MITCHELL v. MITCHELL, Conn., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

James Huntington and Arthur D. Warner, for the executor. Hugh M. Alcorn, for Mary E. and Benjamin Ward Mitchell. Robert E. DeForest, for David M. Mitchell et al. George D. Watrous and Harry G. Day, for Helen W. Brooks.

Judges

ANDREWS, C. J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves a suit to determine the construction of the will of Elizur Mitchell, deceased. The will provided that the testator's estate, subject to a life annuity to his widow, was to be held in trust until January 1, 1900, after which it would be distributed according to specific clauses of the will. The primary dispute concerns the interpretation of a clause (the tenth section) devising two fifths of the estate to Lawrence Mitchell and his children in equal portions, including provisions for the issue of any deceased children. At the testator’s death in 1886, Lawrence Mitchell had four children, one of whom died leaving children. Lawrence remarried and had an additional child born in 1897, before the trust ended. Lawrence died intestate in 1897. The Superior Court in Litchfield County reserved the questions arising under the will for the advice of the Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether at the end of the trust in 1900 the four children of Lawrence Mitchell alive at the testator’s death take the entire two fifths of the estate devised to Lawrence Mitchell and his children in equal portions.
Whether Benjamin Ward Mitchell, the son of Lawrence Mitchell born after the testator’s death but before the trust ended, is entitled to any part of the two fifths of the estate devised to Lawrence Mitchell and his children.
Whether Mary E. Mitchell, widow of Lawrence Mitchell, has any statutory interest in the two fifths of the estate devised to Lawrence Mitchell and his children.
Whether the two fifths of the estate devised to Lawrence Mitchell and his children vested at the death of the testator or at the close of the trust in 1900.
Whether Lawrence Mitchell’s death before the closing of the trust caused his share of the two fifths to become intestate estate.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jones v. Beers, 57 Conn. 295	Legacies and devises vest at the time the will becomes operative unless a contrary intent appears.	Supported the court’s conclusion that the devise vested at the testator’s death.
Marcy v. Marcy, 32 Conn. 308	Same principle regarding vesting of legacies and devises.	Reinforced the timing of vesting of the devise in this case.
Corley v. McElmeel, 149 N.Y. 228	General principle on vesting of legacies and devises.	Supported the court’s interpretation of vesting at death.
Jones' Appeal, 48 Conn. 60	A legacy to a class includes all persons who fall within the class at the time the legacy takes effect in point of enjoyment.	Applied to hold that after-born children who exist at enjoyment are included in the class.
Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299	Definition and treatment of class gifts in wills.	Supported the interpretation that the devise was to a class including after-born children.
Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8	Clarification that class members may take as tenants in common rather than joint tenants.	Used to conclude that the devisees took as tenants in common.
Kingsbury v. Walter, L. R. (1899) 2 Ch. 314	Principles regarding class gifts and inclusion of after-born members.	Supported inclusion of Benjamin Ward Mitchell in the class.
Bolles v. Smith, 39 Conn. 217	Distinction between joint tenancy and tenancy in common in class gifts.	Supported the court’s finding of tenancy in common rather than joint tenancy.
Morris v. Bolles, 65 Conn. 45	Same as above regarding tenancy in common.	Reinforced tenancy in common holding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the will’s language and the circumstances surrounding its execution and the testator’s death. It found no indication of a contrary intent to the general rule that legacies and devises vest at the time the will becomes operative—here, the testator’s death in 1886. The devise to "Lawrence Mitchell and his children" was construed as a class gift that included all children of Lawrence Mitchell at the time the devise takes effect in enjoyment, which was January 1, 1900, when the trust ended.

The court reasoned that the class included the four children alive at the testator’s death as well as the child born afterward but before the trust ended. The provision addressing the "issue" of deceased children was interpreted to mean the children of those deceased children, who would take the same share as their parent would have if living. This supported the conclusion that the devisees took as tenants in common, not joint tenants, because the will specified that issue of deceased children should succeed to their parent’s share rather than the share passing to surviving siblings.

The court further held that Lawrence Mitchell’s death before the trust ended did not cause his share to become intestate estate of the testator; rather, his share passed to his estate. The widow of Lawrence Mitchell had no interest in the testator’s estate but would have a statutory share in the estate of Lawrence Mitchell upon settlement of his intestate estate.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the two fifths of the estate devised to Lawrence Mitchell and his children vested at the testator’s death in 1886 as a class gift to Lawrence and all his children, including the child born after the testator’s death but before the trust ended. The devisees took as tenants in common. The share of Lawrence Mitchell passed to his estate upon his death before the trust ended. The widow of Lawrence Mitchell has no interest in the testator’s estate but may claim a statutory share in Lawrence’s estate.

Implications: This decision clarifies that a class gift in a will includes after-born children who exist at the time the gift takes effect in enjoyment, provided the will’s language supports such inclusion. It confirms that members of a class may take as tenants in common rather than joint tenants when the will indicates such intent. The ruling affects the distribution among the testator’s descendants and their estates but does not establish new precedent beyond the application of established principles of vesting and class gifts in wills.

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DAVID M. MITCHELL, EXECUTOR vs. MARY E. MITCHELL ET AL.

A testator who died in 1886 provided that all of his property, subject to a life annuity to his widow, should be held in trust until January 1st, 1900, when it was to be distributed as directed by subsequent clauses of his will. One of these clauses (10) gave to L "and his children, in equal portions, two fifths of all of my estate after the closing of the trust, to have and to hold unto them and their heirs forever. But if one or more of the said four children of L shall have died leaving issue of his or her body, said issue shall receive the same portion that his or her parent would be entitled to if living." At the testator's death L had four children, one of whom, N, died in 1892, leaving children. In 1895 L remarried and had another child, born in March, 1897, who is still living. L died in July, 1897, intestate, leaving his widow and said five children. In a suit to construe the will it was held: 1. That no part of the property was intestate.

2. That upon the testator's death the two fifths in question vested in L and his four children, equally, as tenants in common; and that they took as a class which opened to let in the child born afterwards but before the class gift took effect in point of enjoyment. 3. That by the "issue" of a deceased legatee, the testator meant his or her children, under which provision N's children took her share. 4. That L's widow had no interest in any of the property of the testator, although she would be entitled to her statutory share in so much of it as might thereafter be distributed to and become part of her deceased husband's estate. A legacy to a class embraces all those who fall within it at the time the legacy takes effect in point of enjoyment.

ANDREWS, C. J.

The complaint in this case asks the advice of the Superior Court as to the distribution of the estate of Elizur Mitchell, pursuant to his will, to the several persons claiming thereunder; and the questions are reserved for this court.

The will was made and duly executed on the 3d day of August, 1885. There was a codicil dated the 19th day of May, 1886. The testator died on the 21st day of May, 1886. Thereafter, on the 22d day of June, 1886, the will and codicil were proved and established in the proper Court of Probate.

The will provided, in the first place, for the support of the testator's widow. She died on the 11th day of May, 18.7. In the next place it provided that the entire estate should be held in trust until — as amended by the codicil — the 1st day of January, 1900, and directed in what way the income of the estate should be disposed of. As soon after the closing of the trust as was practicable the trustee, who was also the executor of the will, settled his account as trustee and as executor of the will, settled his account as trustee and as executor with the Court of Probate, and the same was approved, accepted and ordered to be recorded. From this settlement no appeal has been taken. The court found that there was then in the hands of the executor, for distribution under the provisions of the will, the sum of $375,761.29, of which $8,880 was in real estate. The clauses or sections of said will which direct the distribution of the testator's estate are the eighth, ninth and tenth, and are as follows: —

" Eighth. I order, direct, and declare that the said trust shall terminate and come to an end on the first day of January, A.D. 1900, and the principal fund of the whole of said trust estate shall be divided up and distributed as follows, to wit: 1. I give, devise, and bequeath to my granddaughter Helen M. Winchell, one-fifth part of the principal of my estate after the closing of the trust. But if Helen M. Winchell shall die before the closing of the trust and the distribution of the principal of my estate, without issue of her body, said portion that Helen M. Winchell would be entitled to if living I order and direct shall be distributed, one half to the children of Lawrence Mitchell, equally, and the remaining half to the children of D. M. Mitchell, equally, to have and to hold unto them and their heirs forever.

" Ninth. I give, devise, and bequeath to David M. Mitchell and his children two fifths of the principal of all my estate, in equal portions after the closing of the trust.

" Tenth. I give, devise, and bequeath to Lawrence Mitchell and his children, in equal portions, two fifths of all my estate after the closing of the trust, to have and to hold unto them and their heirs forever. But if one or more of the said four children of L. Mitchell shall have died leaving issue of his or her body, said issue shall receive the same portion that his or her parent would be entitled to if living."

No question arises under the eighth section of the will. Helen M. Winchell — now Helen W. Brooks — is living, and is entitled under that section to have one fifth of the said principal fund distributed to her.

Nor is there any question under the ninth section. David M. Mitchell and his children are entitled to have two fifths of the said principal fund distributed to them in equal portions.

Whatever uncertainty there is arises under the tenth section. At the time the testator died Lawrence Mitchell was the father of four children, viz: Frank H. Mitchell, Nellie E. Mitchell, Jessie P. Mitchell and Vivian E. Mitchell. One of these, Nellie E. Mitchell — afterward Parsons — died on the 13th day of June, 1892, leaving four minor children. When the testator died said Lawrence Mitchell was living unmarried. He had been divorced from the mother of his children. Subsequently, on the 3d day of July, 1895, he married Mary E. Mitchell by whom he had a son, Benjamin Ward Mitchell, born on the 25th day of March, 1897.

The questions upon which the advice of this court is asked, are these: 1st. Whether at the end of the trust in 1900 the four children of Lawrence Mitchell above named (comprising all the children he had at the death of the testator) take the whole of the two fifths of said estate devised to said Lawrence Mitchell and his children, in equal portions, by the tenth section of the will.2d. Whether Benjamin Ward Mitchell, son of Lawrence Mitchell deceased, born after the death of the testator, takes any part of the "two fifths of all the estate devised and bequeathed to Lawrence Mitchell and his children in equal portions" after the closing of the trust.3d. Whether by said tenth section of said will the defendant Mary E. Mitchell, widow of said Lawrence Mitchell deceased, has any statutory interest in said two fifths of said estate. 4th. Whether the two fifths of said estate "devised and bequeathed to Lawrence Mitchell and his children," vested in them as a class at the death of the testator, or at the close of the trust in 1900. 5th. Whether by the death of Lawrence Mitchell, before the closing of the trust in 1900, the portion of the two fifths bequeathed to him has become intestate estate.

It is entirely plain that no part of the estate of Elizur Mitchell is intestate. The one fifth devised to Helen M. Mitchell and the two fifths devised to David M. Mitchell and his children, certainly are not intestate. And we think the two fifths devised and bequeathed to Lawrence Mitchell and his children, in equal portions, is not intestate. It vested in them at the death of the testator.

Legacies and devises vest at the time the will becomes operative, unless there is a clear intent to the contrary. In this will no such contrary intent appears. Jones v. Beers, 57 Conn. 295; Marcy v. Marcy, 32 id. 308; Corley v. McElmeel, 149 N.Y. 228.

The words in this part of the will, "Lawrence Mitchell and his children," standing alone, must be taken to mean Lawrence Mitchell and all his children. They can have no other meaning. It is a devise to a class. A class is a number of persons or things ranked together for some common purpose. Bouvier's Law Dict. And when a legacy is to a class, all those will take who are embraced in the class at the time the legacy takes effect in point of enjoyment. Jones' Appeal, 48 Conn. 60; Belfield v. Booth, 63 id. 299,304. Benjamin Ward Mitchell is one of the class to which this devise is made. Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8. The class consisted of Lawrence Mitchell and all his children. Kingsbury v. Walter, L. R. (1899) 2 Ch. 314. While in some cases the members of a class take as joint tenants, they do not so take when the intent is otherwise. Bolles v. Smith, 39 Conn. 217; Morris v. Bolles, 65 id. 45, 53; Rockwell v. Bradshaw, supra. In this will the clear intent is that they take as tenants in common. The provision in the second part of the tenth section of the will — that if one or more of the then living children of Lawrence Mitchell shall have died leaving issue of his or her body, said issue shall receive the same portion that his or her parent would be entitled to if living — indicates clearly that the members of this class are to take as tenants in common.

At the time this will was made the testator was well advanced in years. He had children and grandchildren, and the grandchildren had come to years of maturity. He knew that his son Lawrence was then unmarried. He had postponed the distribution of his estate until the year 1900. He foresaw the possibility that Lawrence might again marry and have other children, just as he foresaw that the living children of Lawrence might die leaving issue of their own. The language of the first part of the tenth section of the will sufficiently provided for after-born children, if there should be any. It was not probable that such children would have children before the ending of the trust; so he further provided for the issue of the then living children, that they should receive the portion that their parent would have had. This provision of the will shows plainly that the testator intended the members of this class to take as tenants in common. The word "issue," as used in the tenth section of the will, means children. It includes only such issue as can take from a parent, i.e. children. The members of this class being tenants in common, the share of Lawrence did not pass to the other members of the class, but belongs to his estate. The said two fifths devised and bequeathed to Lawrence Mitchell and his children, equally, should be distributed into six equal parts and set, one part to the estate of Lawrence Mitchell deceased, one part to the children of Nellie E. Mitchell Parsons deceased, one part to Frank H. Mitchell, one to Jessie P. Mitchell Blackman, one to Vivian E. Mitchell and one to Benjamin Ward Mitchell.

The widow of Lawrence Mitchell has no statutory interest in any part of the estate of the testator. After the distribution is made and the one sixth of the two fifths is set to the estate of Lawrence Mitchell, it will be the intestate estate of Lawrence Mitchell. She will be entitled to a statutory share in that. She will take that as an interest in the estate of Lawrence Mitchell, her deceased husband, and not as any part of the estate of Elizur Mitchell. We suppose the estate of Lawrence Mitchell will have to be settled as an intestate one.

Perhaps what we have already said is sufficient; but to avoid any possible misconception we answer the questions as follows: —

To the first question we answer, no; to the second one, yes, as already explained; to the third, no; to the fourth, at the death of the testator; to the fifth, no, it does not.

MITCHELL v. MITCHELL