Billy Leon Kearse, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals from the trial court's summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief, raising two issues. See Fla. R. Crim P. 3.851. We previously affirmed Kearse's convictions and sentence of death. See Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1995); Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2000). We also affirmed the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Kearse v. State, 969 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2007).
In his first claim in this appeal, Kearse contends that Florida's lethal injection procedures violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; art. I, 17, Fla. Const. We have repeatedly rejected similar lethal injection arguments. See Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008); Power v. State, 992 So. 2d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 2008); Sexton v. State, 997 So. 2d 1073, 1089 (Fla. 2008); Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 129 (Fla.), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 28 (2008); Schwab v. State, 995 So. 2d 922, 923-40 (Fla. 2008); Woodel v. State, 985 So. 2d 524, 533-34 (Fla. 2008); Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 666 (Fla. 2008); Schwab v. State, 982 So. 2d 1158, 1159-60 (Fla. 2008). Additionally, we have held the procedures constitutional under the requirements of Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). See Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 200 (Fla. 2009) ("Florida's current lethal-injection protocol passes muster under any of the risk-based standards considered by the Baze Court (and would easily satisfy the intent-based standard advocated by Justices Thomas and Scalia)."); Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 28 (2008).
In his second claim, Kearse contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for additional public records. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.852. We find that the court did not abuse its discretion. See Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1149 (Fla. 2006) ("In reviewing the trial court's denial of . . . public records requests, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard." (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order summarily denying relief on Kearse's successive postconviction motion and denying his request for additional public records.
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.