BOONE v. BENDER

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Docket Number

No. 2009-08499.

Attorney(S)

McManus, Collura Richter, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Nicholas P. Chrysanthem, Peter D. Suglia, and John A. McManus of counsel), for appellants. David M. Bushman, Nanuet, N.Y., for respondent.

Judges

Reinaldo E. Rivera
Mark C. Dillon
Ruth C. Balkin

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Kathryn M. Boone, initiated an action against the defendants, Joel C. Bender et al., alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendants had represented the plaintiff in a divorce action that concluded with a settlement before trial. The plaintiff contended that the defendants compromised their advocacy and coerced her into the settlement. The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint, which the Supreme Court, Westchester County, denied. The defendants then appealed this order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Whether the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendants failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge of a legal professional and that this breach proximately caused her damages.
Whether the plaintiff's claims of breach of fiduciary duty, being essentially claims of legal malpractice, should be governed by the same standard as legal malpractice claims.
Whether the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

The defendants contended that the plaintiff was satisfied with their representation, as evidenced by the open-court stipulation of settlement.
They argued that the plaintiff voluntarily entered into the settlement with full understanding and without coercion or threats.
The defendants asserted that their motion for summary judgment should be granted because the plaintiff could not prove essential elements of legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty.

Respondent's Arguments

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants compromised their level of advocacy and coerced her into the settlement.
She claimed that the defendants' mistakes effectively compelled the settlement, constituting legal malpractice despite the settlement of the underlying action.
The plaintiff argued that the defendants failed to zealously advocate on her behalf and that the settlement provided less monetary relief than a trial would have.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Rudolf v Shayne, Docks, Stanisci, Corker Sauer, 8 NY3d 438	Defines elements of legal malpractice: breach of duty by attorney and proximate causation of damages.	Used to establish the standard plaintiff must meet to prove legal malpractice, including causation.
McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295	Clarifies the standard of ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge required of attorneys.	Quoted to define the duty breached in legal malpractice claims.
Tortura v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath Cannavo, P.C., 21 AD3d 1082	Legal malpractice claim viable despite settlement if settlement was compelled by counsel's mistakes.	Supported the plaintiff's claim theory but was found insufficient on the facts here.
Boglia v Greenberg, 63 AD3d 973	Standard for granting summary judgment dismissing legal malpractice claims.	Applied to determine that defendants met their prima facie burden for summary judgment.
Ulico Cas. Co. v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman Dicker, 56 AD3d 1	Standard for breach of fiduciary duty claims requiring identification of conflict as substantial factor in loss.	Referenced to explain that fiduciary breach claims grounded in legal malpractice are governed by the same standard.
Breslin Realty Dev. Corp. v Shaw, 72 AD3d 258	Legal malpractice standard applied to breach of fiduciary duty claims when claims overlap.	Used to clarify the applicable standard for fiduciary duty claims in this context.
Weil, Gotshal Manges, LLP v Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 10 AD3d 267	Requires showing "but for" defendants' conduct, plaintiff would have prevailed or not sustained damages.	Applied to require plaintiff to show causation for breach of fiduciary duty claims.
GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965	Standards for summary judgment and burden shifting under CPLR 3212.	Used to evaluate whether defendants met prima facie burden and whether plaintiff raised triable issues.
Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557	Summary judgment standards requiring no triable issue of fact.	Applied to affirm defendants' prima facie showing.
Holschauer v Fisher, 5 AD3d 553	Unhappiness with settlement alone does not constitute legal malpractice.	Supported the conclusion that plaintiff's dissatisfaction was insufficient to establish malpractice.
Dimond v Kazmierczuk McGrath, 15 AD3d 526	Reasonable exercise of judgment in settlement does not constitute malpractice.	Referenced to reject plaintiff’s claim that defendants failed to advocate zealously.
Pellegrino v File, 291 AD2d 60	Speculative and conclusory allegations insufficient to defeat summary judgment.	Applied to find plaintiff’s allegations insufficient to raise triable issues.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by outlining the legal standard for proving legal malpractice, emphasizing the need to show breach of the duty of ordinary reasonable skill and that this breach proximately caused actual damages. It acknowledged that claims of breach of fiduciary duty that overlap with legal malpractice claims are governed by the same standard requiring proof of causation.

The defendants met their initial burden by presenting the open-court stipulation of settlement, which demonstrated that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly entered into the settlement without coercion or incapacity. This evidence negated the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants coerced her or compromised their advocacy.

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to produce evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Her allegations that the defendants did not zealously advocate and that the settlement was less favorable than a trial outcome were speculative and conclusory. The court noted that mere dissatisfaction with a settlement does not establish malpractice.

Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court’s denial of summary judgment, concluding that the defendants were entitled to dismissal of the complaint as a matter of law.

Holding and Implications

The order of the Supreme Court denying summary judgment is reversed, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

This decision results in the dismissal of the plaintiff’s legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the defendants. The court’s ruling affirms that, absent evidence of coercion or failure to exercise reasonable legal skill, a plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with a settlement is insufficient to sustain a malpractice claim. No new precedent was established; the court applied established legal standards to the facts presented.

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KATHRYN M. BOONE, Respondent, v. JOEL C. BENDER et al., Appellants.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

The defendants represented the plaintiff in an action for a divorce and ancillary relief which ended in a settlement prior to trial. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, alleging legal malpractice on the ground that the defendants compromised their level of advocacy and coerced her into entering into the settlement. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court denied the motion. We reverse.

"In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney `failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession' and that the attorney's breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages" ( Rudolf v Shayne, Docks, Stanisci, Corker Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442, quoting McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301-302). Furthermore, "[t]o establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the lawyer's negligence" ( Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker Sauer, 8 NY3d at 443). "A claim for legal malpractice is viable, despite settlement of the underlying action, if it is alleged that settlement of the action was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel" ( Tortura v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath Cannavo, P.C., 21 AD3d 1082, 1083 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, "[t]o obtain summary judgment dismissing a complaint in an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one of the essential elements of its legal malpractice cause of action" ( Boglia v Greenberg, 63 AD3d 973, 974).

Ordinarily, an action for breach of fiduciary duty requires a plaintiff to merely identify a conflict of interest amounting to a substantial factor in the plaintiffs loss ( see Ulico Cas. Co. v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman Dicker, 56 AD3d 1, 10). However, where, as here, the plaintiffs claims of breach of fiduciary duty are essentially claims of legal malpractice, they are governed by the same standard ( see Breslin Realty Dev. Corp. v Shaw, 72 AD3d 258, 261; Ulico Cas. Co. v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman Dicker, 56 AD3d at 10). Thus, the plaintiff must demonstrate that "but for" the defendants' conduct, she would have prevailed in the underlying matter or would not have sustained any ascertainable damages ( see Weil, Gotshal Manges, LLP v Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 10 AD3d 267, 272).

Here, the defendants met their prima facie burden of demonstrating that the complaint has no merit ( see CPLR 3212 [b]; GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 967; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). The open-court stipulation of settlement established that the plaintiff was satisfied with the defendants' representation of her, that she had discussed the terms of the settlement with the defendants, that she understood that she would have the right to a trial if she did not wish to enter into the stipulation, that she had not been threatened or forced into entering into the stipulation, that she was entering into the stipulation voluntarily and of her own free will, that she had not taken any medications that would hamper her ability to understand the court proceedings, and that she had no additional questions for the defendants. "The fact that the plaintiff subsequently was unhappy with the settlement obtained by the defendant does not rise to the level of legal malpractice" ( Holschauer v Fisher, 5 AD3d 553, 554).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment ( see GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d at 968). The defendants' reasonable exercise of judgment in pursuing a settlement did not constitute malpractice ( see generally Dimond v Kazmierczuk McGrath, 15 AD3d 526, 527), and the plaintiffs allegations, in effect, that the defendants did not zealously advocate on her behalf, and that the settlement provided her with less monetary relief than that which she would have received after a trial, were speculative and conclusory ( see Holschauer v Fisher, 5 AD3d at 554; Pellegrino v File, 291 AD2d 60, 63).