The court properly resentenced defendant pursuant to Correction Law § 601-d to comply with the requirement that FRS be part of the court's oral pronouncement of sentence ( see People v Sparber, 10 NY3d 457). We reject defendant's arguments that the court lacked authority and jurisdiction to correct his sentence once he completed the prison portion thereof ( see People v Hernandez, 59 AD3d 180). Defendant's double jeopardy argument, which is of a type that requires preservation ( see People v Gonzalez, 99 NY2d 76, 82-83), and his remaining challenges to the resentencing are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find them without merit ( see Hernandez, supra). With regard to defendant's argument that the resentencing court had discretion to let stand the original sentence, which unlawfully lacked a provision for FRS, we conclude that Correction Law § 601-d and Penal Law § 70.85, when read together, make clear that a court imposing a resentence pursuant to these enactments has no discretion to omit FRS without the prosecutor's consent, which was lacking here.