AARON v. PATTISON

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 507116.

Attorney(S)

The Steele Law Firm, P.C., Oswego (Kimberly A. Steele of counsel), for Steven L. Aaron and others, appellants. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman Dicker, Albany (Douglas R. Kemp of counsel), for respondent in Action No. 1. Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg Griffin, P.C. (Jonathan G. Schopf of counsel), for respondent in Actions Nos. 2 and 3.

Judges

Cardona, P.J.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses appeals arising from three related actions involving Steven L. Aaron and others (collectively "Aaron") and the law firm Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg Griffin, P.C. ("PSGG"). Action No. 1 is a legal malpractice claim brought by Aaron against PSGG. Actions Nos. 2 and 3 involve PSGG seeking counsel fees against Aaron and associated parties. Aaron moved to compel PSGG to produce documents primarily concerning attorney Gerald Katzman, while PSGG cross-moved for a protective order and sought counsel fees and costs related to these motions. The Supreme Court denied Aaron's motion to compel, partially granted PSGG's cross motion for a protective order, and awarded PSGG costs and counsel fees. Aaron appealed the amended order entered February 26, 2009 in Rensselaer County.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Aaron is entitled to compel PSGG to produce documents related to attorney Gerald Katzman, including time entries, employment contracts, disciplinary records, and other personal and professional information.
Whether the Supreme Court properly granted PSGG's motion for a protective order shielding the requested materials from discovery.
Whether the award of counsel fees and costs to PSGG on the motion was appropriate under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Aaron sought discovery of documents concerning Katzman’s professional activities and personal employment information, arguing these were relevant to proving legal malpractice in Action No. 1 and to defending against PSGG’s claims for counsel fees in Actions Nos. 2 and 3.

Respondent's Arguments

PSGG opposed the discovery request as immaterial and unnecessary, describing Aaron’s motion as a "fishing expedition" aimed at uncovering unsupported allegations.
PSGG sought a protective order to prevent disclosure of the requested documents and requested counsel fees and costs associated with opposing the motion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 434	Standard for materiality and necessity of discovery in legal malpractice claims.	The court held that Aaron failed to show the requested documents were material and necessary to proving legal malpractice, warranting denial of the motion to compel.
CPLR 3101(a)	Discovery of material and necessary documents.	The court applied this rule to deny discovery of documents not shown to be material or necessary.
CPLR 3103(a)	Protective orders to prevent discovery abuse.	The court found no abuse of discretion in granting PSGG’s protective order to shield immaterial documents.
22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a)	Authority to award counsel fees and costs for frivolous or improper motions.	The court affirmed the award of counsel fees and costs to PSGG, finding Aaron’s motion was a fishing expedition.
Doherty v Schuyler Hills, Inc., 55 AD3d 1174, 1175	Appealability of intermediate nonfinal orders.	Referenced to explain that the amended order here was final and appealable.
Bright v McGowan, 63 AD3d 1239, 1240 n 1 (2009)	Right of direct appeal after entry of final judgment.	The court rejected PSGG’s contention that the right of direct appeal had terminated.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first determined that Aaron substantially complied with procedural requirements under 22 NYCRR 202.7(a), allowing consideration of the motion on its merits. It then examined the scope of the requested documents concerning Katzman, which included time entries, billing records, employment contracts, disciplinary and grievance records, and other personal employment details.

Applying the legal standard from AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk Wardwell, the court found Aaron failed to establish that these documents were material and necessary to proving the legal malpractice claim or relevant to defending against PSGG's fee claims. Therefore, pursuant to CPLR 3101(a), the discovery request was properly denied.

The court further upheld the protective order under CPLR 3103(a), reasoning that shielding immaterial and unnecessary information was within the trial court’s discretion and not an abuse thereof. Finally, the court affirmed the award of counsel fees and costs to PSGG under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a), characterizing Aaron’s motion as a "fishing expedition" intended to uncover unsupported allegations, thus justifying sanctions.

Holding and Implications

The amended order denying Aaron’s motion to compel discovery, granting PSGG’s protective order, and awarding counsel fees and costs to PSGG is affirmed.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the Supreme Court’s limitation on discovery, protecting PSGG from producing documents deemed immaterial and unnecessary. The court’s ruling also enforces procedural safeguards by sanctioning improper discovery efforts. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court applied existing standards to the facts of this case.

Show full summary ...

STEVEN L. AARON, Appellant, v. PATTISON, SAMPSON, GINSBERG GRIFFIN, P.C., Respondent. (Action No. 1.) PATTISON, SAMPSON, GINSBERG GRIFFIN, P.C., Respondent,

Cardona, P.J.

In relation to these three actions, Steven L. Aaron, F K Supply, Inc., and Never More Now Corporation (hereinafter collectively referred to as Aaron) moved to compel Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg Griffin, P.C. (hereinafter PSGG) to comply with a request for documents primarily concerning attorney Gerald Katzman. PSGG cross-moved for an protective order as to the requested materials and also sought; counsel fees and costs associated with the motions pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (a). Supreme Court denied Aaron's motion to compel, partially granted PSGG's cross motion for an protective order, and awarded costs and counsel fees. Aaron appeals.

Action No. 1 sounds in legal malpractice. Action Nos. 2 and 3 seek counsel fees.

Aaron is the plaintiff in action No. 1 and a defendant in action Nos. 2 and 3. F K Supply is a defendant in action Nos. 2 and 3. Never More Now is a defendant in action No. 2.

Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg Griffin is the defendant in action No. 1 and the plaintiff in action Nos. 2 and 3.

While an appeal from an intermediate nonfinal order must be dismissed upon entry of a final judgment ( see Doherty v Schuyler Hills, Inc., 55 AD3d 1174, 1175), the amended order appealed from here is a final order and, therefore, contrary to PSGG's contention, the right of direct appeal did not terminate upon entry of the judgments ( see Bright v McGowan, 63 AD3d 1239, 1240 n 1 [2009]).

Initially, we find that Aaron substantially complied with 22 NYCRR 202.7 (a) and, accordingly, we consider the motion to compel on the merits. Specifically, Aaron seeks documents showing Katzman's time entries and billings related to other client matters; documents showing Katzman's employment contracts, partnership agreements and income; evidence of loans to Katzman by PSGG; evidence of any malpractice suits against Katzman; claims against Katzman made to the Committee on Professional Standards; documents showing Katzman's absences from work, including vacation, personal and sick time; and documents pertaining to Katzman's reviews, disciplinary actions, internal grievances, demotions and promotions. As Aaron has failed to demonstrate that these materials are in any way material and necessary to proving a claim of legal malpractice ( see AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 434) or to defending against PSGG's claims for counsel fees, the motion to compel must be denied ( see CPLR 3101 [a]). Furthermore, under the same rationale, we find that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the protective order ( see CPLR 3103 [a]). Nor do we find an abuse of discretion in the award of counsel fees and costs on the motion ( see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [a]). As set forth in the court's amended order, Aaron's motion to compel the production of the patently immaterial and unnecessary information detailed above was nothing more than a "fishing expedition" made for the "illegitimate purpose" of "uncovering facts supporting insufficient, conclusory allegations."

Ordered that the amended order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.