PEOPLE v. DAVIS

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Docket Number

No. B216348.

Attorney(S)

Alan Stern, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Jason Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a conviction of Bruce Wayne Davis for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The offense occurred in September 2007. Davis entered a no contest plea in June 2008, prior to the effective date of a new court facilities fee statute (January 1, 2009). Sentencing was initially scheduled for December 2008, but Davis failed to appear, prompting the issuance of a bench warrant. After his arrest on the warrant, Davis was sentenced in March 2009, after the statute’s effective date, at which time the court imposed a $30 court facilities fee. Davis appealed the imposition of this fee.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the new court facilities fee imposed by Government Code section 70373 applies to convictions entered before the statute’s effective date but sentenced afterward.
What event constitutes a "conviction" for purposes of applying the fee statute: the entry of a plea/verdict or the sentencing and judgment?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Fleury (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1486	Held that the court facilities fee statute is not a penal statute and does not violate ex post facto prohibitions when applied to convictions after the effective date, even if the offense was committed earlier.	Used to support that the fee statute applies prospectively and is not penal in nature.
People v. Castillo (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1410	Confirmed that the statute operates on the event of conviction and does not violate ex post facto rules.	Clarified that the fee applies based on the conviction date, not offense date.
People v. Brooks (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1	Supported the non-penal nature of the fee and its prospective application.	Reinforced the principle that the fee statute is not ex post facto.
People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749	Held that a similar court security fee statute does not violate the ex post facto rule.	Analogized the facilities fee statute to the court security fee statute to justify its prospective application.
Ex Parte Brown (1885) 68 Cal. 176	Established that a person is convicted upon entry of a guilty plea or jury verdict.	Supported the ordinary meaning of "conviction" as the plea or verdict date.
People v. Ward (1901) 134 Cal. 301	Reinforced that conviction occurs at plea or verdict.	Affirmed the historical understanding of conviction timing.
People v. Rodrigo (1886) 69 Cal. 601	Exception: When civil penalties follow conviction, conviction is deemed at sentencing.	Distinguished cases involving civil disabilities from the present case.
Truchon v. Toomey (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 736	Same as above, regarding disenfranchisement as a civil penalty.	Used to illustrate the exception to the ordinary rule of conviction timing.
Helena Rubenstein Internat. v. Younger (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 406	When civil disabilities flow from conviction, judgment entry is required to establish conviction.	Clarified that the facilities fee does not impose civil disabilities, so ordinary rule applies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting that the court facilities fee statute, enacted in 2008 and effective January 1, 2009, imposes a small assessment on every criminal conviction to fund court facilities. It is not a penal statute and therefore does not violate ex post facto prohibitions when applied to convictions after its effective date, even if the offenses occurred earlier. Prior appellate decisions confirmed this principle and the statute’s prospective operation.

The critical question was the timing of the "conviction" event: whether it is the date of the plea or jury verdict, or the later sentencing and judgment. The defendant’s plea and offense occurred before the statute’s effective date, but sentencing occurred after.

The court reviewed longstanding authority establishing that a person is "convicted" when a guilty plea is entered or a jury verdict is returned. This is the ordinary and primary meaning. An exception exists when a civil penalty (such as disenfranchisement or debarment) follows conviction, in which case conviction is considered to occur at sentencing.

Since the facilities fee does not impose a civil disability but is a minor assessment, the ordinary rule applies: the defendant was convicted at the time of his plea in June 2008, prior to the statute’s effective date. Therefore, the statute does not apply to him.

Holding and Implications

The court reversed the order imposing the $30 court facilities fee.

The direct effect is that the defendant is not liable for the facilities fee because his conviction occurred before the statute’s effective date. The opinion clarifies the timing of conviction for purposes of this fee statute but does not establish new precedent beyond confirming the prospective application of the fee and the definition of conviction in this context.

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRUCE WAYNE DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION

EPSTEIN, P. J.

In this case we hold that the new $30 to $35 court facilities fee imposed by Government Code section 70373 does not apply to cases in which the defendant's conviction, by plea or jury verdict, was rendered before the January 1, 2009 effective date of the statute. Earlier published opinions have held that the rules against ex post facto laws and for prospective application of a new statute are not offended where the offense was committed before the effective date but the plea, verdict or sentence occurred after that date. In this brief opinion, we fill in what may be the last remaining gap about application of this small fee.

The principal provision of the new law provides: "To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court facilities, an assessment shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense, including a traffic offense, except parking offenses. . . ." The assessment is $30 for every misdemeanor or felony, and $35 for nonparking infractions. (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1).) It was enacted in 2008 as "part of a broader legislative scheme in which filing fees in civil, family, and probate cases were also raised." ( People v. Fleury (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1489 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 722].) Since its history and substance demonstrate that it is not a penal statute, in terms or effect, its application to crimes committed before the effective date does not offend the prohibition against ex post facto laws. ( Id. at pp. 1488, 1490, 1493; People v. Castillo (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1414 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 688]; People v. Brooks (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 221].) The Fleury and Castillo cases recognize that the phrasing of the statute is similar to the language of the court security fee law (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), which our Supreme Court held did not violate the ex post facto rule. ( People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 754 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 310, 171 P.3d 32].) Neither does its application offend the rule that new laws are presumed to operate prospectively. ( People v. Castillo, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 1413.) As the Castillo case points out, the question was "on what event does this statute operate." The answer, provided by the language of the statute itself, is a conviction. ( Ibid.)

That said, it remains to consider what constitutes a "conviction" — is it the verdict or guilty plea, or the ensuing sentence and judgment of conviction? It matters in this case because the no contest plea entered by defendant, as well as the offense itself, happened before the effective date. The offense, felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), was alleged to have occurred in September 2007 and the no contest plea was entered in June 2008. The defendant was ordered to appear for sentencing later in December but did not, upon which a warrant was issued for his arrest. He was picked up on the bench warrant and sentenced in March 2009, a little more than two months after the effective date. The court imposed a $30 facilities fee.

It has been settled law for over 250 years that a person stands "convicted" upon the return of a guilty verdict by the jury or by the entry of a plea admitting guilt. (See 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 262, quoted in Ex Parte Brown (1885) 68 Cal. 176, 178 [ 8 P. 829]; People v. Ward (1901) 134 Cal. 301, 308 [ 66 P. 372], quoting Justice Story's opn. in United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. 19, 40 [25 F.Cas. 1287].) These authorities and others tell us that this is the "primary" and "ordinary" meaning of the term.

But there is another, essentially an exception to the general rule. Where a civil penalty, such as disenfranchisement or debarment from office, follows as a consequence of the conviction, the conviction is held not to occur until the sentence has been pronounced. (See People v. Rodrigo (1886) 69 Cal. 601, 605 [II P 48[] [debarment]; Truchon v. Toomey (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 736 [ 254 P.2d 638] [disenfranchisement]; Helena Rubenstein Internat. v. Younger (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 406 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 473] [disqualification from holding office; case thoroughly discusses reported decisions up to that time].)

As summarized in Helena Rubenstein, "Where, as here, a civil disability flows as a consequence of the `conviction,' the majority and better rule is to require the entry of judgment." ( Helena Rubenstein Internat. v. Younger, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 421.)

Since there is no "civil disability" flowing from the small facilities fee assessment, the ordinary rule applies: the defendant was convicted when he entered his plea. Since the statute only applies to cases in which the conviction occurs on or after its effective date, it does not apply to this case.

DISPOSITION

The order imposing the $30 facilities fee is reversed.

Willhite, J., and Manella, J., concurred.