Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court's determination to designate the defendant a level three sex offender is supported by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, should not be disturbed (see Correction Law § 168-n [3]; People v Lewis, 56 AD3d 447; People v Solis, 52 AD3d 800; People v Warren, 42 AD3d 593; People v Bula, 41 AD3d 569; People v Morris, 33 AD3d 778; People v Baylor, 19 AD3d 467; People v Cureton, 299 AD2d 532).
A departure from the presumptive risk level is warranted where "there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the guidelines" (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006]; People v Bowens, 55 AD3d 809, 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d 907, 908; People v Hines, 24 AD3d 524, 525; People v Ventura, 24 AD3d 527; People v Dexter, 21 AD3d 403, 404).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a downward departure, as the defendant failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a mitigating factor "of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the guidelines" (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006]; see People v Kraus, 66 AD3d 854; People v Jacobs, 61 AD3d 835, 836; People v Bowens, 55 AD3d at 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d at 908; People v Wragg, 41 AD3d 1273, 1274; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d 520; People v Agard, 35 AD3d 568).