It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Supreme Court neither abused nor improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that part of the cross motion of defendant for leave to amend its answer. "Leave to amend the pleadings `shall be freely given' absent prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay" ( McCaskey, Davies Assoc. v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 59 NY2d 755, 757; see CPLR 3025 [b]; Fahey v County of Ontario, 44 NY2d 934, 935), and "the denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where . . . the proposed amendment[] manifestly lack[s] merit or [is] palpably insufficient on [its] face" ( Dec v Auburn Enlarged School Dist., 249 AD2d 907, 908 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Prejudice may be found where a party has incurred some change in position or hindrance in the preparation of its case which could have been avoided had the original pleading contained the proposed amendment" ( Whalen v Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 92 NY2d 288, 293; see Loomis v Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 NY2d 18, 23-24, rearg denied 55 NY2d 801). Although the delay of defendant in seeking leave to amend its answer was lengthy, "`[m]ere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment. It must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side, the very elements of the laches doctrine'" ( Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959; see McFarland v Michel, 2 AD3d 1297, 1300).
Here, plaintiff failed to identify any prejudice arising from the proposed amendment ( see Corsale v Pantry Pride Supermarket, 197 AD2d 659, 660-661), and the evidence submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion established that its proposed additional defense that plaintiff's claims were discharged in bankruptcy is not patently without merit ( see Debicki v Schultz, 212 AD2d 988).