BERNSTEIN v. SEEMAN

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 08 Civ. 5899.

Motions

Motion to dismiss : Denied

Attorney(S)

Jeffrey Isiah Bernstein, San Diego, CA, pro se. Carol M. Goodman, John P. Oleske, Herrick, Feinstein, New York, NY, Joyce M. Pratt, Robert Harris Bernstein, Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.

Judges

Victor Marrero

Acts

The Public Health And Welfare — Civil Rights — Equal Employment Opportunities — Definitions

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Pro se plaintiff Jeffery Bernstein filed a lawsuit against defendants May Seeman, MEAG NY Corporation, Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., and Munich Reinsurance Germany, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, retaliation, and defamation. The Court previously granted motions to dismiss certain claims against Seeman and MEAG NY and dismissed the defamation claim against Munich Re, while allowing the Title VII claim against Munich Re to proceed. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox for pretrial purposes. MEAG NY answered and counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of the duty of loyalty. Bernstein submitted letters construed as a motion to dismiss the counterclaims, which MEAG NY opposed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether plaintiff Jeffery Bernstein’s motion to dismiss MEAG NY’s counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of loyalty should be granted at the motion to dismiss stage.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Bernstein contended that MEAG NY failed to provide sufficient factual details to support its counterclaims.
He challenged the factual accuracy of the counterclaims.
He requested dismissal of MEAG NY’s claims without reference to any cognizable legal basis.

Defendant MEAG NY's Arguments

MEAG NY opposed the motion to dismiss, treating Bernstein’s letters as a properly made motion.
MEAG NY argued that its counterclaims met the pleading requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).
MEAG NY contended that the motion to dismiss was premature and that factual disputes should not be resolved at this stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)	At the motion to dismiss stage, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint (or counterclaim) as true.	The court applied this principle to deny Bernstein’s motion to dismiss, holding that factual disputes are not resolved on a motion to dismiss.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)	Requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."	The court found MEAG NY’s counterclaims satisfied this standard, justifying denial of the motion to dismiss.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the counterclaims, Bernstein’s submissions, and MEAG NY’s opposition. It treated Bernstein’s letters as a motion to dismiss and found that MEAG NY’s counterclaims sufficiently alleged facts to meet the pleading standards under Rule 8(a)(2). The Court emphasized that at the motion to dismiss stage, factual allegations are accepted as true and that motions to dismiss are not the appropriate vehicle to resolve factual disputes. The Court thus concluded that Bernstein’s motion was premature and denied it accordingly.

Holding and Implications

DENIED plaintiff Jeffery Bernstein’s motion to dismiss the counterclaims of defendant MEAG NY.

The direct effect of this decision is that MEAG NY’s counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of loyalty will proceed in the litigation. The Court’s ruling does not establish new precedent but affirms the application of established pleading standards at the motion to dismiss stage.

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Jeffery BERNSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. May SEEMAN et al., Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Jeffery Bernstein ("Bernstein") brought this action against defendants May Seeman ("Seeman"), MEAG NY Corporation ("MEAG NY"), Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. ("Munich Re"), and Munich Reinsurance Germany (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). Bernstein also alleged that Defendants retaliated against him after he initially filed his discrimination claim, and that Defendants defamed him. By Decision and Order dated January 9, 2009, the Court granted Seeman and MEAG NY's motion to dismiss Bernstein's amended complaint as to all claims against Seeman, and as to the defamation claim against MEAG NY. The Court also granted Munich Re's motion to dismiss the defamation claim against it, and denied Munich Re's motion as to the Title VII claim.

The Court referred this action to Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox for general pretrial purposes on January 12, 2009. MEAG NY filed an answer and counterclaim, dated January 26, 2009 ("Answer and Counterclaim"), alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of loyalty. In a letter sent to Judge Fox via facsimile on February 2, 2009, Bernstein requested, in conclusory terms and without reference to or support from any cognizable legal basis, that any claims made by MEAG NY against him be dismissed. MEAG NY filed an opposition to the submission "as if it were a properly-made motion to dismiss," dated February 17, 2009. Bernstein responded in a letter sent by facsimile to Judge Fox on February 18, 2009. Judge Fox deemed the communications from Bernstein to be a motion to dismiss and referred the matter to this Court for decision.

Having reviewed the Answer and Counterclaim, Bernstein's communications from February 2 and February 18, 2009, and MEAG NY's opposition to the motion to dismiss, the Court denies Bernstein's motion to dismiss as premature. Bernstein argues that MEAG NY did not present sufficient factual details to support its claims, and he contests the factual accuracy of the counterclaims. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the counterclaim as true. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). MEAG NY's claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of loyalty are not subject to a heightened pleading standard, and a motion to dismiss is not the proper stage at which to resolve factual disputes. MEAG NY has fulfilled its duty to present "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion (Docket No. 38) of plaintiff Jeffery Bernstein to dismiss the counterclaims of defendant MEAG NY is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.