Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
On June 8, 2007, a clear, sunny day, the plaintiff was exiting the defendant's premises when she allegedly tripped and fell. The plaintiff attributed her fall to a crack on a concrete platform step. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that, as a matter of law, the crack was a trivial defect. The Supreme Court denied the motion.
Generally, the issue of whether a dangerous or defective condition exists depends on the particular facts of each case, and is properly a question of fact for the jury ( see Trincere v County of Suffolk, 90 NY2d 976, 977). However, a property owner may not be held liable for trivial defects, not constituting a trap or nuisance ( id.; see Ambroise v New York City Tr. Auth., 33 AD3d 573, 574). In determining whether a defect is trivial, the court must examine all of the facts presented, including the "width, depth, elevation, irregularity and appearance of the defect along with the `time, place, and circumstance' of the injury" ( Trincere v County of Suffolk, 90 NY2d at 978, quoting Caldwell v Village of Is. Park, 304 NY 268, 274 [1952]). Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that the alleged defect in the step was trivial and nonactionable and did not possess the characteristics of a trap or nuisance ( see Fisher v JRMR Realty Corp., 63 AD3d 677, 678; Shiles v Carillon Nursing Rehabilitation Ctr., LLC, 54 AD3d 746). Although the plaintiff, in her deposition testimony, described the width of the crack as 1½ inches wide, photographs of the crack, which she confirmed fairly and accurately represented the accident site, indicate that the width was slight and that there was no elevation differential ( see Fisher v JRMR Realty Corp., 63 AD3d at 678; Shiles v Carillon Nursing Rehabilitation Ctr., LLC, 54 AD3d at 746). Further, the plaintiffs deposition testimony established that the accident occurred during daylight hours on a clear day with nothing obstructing her view ( see Shiles v Carillon Nursing Rehabilitation Ctr., LLC, 54 AD3d at 746; Hawkins v Carter Community Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 40 AD3d 812, 813). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Hawkins v Carter Community Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 40 AD3d at 813; Dick v Gap, Inc., 16 AD3d 615). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.