Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of grand larceny in the second degree ( see Penal Law § 155.40), grand larceny in the third degree ( see Penal Law § 155.35), and scheme to defraud in the first degree ( see Penal Law § 190.65 [b]; People v First Meridian Planning Corp., 86 NY2d 608, 618; People v Nicholas, 44 AD3d 1075; People v Houghtaling, 14 AD3d 879, 881; People v Bastian, 294 AD2d 882, 883) beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the disqualification of his original attorney did not deprive him of the right to the counsel of his choice ( see People v Kirkorov, 57 AD3d 568). The County Court properly concluded that continued representation of the defendant by this attorney would create an actual conflict of interest, as well as a violation of the "advocate-witness" rule ( People v Paperno, 54 NY2d 294, 299-300; see People v Gordon, 272 AD2d 133; People v Limongelli, 156 AD2d 473, 474).
The defendant's contention that the court improperly imposed restitution without conducting a hearing is unpreserved for appellate review, since the defendant failed to request a hearing or otherwise challenge the amount of restitution imposed at sentencing ( see Penal Law § 60.27; People v Home, 97 NY2d 404, 414 n 3 [2002]; People v Toomer, 61 AD3d 899; People v Passalacqua, 43 AD3d 964; People v Allen, 305 AD2d 421). In any event, the contention is without merit because there was sufficient support in the record for the court's determination of the amount of restitution ( see People v Charles, 309 AD2d 873, 874).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.