Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
A court has the discretion to depart from the presumptive risk level, as determined by use of the risk assessment instrument, based upon the facts in the record ( see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d 809, 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d 907, 907; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d 520, 520; People v Hines, 24 AD3d 524, 525). However, "utilization of the risk assessment instrument will generally `result in the proper classification in most cases so that departures will be the exception not the rule'" (People v Guaman, 8 AD3d 545, quoting Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [Nov. 1997]; see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d at 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d at 908; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d at 520; People v Hines, 24 AD3d at 525). A departure from the presumptive risk level is warranted where "there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the guidelines" (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006]; see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d at 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d at 908; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d at 520; People v Hines, 24 AD3d at 525). Further, there must be clear and convincing evidence of the existence of a special circumstance to warrant such a departure ( see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d at 810; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d at 520; People v Agard, 35 AD3d 568, 568; People v Ventura, 24 AD3d 527; People v Dexter, 21 AD3d 403, 404).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a downward departure, as the defendant failed to present clear and convincing evidence of special circumstances warranting such a departure ( see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d at 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d at 908; see also People v Wragg, 41 AD3d 1273, 1274; People v Santos, 25 Misc 3d 1212[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 5204Q[U] [2009]; cf. People v Stevens, 55 AD3d 892).