Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The record supports the Family Court's determination that the petitioner established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the appellant committed the family offense of aggravated harassment in the second degree, warranting the issuance of an order of protection ( see Family Ct Act §§ 812, 832; Penal Law § 240.30; Matter of Larson v Gilliam, 49 AD3d 650; Matter of Fiore v Fiore, 34 AD3d 803; see also People v Wilson, 59 AD3d 153, 154). Contrary to the appellant's contention, Penal Law § 240.30 (1) is not unconstitutional as applied to him, because the finding that he committed a family offense by violating this statutory provision "arose from his harassing conduct, not from any expression entitled to constitutional protection" ( People v Shack, 86 NY2d 529, 536).