Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he and another person formed and shared a common intent to murder the victim is unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484; People v Mathis, 60 AD3d 697, 698; People v Perez, 265 AD2d 347, 348). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant, with the requisite mental state, acted in concert with, and intentionally aided, a second shooter ( see Penal Law § 20.00; People v Cheng, 232 AD2d 651; People v Johnson, 162 AD2d 620).
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the Supreme Court properly declined to dismiss a juror and declare a mistrial on the ground that the juror was grossly unqualified. To find a juror grossly unqualified, the court must be convinced that the juror would be prevented from rendering an impartial verdict ( see People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 298). Such determination is to be afforded great deference ( see People v Punwa, 24 AD3d 471, 472; People v Franklin, 7 AD3d 966, 967), and we perceive no basis to disturb the determination on appeal.
The defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel ( see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137).