
Defendants fail to prove that the jurisdictional amount is not met here. Plaintiffs' fraud claim seeks $75,000 and punitive damages for alleged misrepresentations that induced plaintiffs to pay $50,000 earnest money to defendants and a $25,000 lender's fee to a third party. Defendants take the position that, because the checks submitted to pay the $50,000 earnest money and $25,000 lender's fee were paid by entities other than the plaintiffs, those entities must be the "real" parties in interest. Defendants further contend that plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages because they were not the victims of any fraud; rather, they argue, the entities who actually paid the fees would be the proper parties to raise such a claim. Defendants fail to cite any authority to support their argument.
Defendants' argument fails, for it glosses over the central point: that this case is about the fate of the $75,000 paid on behalf of plaintiffs in the course of a transaction between plaintiffs and defendants as well as about the punitive damages plaintiffs seek. Who actually paid the funds is immaterial unless defendants can show that plaintiffs are asserting in bad faith that the funds were paid on their behalf. The transaction that forms the basis for this lawsuit was between plaintiffs and defendants, and the purchase agreement — indeed, the entire record — reflects as much; it cannot plausibly be disputed that the money was paid on behalf of any party other than the two plaintiffs. Defendants accepted the $50,000 in earnest money as payment on plaintiffs' behalf, and the $25,000 check paid to the lender lists "For Steve Barry's" in the memo line. See Def. Exh. 1. Similarly, because the transaction was between plaintiffs and defendants, any fraud or breach that was committed was committed against plaintiffs. Thus, defendants have failed to show to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy does not include the $50,000 earnest money, the $25,000 lender's fee, and any punitive damages. Because any amount of punitive damages will push the amount in controversy over $75,000, the jurisdictional amount is met on the basis of these damages alone.
Plaintiffs have also put forth testimonial evidence that they seek at least $20,000 in damages arising out of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in trying to complete the transaction. Adding this $20,000 to the $75,000 in damages on the fraud claim reaches $95,000, an amount that clearly exceeds the jurisdictional amount necessary to establish the amount in controversy.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs have not put forth sufficient evidence of these damages because they have not produced receipts documenting these damages. However, it is defendants' burden to show, to a legal certainty, that plaintiffs do not have a legitimate or good faith claim. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). Defendants' argument that one type of evidence is preferable to another type of evidence does not carry this burden.
***
According, it is ORDERED that, because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and the parties are of diverse state citizenship, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a).
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST 1. Appealable Orders : Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964). Rev.: 4/04 2. Time for Filing : The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. 3. Format of the notice of appeal : Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).