Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
An insurance agent or broker has a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage for a client within a reasonable amount of time, or to inform the client of the inability to do so ( see Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d 266, 270; Loevner v Sullivan Strauss Agency, Inc., 35 AD3d 392, 393; Tappan Wire Cable v County of Rockland, 305 AD2d 665, 666; Reilly v Progressive Ins. Co., 288 AD2d 365). Thus, the duty is denned by the nature of the client's request ( see Loevner v Sullivan Strauss Agency, Inc., 35 AD3d at 393; Kyes v Northbrook Prop. Cos. Ins. Co., 278 AD2d 736, 737; Wied v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 208 AD2d 1132, 1133). Absent a specific request for coverage not already in a client's policy or the existence of a special relationship with the client, an insurance agent or broker has no continuing duty to advise, guide, or direct a client to obtain additional coverage ( see Hoffend Sons, Inc. v Rose Kiernan, Inc., 7 NY3d 152, 157-158; Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d at 270-271; Loevner v Sullivan Strauss Agency, Inc., 35 AD3d 392).
Here, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment ( see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562) by presenting evidence that the plaintiff had not explicitly requested that the defendant insurance agent procure specific insurance coverage ( see Hoffend Sons, Inc. v Rose Kiernan, Inc., 7 NY3d 152; Loevner v Sullivan Strauss Agency, Inc., 35 AD3d 392). Moreover, even if the plaintiffs request for a "quote" could be deemed an explicit request for the procurement of insurance, the defendant agent informed the plaintiff that he could not generate a quote unless the plaintiff provided him with specific information relating to the property's potential location in a flood zone, which the plaintiff did not provide. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant agent did not breach any duty to procure insurance coverage for the plaintiff ( see Hoffend Sons, Inc. v Rose Kiernan, Inc., 7 NY3d at 152; Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d at 270-271; Loevner v Sullivan Strauss Agency, Inc., 35 AD3d 392). In addition, there was no special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant agent ( see Hoffend Sons, Inc. v Rose Kiernan, Inc., 7 NY3d at 158; Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d at 271). Since the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324), the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.