Ordered that the order dated May 19, 2009, is affirmed, with costs.
Generally, a party seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious claim ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Martins v Yukhayev, 63 AD3d 697, 698; Cava Constr. Co., Inc. v Gealtec Remodeling Corp., 58 AD3d 660, 661; Krisztin v State of New York, 34 AD3d 753). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the trial court ( see Rugieri v Bannister, 7 NY3d 742, 744; Young Chen v Ruihua Li, 67 AD3d 905, 906; Martins v Yukhayev, 63 AD3d at 698).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the subject motion. The plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for its default. Even were the court to accept the plaintiffs bare allegations of attorney neglect, while CPLR 2005 allows courts to excuse a default due to law office failure, "it was not the Legislature's intent to routinely excuse such defaults, and mere neglect will not be accepted as a reasonable excuse" ( Ortega v Bisogno Meyerson, 38 AD3d 510, 511 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Heidari v First Advance Funding Corp., 55 AD3d 669, 670; Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead v Jablonsky, 283 AD2d 553, 554; De Vito v Marine Midland Bank, 100 AD2d 530, 531).