Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof that the appellant was to "be designated a sexually violent offender and"; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Although the hearing court failed to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Correction Law § 168-n (3), this Court may make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law where, as here, the record is sufficient to do so ( see People v Britt, 66 AD3d 853, lv denied 13 NY3d 716).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the hearing court's determination to designate the defendant a level three sex offender is supported by clear and convincing evidence ( see Correction Law § 168-n; People v Mingo, 12 NY3d 563; People v Lewis, 56 AD3d 447; People v Warren, 42 AD3d 593; People v Dominie, 42 AD3d 589). The hearing court properly assessed points for risk factor 1 based on the defendant's and the victim's sworn statements and the defendant's testimony at his plea allocution and sentencing ( see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 7-8 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]). It also properly assessed points for risk factor 7 because he was a stranger to the victim ( see Guidelines at 12) and risk factor 11, given his admission that he was using alcohol at the time of the offense ( see Guidelines at 15; People v Britt, 66 AD3d 853).
However, as the People correctly concede, the Supreme Court erred in designating the defendant a sexually violent offender ( see Correction Law § 168-a, [7] [b]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
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