Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court properly granted the People's reverse-Batson challenge ( see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; People v Luciano, 10 NY3d 499, 502-503). The trial court's determination that the proffered reason for challenging the juror in question, that she had previously served on a jury, was pretextual, is entitled to great deference and is supported by the record ( see People v Quito, 43 AD3d 411, 412-413; People v Richie, 217 AD2d 84, 89).
The trial court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's challenge for cause to a potential juror ( see People v Franklin, 7 AD3d 966, 967). Even if a prima facie showing of actual bias had been made ( see People v Torpey, 63 NY2d 361, 367), her unequivocal answers demonstrated that she could be fair and impartial ( see People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419; People v Johnson, 278 AD2d 245).
The defendant's contention that the prosecutor violated the unsworn witness rule during the prosecutor's cross-examination of him and during summation is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit ( see People v Paperno, 54 NY2d 294, 302; People v Rivera, 27 AD3d 491, 492; People v Blackwood, 295 AD2d 292, 293).
The defendant's challenge to certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v Hollenquest, 48 AD3d 592, 593). In any event, the remarks either were fair comment, were within the permissible bounds of rhetorical comment, or do not warrant reversal ( see People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 401; People v Wright, 40 AD3d 1021; People v Heide, 206 AD2d 875, affd 84 NY2d 943).
On this record, we cannot conclude that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel ( see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; People v Steele, 135 AD2d 673).