IN RE KARLA

ing a lot more." The social worker testified that continued visitation between Mother and Karla was important. However, Mother's progress towards reunification was characterized as "slow" and "marginal."

Father appeared by video conference and testified that he wanted Karla to live with him. Father testified that he lived in Callao, Peru, which is a safe suburb of Lima that has a children's park and a school nearby. Father testified that he had space for Karla in his three-bedroom home, in which he had lived for five or six years with his girlfriend and aunt. Karla could share a room with his ten-month old daughter, Daniela.

Father's girlfriend also has a daughter that is one year older than Karla. She lives with her father but comes to stay on weekends and during holidays.

Father also testified that, when Karla visited him for about two and a half months in 2008, he spent a lot of time with Karla and that Karla "wanted to be with [him] all the time." Father said that Karla "learned a lot of new things while she was going to school here" and that he had a large family nearby, including many children. Father testified that he had worked in customs at the port for the last two years. The job provides enough money for Father to be able to support his family and have some extra money. Father also noted that his mother has agreed to provide some additional monetary support if Karla were to come live with him.

Father stated that he planned to enroll Karla in a school where they also speak English if she came to live with him. Father also said he had made inquiries about Accion por los Ninos, where they give counseling and therapy to children who have been abused. Father stated: "I know that what [Karla] has gone through is very serious, and I want to continue the treatment that she already started. . . ." Father also testified that, from the first time he read the allegations, he had always believed his daughter. He believed that Karla will need a lot of help from him and his family and he is willing to give her all the help she needs. Father said he would be able to help Karla "[b]ecause [he] love[s] her from the bottom of [his] heart, and [he] know[s] [his] daughter." When asked why he wanted Karla to come live with him, Father testified: "Because I miss her. I miss her a lot. And because of what is the painful situation that she is going through, and to not be able to be by her side because of my situation, that's why I want to be with her."

Father said: "Whatever my daughter needs, I'm going to give it to her; time, patience. . . ." On cross-examination, Father admitted that he had previously attended anger management classes in connection with a domestic violence conviction. Father also conceded that he had not paid any child support for Karla over the past five years, despite the fact that he had been regularly employed for the past two years. When asked if he had a name for a therapist at Accion por los Ninos that would be able to see Karla, Father responded: "No, I don't have a name. I don't have a name because . . . my daughter has to be present for the type of therapy that they're going to give her here." Father also testified that he did not think Karla would be traumatized by moving to his home "[b]ecause all the affection that the family has here . . . and I know that it will help her a lot."

The court also questioned Father, as follows:

"Are you and your girlfriend prepared to handle bed wetting on a fairly regular basis, if that were to occur?

"A Yes.

"Q Were you aware that that has been a problem?

"A No, I didn't know.

"Q Are you prepared to handle behavior that could be described as sexualized behavior for a child of Karla's age?

"A Yes. Because of what you're telling me, I know that I need a lot of therapy for [Karla]. And because of that, I am going to do whatever is within my reach to help her.

"Q Now, I have lived in Latin America, and I know that, at times, there is a lot of reservation about discussing things of this nature with other people.

"Are you willing to discuss any of these issues with your family members who would have contact with Karla, so they would understand some problematic conduct that might occur?

"A Yes, I am willing to do that.

"And all my close relatives who know about this are willing to give me all the support.

"Q My concern is that if Karla, in the future when she's older, senses that this is a subject that is taboo, then she might develop a sense of shame about what she had no control over; something that happened to her that she might feel it's secret and shameful. I wouldn't want to see that happen.

"(Spanish spoken) And that it's not a shameful thing.

"A I understand what you're telling me. That's why I think I would need some therapy, some parenting classes also, to be able to help my daughter."

It was stipulated that Father's girlfriend, Father's stepmother, and Father's aunt would all testify "they had an opportunity to observe [Father] with Karla; that he was a loving father, that he provided care for her, and that he made sure she was safe. [¶] They would also testify that should Karla come to Peru, they would do what they could to make sure she healed." Numerous photographs, reflecting Father's visits with Karla and his home in Peru, were also admitted into evidence.

During argument, Karla's counsel questioned whether it would really be better to have Karla remain where she is and then send her to Father at some later date. Karla's counsel ultimately urged the court to place Karla with Father, relying on "the legislative policy [that] is always so strongly in favor of the parents. . . ." Father's counsel made a similar argument. In contrast, Mother's counsel and the Agency maintained that Karla would suffer detriment if moved to Peru, and thus, should not be placed with Father. Mother's counsel also noted: "I'm focusing on what I think is a practical concern; and that is, once [Karla] is in Peru, we have essentially made a definitive and final decision. [¶] . . . [¶] The law says you have not, your Honor. But I would be more than a bit surprised if there were any practical mechanism to exercise any oversight of a child placed in Lima, Peru. [¶] . . .[¶] Once it's done, . . . you say you do and can retain jurisdiction. As a practical matter, it will be difficult to effectuate any order from here once [Karla] is there. [¶] I think, at the very least, . . . it behooves us to have [a home] study done before taking any such action."

County counsel for the County of San Mateo (County Counsel), attorney for the Agency, pointed out: "[F]rom a practical standpoint, if [Karla] is moved to Peru right now, today, the ability of [Mother] to reunify with her child is basically gone." County Counsel also stated: "I don't know from a legal standpoint whether the Court would have the authority to bring [Karla] back from Peru over [Father's] objection. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . It's an issue of right now, at this very moment, there is clear and convincing evidence that [Karla] will suffer detriment if the bond with [Mother] is permanently severed and [Karla] is moved before [Mother] has an opportunity to at least attempt to address, in therapy, what's going on with her daughter and the daughter has an opportunity, through therapy, to at least stabilize."

Placement Order

The court concluded "that the evidence fails to show that placement with Father would be detrimental to [Karla]." In announcing its ruling, the court stated: "The standard of proof per all the case law is clear and convincing evidence; not do I sort of think [detriment] might happen and not is it even probable that [the placement] will be damaging? [¶] Is there clear and convincing evidence that it will? The evidence fails as to showing detriment in my view, factually. [¶] . . . [¶] I could find nothing in [Father's] testimony and in the vigorous cross-examination that would indicate any detriment whatsoever of any kind; that's whether he lived in Oakland or Fresno or Lima, Peru. [¶] On the other hand, in spite of [Karla] being placed with loving caregivers since September 11th, her behavior has been up and down. Her symptomatology has increased, and the more contact, it seems, with mother in the one unsupervised moment in time, the parenting classes, is when things devolve. [¶] . . . [¶] I see the detriment in not doing what I'm about to do. [¶] I agree with [Karla's counsel] that this is a matter of weighing some hurt now versus the definite chance for lots and lots of heartache along the way that might or might not result in a happy ending. [¶] I'm finding, absolutely, that I cannot make the finding of detriment."

In its written orders of October 29 and 30, 2009, the court removed Karla from Mother's physical custody, ordered placement with Father in Peru, no later than November 15, 2009, and retained jurisdiction. The court's written orders also provide that "[s]ole physical legal custody" of Karla was granted to Father. The court ordered the Agency, within three months, to complete and submit a report with an update on the placement and Karla's status. The court also provided: "Father shall keep the [Agency] notified of [Karla's] therapist's name and the treatment schedule. Father is to sign any waivers of confidentiality so that the [Agency] may be kept informed of [Karla's] status in therapy and other services." The court also ordered "a transitional good-bye visit" with Mother, as well as a therapy session for Karla, a session with her current caregivers, and a session with the person that will accompany Karla to Peru. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.

Although neither party contends that the court intended to make a final order of sole physical and legal custody, the juvenile court's written orders are internally inconsistent. The court's oral orders are also in conflict with an order of sole physical and legal custody. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court said "I'm declaring dependency, retaining jurisdiction, and placing [Karla] with her father in Peru forthwith." This made clear that the court was selecting the option found in section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2). "The Legislature did not define what it meant by `custody' in section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2). However, in the context of that subdivision, the term `custody' necessarily means `placement,' i.e., temporary physical custody, because the court is continuing its jurisdiction over the child." (In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131, fn. 2.) On the other hand, it is implicit in the meaning of "sole legal and physical custody" that the parent has the "exclusive right to control decisions about the child and to have possession of the child." (Id. at pp. 1130-1131.) Thus, the court's orders suggest both a temporary and permanent placement with Father. The courts of appeal have reached differing conclusions regarding which order controls when a juvenile court's oral pronouncements differ from its written order. (See, e.g., In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1241 fn. 5 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 288] [oral pronouncement prevails over conflicting written order]; In re Jerred H. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 793, 798 fn. 3 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 481] (juvenile court's written order terminating parental rights controlled over contrary oral pronouncements at hearing]; In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756, fn. 1 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 326] [to extent "court's oral pronouncement differed from its written order, the written order controls"].) Because the court's written orders are internally inconsistent, in that they provide for both sole legal and physical custody to Father as well as "placement" with Father and continuing jurisdiction, we conclude that the court's oral pronouncement prevails.

On November 9, 2009, Mother filed a petition for writ of supersedeas or, in the alternative, writ of mandate. We denied the petition for writ of mandate, but granted the petition for writ of supersedeas and stayed the superior court's orders of October 29 and 30, 2009, to the extent the court ordered Karla transported to Peru and placed in Father's home, pending resolution of the current appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

Mother contends that the juvenile court's placement order must be reversed because (1) the court's finding of no detriment is unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) no home study or other evaluation of Father's home was completed before the placement; and (3) the court abused its discretion by making insufficient provisions for the enforceability of its continuing jurisdiction after Karla is placed in Peru. Father has filed a respondent's brief urging us to affirm the juvenile court's orders. In the unpublished portion of our opinion we reject Mother's first two arguments. In the published portion of our opinion we agree that the court must consider if additional measures are necessary or appropriate to ensure its continuing jurisdiction and remand for that purpose.

County Counsel filed a letter stating the Agency's intent to not file a respondent's brief because the orders at issue on appeal were contrary to its recommendations.

A., B. A. Does Substantial Evidence Support the Court's Findings Regarding Placement with Father?

See footnote, ante, page 1236.

Mother asserts that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's placement determination under section 361.2, subdivision (a). As discussed above, if a child is ordered removed from a custodial parent and a noncustodial parent exists who requests custody, the court is required to place the child with that parent unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the child's safety, protection, or physical or emotional wellbeing. (§ 361.2, subd. (a); In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426 ( Luke M.); In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1827.) Mother concedes that Karla was removed from her custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1), and that Father is a noncustodial parent who requested custody. Thus, the only question we consider is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that there was no clear and convincing evidence that placing Karla with Father would be detrimental.

When a court's detriment finding under section 361.2, subdivision (a) is challenged on appeal for insufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the order and determine whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, keeping in mind the heightened burden of proof. (See In re Isayah C., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 694-695; Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1424, 1426; In re Marquis D., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1825.) We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or determine the weight of the evidence. ( In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) "Under the substantial evidence rule, we must accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 53.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there was no clear and convincing evidence that Karla would suffer detriment if placed with Father. A detriment evaluation, under section 361.2, "requires that the court weigh all relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer net harm." ( Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.) In evaluating detriment, the juvenile dependency court is entitled to consider the emotional impact that the placement will have on the child even if the noncustodial parent's conduct does not contribute to the detriment. ( Ibid.)

Mother's argument hinges on the fact that both Karla's therapist and the social worker testified that placement with Father would be detrimental. Mother contends that "Father presented no contrary expert testimony, no contrary psychological evidence, and could point to no evidence in the social worker reports or testimony that [Karla] would not suffer severe removal detriment." Mother's arguments, however, attempt to shift the statutory burden of proof, and are unavailing.

Section 361.2, subdivision (c), provides that "[t]he court shall make a finding either in writing or on the record of the basis for its determination" under subdivision (a). In this case, the court stated: "The standard of proof per all the case law is clear and convincing evidence; not do I sort of think it might happen and not is it even probable that it will be damaging?" The juvenile court, as the trier of fact, simply did not find the evidence of detriment presented by the Agency, in light of the entire record, to be "clear and convincing." During argument, the court asked: "Where is the clear and convincing evidence of detriment; not speculative evidence of detriment and not possible evidence of detriment?" From the court's statements at the contested disposition hearing, it is apparent that the court did not find Hernandez's or the social worker's testimony to be persuasive. We may not reweigh that determination. ( In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53; see also Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427.)

The court could, for example, consider that Hernandez never spoke with Father and had no basis to assess his capabilities. Nonetheless, Hernandez assumed that Father would not be able to provide Karla with the consistency, validation, and support she needs to heal.

On the other hand, the court clearly found Father's testimony and photographic evidence persuasive. With respect to Father's testimony, the court said: "Based on my listening to [Father], observing him on the television, which was extremely useful and a technological marvel, in my view — it is so much different to see someone and assess their testimony than to read what they've said in a report, to see a man who desperately wants his daughter, is devoted to the notion of being able to help her, and, perhaps, lacks not so much insight as maybe sophistication, but is willing and able and has taken steps to reach out and to become educated and learn and get the tools he's going to need to help her through this. [¶] He has a solid support group, people that I was concerned might not know what's happened. But his answer satisfied me that this is a group and team effort down there. [¶] The team in the photos looks rather large and full of what appear to be positive females and supportive people of different ages as well as lots of little kids enjoying each other's company who, whether they're relatives or friends, can only be a positive thing. [¶] I could find nothing in his testimony and in the vigorous cross-examination that would indicate any detriment whatsoever of any kind; that's whether he lived in Oakland or Fresno or Lima, Peru."

Mother argues that the juvenile court relied on speculation about the future in making its no detriment finding. Specifically, Mother argues: "Father and the trial court focused on the absence of evidence that [F]ather would not provide services to Karla which would mitigate the harm, and that there was an absence of evidence that such potential future services would not mitigate and eliminate the identified removal detriment." Mother's argument misses the mark. First, we are not concerned with "removal detriment." "[S]ection 361.2 is not a removal statute. Section 361.2 provides no basis for the court to remove a child from a parent's custody; rather it is one of the statutes that guides the court and the Agency in determining the child's placement after removal from the custodial parent pursuant to section 361." ( Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.) More importantly, Mother's argument is flawed because it assumes that the trial court was required to accept, and did accept, Hernandez's and the social worker's testimony that placement with Father would cause harm. The record is clear that the court did not.

Mother has not appealed the court's decision to remove Karla from Mother's physical custody pursuant to section 361.

There was evidence of Father's ability to provide a stable, supportive, loving, and appropriate home for Karla. Father demonstrated his awareness of Karla's special needs as a sexual abuse victim and testified that he was willing and able to ensure she got the support and services she needs. Father's lack of day-to-day physical contact with Karla is only a consequence of his deportation. Nonetheless, he has maintained contact with Karla via regular telephone calls and periodic visits. Although Father has a criminal history, including convictions for driving under the influence and domestic violence against Mother, there was no evidence of continued criminality over the last five years. Furthermore, "[t]here is no `[g]o to jail, lose your child' rule in California. [Citation.]" ( In re S. D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that there is no clear and convincing evidence that Karla would suffer detriment if placed with Father.

Mother's reliance on Luke M. does not compel a contrary ruling. In Luke M., the juvenile court found that children (Luke and Lenay) removed from their mother's custody would suffer detriment if placed with their noncustodial father in Ohio and, instead, placed the children with their paternal aunt and uncle. The social worker had recommended against placement with the father, noting that Luke and Lenay had extremely strong bonds with other siblings and did not wish to live with their father. The social worker also noted that the mother had made great strides in treatment and moving the children to Ohio would compromise reunification with her. ( Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1415-1418.) The court, in finding detriment, emphasized that it did not arise from any conduct by father, but from the lack of security that would come from separating Luke and Lenay from their siblings. A permanent plan was adopted, whereby the children would be reunified with their mother. ( Id. at p. 1419.) The children's father appealed, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the court's detriment finding. ( Id. at pp. 1415-1416.)

The reviewing court rejected the father's argument that his substantive due process rights were violated because the trial court placed sibling rights above parental rights. The court stated: "Jeffrey's argument . . . ignores an important component of the trial court's decision in this case, i.e., that it was in the best interests of the children to reunify with their mother. The social worker opined that moving the children to Ohio would impede reunification with the mother. Thus, in rendering its placement order, the court also had to balance the children's need to reunify with their custodial parent versus the noncustodial parent's right to custody. Under the circumstances of this case where the custodial parent is trying to reunify and the court has concluded such reunification would best serve the children's interests, Jeffrey's contention that sibling rights were given precedence over parental rights is misplaced." ( Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1423-1424, italics added.)

The court also rejected the father's argument that detriment must be related to parental conduct and concluded "[s]ibling relationships are clearly a relevant consideration in evaluating a child's emotional well-being." ( Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.) The court further observed: "The record amply supports a finding that there was a high probability that moving to Ohio would have a devastating emotional impact on Luke and Lenay. They depended on their siblings for love, support, and security. Since their removal, their only request of the social worker was not to be separated. . . . [¶] Further, Luke and Lenay said they wanted to live in California after visiting with [the father] in Ohio. . . . [¶] In addition, the social worker opined the children would suffer detriment if separated from their siblings. . . . [¶] . . . [T]he social worker believed the children needed to be with each other and telephoning would not be an adequate substitute. She also believed that therapy in Ohio would not address their concerns of being able to contact their siblings. The trial court could properly credit the social worker's assessments in this regard." ( Id. at pp. 1426-1427.) Based on this evidence, and the required deference to the juvenile court's factual assessments, the reviewing court there determined substantial evidence supported the court's finding of detriment. ( Id. at p. 1427.)

Mother does not argue that the trial court failed to consider Karla's relationship with her half-sibling in analyzing detriment. Rather, Mother relies on Luke M. "for the point that significant relationships of the child must be considered, and the detriment from the severance of those relationships may prevent a section 361.2 placement out-of-state." Mother again appears to misperceive the standard of review. The juvenile court, in Luke M., actually found detriment would result from placement with the father. ( Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.) The reviewing court merely concluded that substantial evidence supported the finding. ( Id. at p. 1427.) Luke M. does not suggest that a detriment finding was compelled by the evidence, much less that such a finding would be compelled by the evidence presented here. In this case, the juvenile court did consider testimony regarding Karla's relationships with Mother and other relatives in California, but here the trial court did not conclude that staying in California or attempting to reunify with Mother would best serve Karla's interests. In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564 ( John M.), is more instructive. In John M., the noncustodial father, Dewayne, appealed from a disposition order that denied his request to place John with him in Tennessee, pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (a). ( Id. at p. 1567, 1569.) A dependency petition had previously been filed on John's behalf, alleging physical abuse by John's mother, E.E. ( Id. at p. 1567.) The juvenile dependency court found detriment to John from placement with Dewayne based on John's unwillingness to live with Dewayne, John's need for services, John's relationships with a half-sibling and members of his extended family in San Diego, John's lack of a relationship with Dewayne, the paucity of information regarding Dewayne, and E.E.'s reunification plan. ( Id. at pp. 1568-1570.)

We do not otherwise consider any argument regarding reunification or visitation. Mother only hints at such an argument, but does not develop it in the body of her opening brief. Thus, we may pass it without consideration. (In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708 [parties must "`include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat appellant's . . . issue as waived'"].)

The reviewing court found only sparse evidence of John's relationship with his half-sibling and concluded that there was "no support for `a finding that there was a high probability that moving to [Tennessee] would have a devastating emotional impact on [John.]'" ( In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570.) The court also concluded that there was no support for the proposition that a move would prevent E.E. from reunifying or that such a move away from John's extended family in San Diego would be detrimental. ( Ibid.) With respect to John's wishes, the reviewing court noted that a child 14 years old "was entitled to have his wishes considered, [but] he was not entitled to decide where he would be placed. [Citation.]" ( Ibid.) Although it was clear that John needed services to address his emotional disturbance and cognitive difficulties, the reviewing court observed that the social worker admitted that she had no information that Dewayne was unable to meet these special needs. ( Id. at p. 1571.) With respect to John's relationship with his father, the reviewing court noted that the reasons for a four-year hiatus in contact were not clear, that the juvenile court found Dewayne was not to blame, and that contact had resumed approximately a year before the dependency petition was filed. Thus, the reviewing court concluded that "John's need for services, his lack of a relationship with Dewayne, and the paucity of information about Dewayne do not support the detriment finding" and that the "Agency did not meet its burden of proving detriment by clear and convincing evidence. . . ." ( Ibid.)

Mother makes no attempt to distinguish John M. on the detriment issue and, in fact, highlights the many similarities between the two cases. Even if the therapist's and social worker's testimony in this case was sufficient to support a contrary detriment finding by the trial court, we cannot reverse the trial court's finding. The order under review "will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence. [Citation.]" ( In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

B. Did the Court Err by Placing Karla with Father Before Conducting a Home Study?

Mother's counsel asked the juvenile court to require a home study as a prerequisite to placement with Father. The court responded: "I have no basis in law to do that, and I would not do that because I'm not going with [the option located in section 361.2, subdivision (b)](3)." Mother's counsel continued: "Well, your Honor, if the assessment and report within three months is for the purpose of not just telling what's going on but also to provide assistance and assurance that the desired services are going to be done, I don't know why it wouldn't be done as a prerequisite." The court remarked, "I have to follow the law. That's not the law."

On appeal, Mother argues that because "[t]he juvenile court founded its decision on the premise that it had no discretion to delay the placement decision to allow the Agency to prepare an evaluation of [F]ather's home prior to the placement . . . [¶] . . . reversal of the disposition as to the placement of Karla with [Father] in Peru is required to allow the court to receive and consider such an assessment prior to the international transfer." Specifically, Mother contends that "given the dearth of information concerning [F]ather's home, the occupants of [F]ather's home, [F]ather's ability to . . . protect [Karla], and the lack of information as to the services which would be immediately in place to meet the special needs of [Karla], the trial court abused its judicial discretion in denying [M]other's request that an assessment be conducted prior to the transfer of [Karla] to Peru."

Mother concedes that "[s]ection 361.2 does not explicitly provide authorization for the court to order an assessment or investigation prior to placing a child in the home of a previously non-custodial parent." Mother relies instead on John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 1564.

In John M., as noted ante, the noncustodial father, Dewayne, appealed from a disposition order that denied his request to place John with him in Tennessee. ( John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th. at p. 1567.) The social worker, in John M., had concluded that placement with the father was a viable option, but that a report pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC; Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.) would need to be completed first. ( John M., supra, at p. 1568.) Dewayne did not testify at the disposition hearing, but his counsel argued for a continuance so that a home evaluation could be completed, pursuant to the ICPC or by some other method. ( Id. at pp. 1568-1569.) The dependency court determined that the ICPC report was required but would take up to six weeks to complete. It then denied the continuance request, found detriment under section 361.2, subdivision (a), and ordered the child placed with relatives. ( John M., supra, at pp. 1568-1569.) Part of the basis for the juvenile court's finding of detriment was that "Dewayne was out of state, making him, `to some degree, . . . an unknown entity'. . . ." ( Ibid.)

Mother does not contend that the ICPC applies to the instant case. The ICPC governs conditions for out-of-state "placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption." (Fam. Code, § 7901, art. 3, subds. (a), (b).) "[C]ompliance with the ICPC is not mandatory when a California court places a child with a parent residing in another state." (In re Johnny S. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 969, 971; see also John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1573-1575; Tara S. v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1837-1838.)

As previously noted, the reviewing court concluded that the Agency did not meet its burden of proving detriment by clear and convincing evidence. Dewayne also argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance so that a home evaluation could be completed. ( John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1571.) The reviewing court stated: "We understand why the court was reluctant to place John with Dewayne when very little was known about Dewayne other than his lack of a criminal record. What the court should have done was continue the hearing, leaving John in his temporary placement for the period of time necessary to gather information about Dewayne." ( Id. at p. 1572.) Accordingly, it was held that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying Dewayne's continuance request. ( Ibid.)

The court also held that the juvenile court erred by concluding that an ICPC report was required before placing John with Dewayne. ( John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1575.) Nonetheless, the court observed: "While . . . ICPC compliance is not required for an out-of-state placement with a parent, nothing in the ICPC prevents the use of an ICPC evaluation as a means of gathering information before placing a child with such a parent. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Because Dewayne is a parent, the appropriate investigation is a basic one, less rigorous than the investigation necessary for placement with a more distant relative such as a cousin. While Dewayne's geographic distance from San Diego necessitates a greater effort to garner information, it should not subject him to greater scrutiny. The depth of investigation should be determined by the fact that he is John's parent, not that he lives in Tennessee." ( Id. at pp. 1572-1573.) The reviewing court provided that, on remand, "the court may order the Agency to obtain information about the suitability of Dewayne's home as a placement for John, either through the ICPC process or by alternative means." ( Id. at p. 1576, italics added.)

John M. cannot be read to suggest that a home evaluation is required in every case in which a child is placed with his or her out-of-state noncustodial parent. The John M. court did not hold that placement of a child with the noncustodial parent without receipt of a home study or similar evaluation constitutes error, or an abuse of discretion. The disposition judgment was reversed because the detriment finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. ( John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1571.) The only abuse of discretion identified by the reviewing court was the court's denial of a continuance to obtain an evaluation Dewayne himself requested, presumably to show the appropriateness of his home. ( Id. at p. 1572.)

Mother argues that the John M. court implicitly held that a juvenile court "should order [an] assessment when there is a dearth of information about the noncustodial parent's ability to provide for the care and welfare of the child." Even if John M. is susceptible to the reading advocated by Mother, there was no "dearth of information" here. Here, unlike in John M., the juvenile court clearly did not believe that Father was an "unknown entity," after having heard and observed Father's testimony by video conference regarding his living situation, his job, his extended family, and the services that would be available to Karla in Peru. The court had also reviewed the Agency's reports that detailed numerous similar conversations with Father. Father was subjected to rigorous cross-examination.

The juvenile court may well have had discretion to request an evaluation of Father's home, even if not statutorily required. Contrary to Mother's assertion, the court's statement at the disposition hearing does not indicate that the court believed it was prohibited from requesting an assessment of Father's home before making the placement, but only that there was no requirement that it do so. Rather, the court expressed its confidence in Father's repeated reports regarding his home, his employment, and the availability of both therapy and parenting classes in Peru. In this case, while there would have been no abuse of discretion in ordering further evaluation before placement, we conclude that the court properly determined it was not required to obtain a home study before it placed Karla with Father.

C. Did the Court Abuse Its Discretion by Placing Karla with Father Without Ordering Measures to Enforce Its Continuing Jurisdiction?

Finally, Mother argues that "the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the transfer of [Karla] to Peru subject to its continuing jurisdiction without any contact with Peruvian officials and without any legal assurances that it could effect the return of [Karla] to California if needed or that it could preserve its effective jurisdiction over the dependent child in Peru."

California's juvenile dependency law does not prohibit placement of children outside of the United States. (In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1412 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 863] ["we decline to apply the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius to the Welfare and Institutions Code and thereby read an implicit ban on placing dependent children in foreign countries"].) And Mother concedes that no published dependency case has held that a juvenile court abuses its discretion by placing a child subject to its continuing jurisdiction with his or her noncustodial parent in a foreign country absent protective measures.

Numerous cases have addressed international placements in the dependency context, but none have addressed the argument raised by Mother here. (See In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 460, 159 P.3d 491; In re Sabrina H., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th 1403; In re Angelica V. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1007 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 295]; In re Rosalinda C. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 273 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 58].) Furthermore, none of these cases involved placement with a noncustodial parent pursuant to section 361.2.

Nevertheless, Mother relies on several family law custody cases involving international relocation to support her argument that necessary prerequisites to such placements include assurances that the juvenile court can still maintain effective jurisdiction over the minor and that Karla would be returned if the court so ordered. In the primary opinion relied on by Mother, the Second District Court of Appeal declared that " before permitting any relocation which purports to maintain custody and visitation rights in the nonmoving parent, the trial court should take steps to insure its orders to that effect will remain enforceable throughout the minority of the affected children." (In re Marriage of Condon (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 533, 547 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 33], italics added (Condon); see also In re Marriage of Abargil (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1299, 1303-1304 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 429] (Abargil); In re Marriage of Lasich (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 702, 719, fn. 9 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 356] (Lasich).)

We need not address in any detail the supersedeas cases, on which Mother also relies to support her argument. These cases involve maintenance of the status quo while an appeal is pending. (In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225, 1229 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 619]; In re Wanomi P. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 156, 163 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 623]; In re Manuel P. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 48, 72-73 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 447]; Mills v. County of Trinity (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 859, 861 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 679]; People ex. ret. S. F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 536-537 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 790, 446 P.2d 790]; Denham v. Martina (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 30, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 757]; see also Lerner v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 676 [ 242 P.2d 321] [writ of prohibition]; Foster v. Superior Court (1935) 4 Cal.2d 125 [ 47 P.2d 701] [writ of prohibition].) We have already effectively preserved appellate jurisdiction by granting Mother's petition for writ of supersedeas. Mother's reliance on In re M.M. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 897 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 273] is also misplaced. In that case, this division held that transfer of a dependency case from California juvenile court to tribal court, and the tribal court's acceptance of jurisdiction, deprived the California courts of jurisdiction over the dependency case. (Id. at pp. 901, 906.) There has been no transfer of the juvenile dependency case before us. Mother appears to rely only on our statement that "[b]ecause the Karuk tribe is a separate sovereign, we could no more compel its courts to comply with our orders than we could compel the courts of a foreign state or nation to do so. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 913, italics added.)

In Condon, a mother sought to return to her native Australia with her two children after dissolution and child custody proceedings were decided in the California family courts, where the family had resided for several years. (Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 536-541.) The parents had been temporarily awarded joint legal and physical custody of the children. (Id. at pp. 538, 550.) The trial court concluded that while each parent was fit and "`it would be in the children's best interest to spend significant periods of unmonitored time with each parent . . . it was also in their best interest that [the mother] be allowed to reestablish her residence in Australia.'" (Id. at pp. 539-540.) Accordingly, the custody order provided that the children were to spend the school year with their mother in Australia, and spend their four school vacation periods with their father in California. (Id. at p. 540.) The children's father appealed. (Id. at p. 541.)

The reviewing court began by recognizing that, in In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473], the Supreme Court announced that a parent with primary physical custody may relocate unless the other parent demonstrates the move would be contrary to the child's best interests. (Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 535, 542-543.) However, the court noted three concerns that distinguish international relocations from intrastate or interstate relocations. "First, the cultural problem. In some cases, to move a child from this country to another is to subject him or her to cultural conditions and practices far different from those experienced by American citizens or to deprive the child of important protections and advantages not available in the other country. . . . [¶] Second, the distance problem. . . . For a person of average income or below, an order relocating his or her child to a faraway foreign country is ordinarily tantamount to an order terminating that parent's custody and visitation rights, [¶] Third, and most difficult, is the jurisdictional problem. California court orders governing child custody lack any enforceability in many foreign jurisdictions and lack guaranteed enforceability even in those which subscribe to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction[, October 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670]. Thus, the California courts cannot guarantee any custody and visitation arrangements they order for the non-moving party will be honored." (Id. at pp. 546-547, italics added.) The reviewing court emphasized that a trial court confronted with a parent's request to relocate a child internationally should consider all three of the above factors in determining the "best interests of the child." (Id. at p. 547.)

See In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1078 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 356, 88 P.3d 81] ("noncustodial parent bears the initial burden of showing that the proposed relocation of the children's residence would cause detriment to the children, requiring a reevaluation of the children's custody").

The Condon court also stated: "Finally, before permitting any relocation which purports to maintain custody and visitation rights in the nonmoving parent, the trial court should take steps to insure its orders to that effect will remain enforceable throughout the minority of the affected children. Unless the law of the country where the children are to move guarantees enforceability of custody and visitation orders issued by American courts, and there may be no such country, the court will be required to use its ingenuity to ensure the moving parent adheres to its orders and does not seek to invalidate or modify them in a foreign court." (Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 547-548, italics added.)

In Condon, the reviewing court refused to interfere with the trial court's order allowing the relocation, concluding that "the careful balance the trial court struck . . . could be reasonably found to serve the best interests of the Condon children." (Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 554.) However, the court noted: "The delicate balance the trial court struck depends on [the mother] placing her two boys on flights to Los Angeles four times a year and resisting the temptation to move away once again. . . . Meantime [the mother] once before defied the order of a California court by secretly transporting her children to Australia and keeping them there without allowing [their father] any access until the Australian courts ordered their return under mandatory provisions of the Hague Convention. . . ." (Ibid.) The children's father presented authority showing that enforcement of the family court's orders in Australia could be problematic, but that registration of the California order with the Australian courts would provide some measure of protection. (Id. at pp. 541, fn. 9, 556-557, 559-560.) The court also observed that "the Hague Convention protects a custodial parent from unlawful removal or retention of minor children for only one year" and that "the court of the requested state . . . is not bound to order the return of the child if the person opposing its return establishes the parent requesting return `was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of the removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention' or `there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 556 fn. 22.)

Because "[i]t [was] possible, although not probable, an Australian court with less stake in the children's relationship with a California father would consider it against the best interests of those children to require them to travel eight thousand miles . . . four times a year," the court concluded that "a custody order which is guaranteed enforceability for only 1 year of the remaining 10 to 12 years of minority represents an abuse of discretion by the issuing court." (Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) The court noted: "Such an order does not adequately protect the interests of this state's citizen, the father, in maintaining a relationship with his children, nor does it adequately preserve the policies this state's Legislature has declared should govern child custody arrangements." (Ibid.) After concluding the order would not have guaranteed enforceability in the Australian courts, the court remanded to the trial court to obtain the mother's concession of continuing jurisdiction in the California courts and to create sanctions calculated to enforce that concession. (Id. at pp. 535, 562.) The trial court was instructed to create sanctions, which "should include the posting of an adequate monetary bond within [the mother's] means and the potential forfeiture of all or some support payments upon proof [the mother] is disregarding essential terms of the court order or has violated the concession of jurisdiction by pursuing modification of the California order in the courts of Australia or any other nation." (Id. at p. 562.)

We note that Father here has expressed concerns about the financial burdens of a bond requirement and that he has qualified for appointed counsel based on his limited financial means.

In Abargil, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1294, and Lasich, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 702, similar protective measures were imposed to ensure the enforceability of the family court's custody orders in an international move-away context. In Abargil, a mother obtained a custody order that allowed her to move to Israel with her son. (Abargil, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1296, 1298.) The trial court ordered the mother to register the order in the Israeli courts and to similarly file her stipulation consenting to the judgment and California's continuing jurisdiction. She was also required to post a bond to ensure her compliance. (Id. at p. 1300.) Nonetheless, the father, who only had visitation rights, claimed on appeal that "California's custody orders are nullities in foreign lands, making registration of the judgment in Israel meaningless." (Abargil, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) The reviewing court concluded that the father had abandoned his claim because it was made without citation to any authority. Furthermore, the mother's expert on Israeli law noted that Israeli law permits parties to agree to be bound by a foreign judgment and then file their agreement with an Israeli court as an Israeli judgment. (Id. at pp. 1300-1301.)

Although the father had shown no error, the case was remanded, in the interests of justice, to ensure that adequate protections for enforceability were in place. The trial court was directed to modify its judgment on remand to ensure the following: "First, it shall require [the mother] to post a substantial financial bond in a specific amount sufficient to ensure her compliance with the court's judgment and orders. [Citation.] [¶] Second, it shall prohibit [the mother] . . . from attempting to modify the judgment except upon application to a California state court. [Citation.] . . . [¶] Finally, [the mother] must register the trial court's judgment with the proper Israeli authorities before she may take [the child] to Israel. Until the judgment is registered, the stay barring [the child's] departure from California shall remain in place." (Abargil, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1303-1304.)

In Lasich, a mother successfully petitioned to move with her children from Sacramento to Spain. (Lasich, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 704-705, 710.) The trial court's custody order provided the father with eight weeks of "parenting time" every summer, one week at Christmas, one week at spring break, and up to two weeks in Spain. ( Id. at p. 711.) The order also conditioned the relocation on the mother's registration of the custody order under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, October 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670 (Convention) and the mother's annual acknowledgement in the Spanish courts that the children remained habitual residents of California. The mother also conceded that California retained exclusive jurisdiction to make any custody order and was required to post a $100,000 bond, which would be forfeitable if she sought to modify the order in the courts of any other country. (Lasich, at pp. 712-713.) On appeal, the reviewing court rejected the father's argument that the trial court failed to comply with the guidelines of Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 533. With respect to enforceability of jurisdiction, the court concluded that "[t]he court . . . heeded Condon by imposing rigorous jurisdictional terms to ensure its orders will be enforceable in Spain." (Lasich, at pp. 718-719 fn. 9.) No abuse of discretion was shown. (Id. at p. 720.)

There are obvious differences between this dependency proceeding and the custody disputes at issue in Condon, Abargil, and Lasich. First, in the cited cases, neither parent had suffered a removal. "The family court is established to provide parents a forum in which to resolve, inter alia, private issues relating to the custody of and visitation with children. In that setting, parents are presumed to be fit and capable of raising their children. [Citation.] The juvenile court, by contrast, provides the state a forum to `restrict parental behavior regarding children, . . . and . . . to remove children from the custody of their parents or guardians.' [Citation.]" (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 866, 913 P.2d 1075], brackets added.) Thus, in Condon, Abargil, and Lasich, protective measures were necessary to ensure the nonmoving parent's continuing custody or visitation rights. (See, e.g., Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) Here, on the other hand, the question is Mother's ability to assert custodial or visitation rights once Karla is in Peru. The disposition orders do not provide her with any such rights.

Further, unlike the Condon, Abargil, and Lasich courts, we are not concerned with an order that requires enforceability throughout the remainder of Karla's minority. Section 361.2 specifically contemplates the possibility that dependency jurisdiction will be terminated within a short period after placement with a noncustodial parent. (See § 361.2, subd. (b)(1)"(3).) Here, one year of guaranteed enforceability would be sufficient to maintain the court's jurisdiction for the six months of continuing jurisdiction contemplated by the orders at issue. Finally, Mother has presented no authority, either to the juvenile court or on appeal, questioning Peru's willingness to accept and enforce the juvenile court's order. Mother simply asks us to presume that Peruvian courts will disregard the California juvenile court's jurisdiction.

This highlights our concern that Mother did not preserve the arguments she currently raises on appeal. During argument at the disposition hearing, Mother's counsel only asserted a vague "practical concern" that it would be "difficult to effectuate any order from here once the child is [in Peru]." After the juvenile court announced its finding of no detriment, Mother specifically advocated for the court's continuing exercise of jurisdiction, but did not argue that any particular mechanisms were needed to ensure the continuing enforceability of that jurisdiction. Needless to say, Mother cites Condon, Abargil, and Lasich for the first time on appeal.

After announcing that the court would not make a finding of detriment, the court and the parties engaged in the following colloquy: "[THE COURT:] Now the question is: Do I follow [section 361.2, subdivision (b)] (1) or (2)? [¶] (3) is out. [¶] I'm inclined, because of [County Counsel's] comments, that it would be so very difficult for the [Agency] to monitor, to follow option (1), but I'm prepared to listen to any dissent as to that and to change my indicated if anyone wants to address that issue? [¶] . . . [¶] [MINOR'S COUNSEL:] Your Honor, as counsel for the child, I would like to see the Court follow subsection (2), to ensure that therapy gets in place, that [Father] is able to find a parenting class that will address the specific needs of his child, and to ensure that we can get whatever their HSA department in Peru is on board to maybe transfer the case to that agency, [¶] MOTHER'S COUNSEL:] I would agree that among the options, that would be preferrable [sic]. . . ." (Italics added.)

Thus, we could well conclude that Mother has forfeited the issue, or invited any error, with respect to the necessity of protective measures to ensure continuing jurisdiction. (See County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1118 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 575J ["doctrine of invited error prevents a party from asserting an alleged error as grounds for reversal when the party through its own conduct induced the commission of the error"]; In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 43] ["[i]n dependency litigation, nonjurisdictional issues must be the subject of objection or appropriate motions in the juvenile court; otherwise those arguments have been waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal"]; In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 763].) The court was initially inclined to order Father as Karla's legal and physical custodian and terminate its jurisdiction. Had the court elected to do so, we would not be concerned with the preservation of its continuing jurisdiction. Furthermore, had Mother raised Condon, Abargil, or Lasich in the juvenile court, the court may well have considered entry of different orders.

We note that termination of jurisdiction would actually eliminate the risk of termination of Mother's parental rights. (See In re Sarah M. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1491 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 374], disapproved on other grounds by In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 204.)

It is difficult to fault the juvenile court for failing to order protective measures to ensure its continuing jurisdiction when it was not asked to do so. We are nevertheless concerned that the trial court has ordered a minor subject to its dependency jurisdiction placed abroad without any apparent consideration of its ability to make or enforce any further orders that may be necessary or appropriate. "[T]he underlying purpose of dependency law is to protect the welfare and best interests of the dependent child. [Citations.]" (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1424-1425 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 907].) Should problems with the placement arise, or should the court determine that Karla should be returned to Mother's custody, and the juvenile court is unable to effect her return to California, Karla's welfare would be jeopardized. Because Mother raises an important legal issue and the interests of justice weigh in favor of consideration, we will not pass the issue. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Ca1.4th 1287, 1293 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 90 P.3d 746] ["the appellate court's discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue"], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962 [84 Ca1.Rptr.3d 557]; Abargil, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303.)

Although Condon, Abargil, and Lasich are clearly not binding authority in this context, they do highlight a concern of at least equal magnitude in a dependency case such as this — whether the orders under consideration will become a nullity once the child is abroad. It may be argued that the issue is of greater concern where the juvenile court serves in loco parentis in protecting the interests of the minor. However, unlike the Condon court, we have no basis to conclude, or even assume, that the juvenile court's orders would lack enforceability or be disregarded in the Peruvian courts. (Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 535, 562.) And, we cannot heed Mother's pleas to direct the trial court to impose the prophylactic measures adopted by the Condon, Abargil, and Lasich courts because we lack any information as to what effect such measures might have in Peru. Nonetheless, simply relying on Father's word that he will honor the juvenile court's jurisdiction if the court orders Karla's return places compliance in Father's hands, rather than under the court's control, and abdicates the court's responsibility.

Nor are we persuaded that either the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA; Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.) or the Hague Convention ensure the juvenile court's jurisdiction over Karla once placed in Peru.

"It is well settled in California that the UCCJEA is the exclusive method of determining subject matter jurisdiction in custody disputes involving other jurisdictions. [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Sareen (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 371, 376 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 687], italics added.) The UCCJEA applies to juvenile dependency proceedings. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 310 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 595, 867 P.2d 706]; Fam. Code, § 3402, subd. (d).) Under the UCCJEA, California courts have jurisdiction to make child custody determinations when California is the "home state" of the child on the date of commencement of the proceeding. (Fam. Code, § 3421, subd. (a)(1).) We may accept that California's juvenile courts would be entitled, pursuant to the UCCJEA, to continue exercising jurisdiction over this case even after Karla is in Peru. (See Grahm v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 270] ["the original state retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction as long as the parent who is exercising visitation rights still lives in that state and the relationship between that parent and the child has not deteriorated to the point at which the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable"]; In re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236, 246 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 697] [Cal. juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction over children who lived in Cal. for at least six months before leaving to visit grandmother in Mexico, despite fact not physically present in state when dependency petition filed].) However, the UCCJEA provides no assurance that the sovereign Peruvian courts would agree and recognize California's continuing exclusive jurisdiction either as a matter of comity or under treaty. None of the cases cited by Father shed any light on this issue.

"`Home state' means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. . . ." (Fam. Code, § 3402, subd. (g).)

More relevant is the Convention. Father asserts that Peru is a signatory to the Convention. And Mother appears to concede as much. "The objects of the . . . Convention are — [¶] a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and [¶] b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States." (Convention, art. 1.) The Convention accomplishes these objectives by requiring the country to which the child has been removed to return a wrongfully removed or retained child to his or her country of habitual residence, unless the removing party establishes an exception or defense to return. (Convention, arts. 12, 13, 20.) Article 16 also provides that the judicial or administrative authorities of the country to which the child has been removed "shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention. . . ." (Convention, art. 16.)

In the United States, the Convention is implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq.).

Our own research indicates that Peru acceded to the Convention on June 1, 2007, and that the United States has recognized Peru's accession. (U.S. Dept. of State, Bur. of Consular Affairs, Hague Abduction Convention Country List http://travel.state.gov/abduction/ hague_issues/hague_issues_1487.html [as of July 21, 2010].) "The distinction between accession and ratification is that only nations that have ratified the Convention can be considered signatories under Article 37. Accession, by contrast, binds a country only with respect to other nations that accept its particular accession under Article 38." (Gonzalez v. Gutierrez (9th Cir. 2002) 311 F.3d 942, 945, fn. 2, abrogated on other grounds by Abbott v. Abbott (2010) 560 U.S. [ 176 L.Ed.2d 789, 130 S.Ct. 1983].)

"The removal or retention of a child is to be considered `wrongful' pursuant to the Convention where it breaches the petitioner's rights of custody, provided that the petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of the retention or removal. [Citations.] . . .[¶] If the petitioner succeeds in showing a wrongful removal or retention, the court must order the child's return to the country of habitual residence unless the respondent demonstrates that one of four exceptions applies. [Citations.]" ( In re Marriage of Forrest and Eaddy (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1211 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 172].)

Mother concedes that California is Karla's "habitual residence" under California's interpretation of the Convention. However, Mother asserts that she may be unable to seek return of Karla under the Convention or that she may be unable to enforce visitation rights under the Convention. We need not address these arguments because they were raised for the first time in Mother's reply brief. (Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747, 761, fn. 4 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 110 P.3d 903]; Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 800 (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 848, 864, fn. 12 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 366].) Furthermore, we are only concerned with the court's ability to effect return of Karla under the Convention. The parties have not pointed us to any authority, and we know of none, involving a juvenile court's ability to petition for return of a child under the Convention, nor have they suggested any mechanism by which a California court could do so.

Likewise, we need not address the numerous opinions that Mother cites for the first time in her reply brief. Suffice it to say, however, that they do not address the question presented here.

Mother also argues that one of the exceptions provided in Convention article 12, article 13, or article 20 could be used to deny Karla's return. "Under the Convention, a person claiming a child has been wrongfully removed or retained may file a petition in an appropriate court where the child is located requesting the child's return. [Citations.] If the court determines the child has been wrongfully removed or retained, the court must order the child's return subject to some narrowly construed exceptions, including when the return of the child would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or emotional harm, or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. (Convention, arts. 12 13; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2).) The court may also decline to order the child's return if the child objects to being returned and the child's age and maturity make it appropriate for a court to consider the child's views. (Convention, art. 13.) Similarly, if a petition is filed more than a year after the child's wrongful removal or retention, the court may decline to order the child's return if the child is now settled in the child's new environment. (Convention, art. 12.)" (Bardales v. Duarte (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 899].) Father, on the other hand, contends that none of the exceptions would bar Karla's return during the duration of her dependency. Both engage in pure speculation. On this record, we can only conclude that Karla's return to the United States would not necessarily be guaranteed under the Convention.

Thus, the interests of justice require remand to the juvenile court for its consideration of (1) evidence regarding recognition and enforcement of the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction under the laws of Peru and (2) imposition of any measures necessary or appropriate to ensure enforceability of the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction and its orders while Karla is outside the United States.

At minimum, the juvenile court should require Father to expressly concede the juvenile court's jurisdiction throughout the pendency of the dependency case, as Father has indicated he is willing to do.

IV. DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded for further proceedings as described above. On remand, the juvenile court is also directed to clarify, in its revised disposition orders, that Father has been awarded temporary physical custody rather than sole legal and physical custody. In all other respects the juvenile court's orders are affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

Simons, Acting P. J., and Needham, J., concurred.