ORDER
M. RODGERS, Magistrate Judge
This cause comes on for consideration upon the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation dated July 1, 2010 (Doc. 27). Plaintiff has been furnished a copy of the Report and Recommendation and has been afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). I have made a de novo determination of any timely filed objections.
Having considered the Report and Recommendation, and any objections thereto timely filed, I have determined that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted.
Accordingly, it is now ORDERED as follows:
1. The magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation is adopted and incorporated by reference in this order.
2. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as malicious, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), for Plaintiff's abuse of the judicial process.
DONE AND ORDERED.
ut the parties having raised any issue regarding that specific point of law. We find that outcome to be inequitable, and thus we feel that it should be reversed.
We have concluded that the factors for overruling precedent laid out in Robinson weigh in favor of over-ruling the retroactivity holding of Karaczewski. Moreover, we have found further justification for overruling the retroactivity holding as a result of the inequity that has arisen in this case. Accordingly, we overrule the holding of Karaczewski that gave retroactive effect to its decision.
It should be particularly noted that our holding today affects only claims based on injuries that occurred on or before the date this Court decided Karaczewski, as long as the claim has not already reached final resolution in the court system. We do not overrule any aspect of the Karaczewski opinion other than its retroactive effect. Contrary to the assertions in Justice YOUNG'S dissent, which Justices CORRIGAN and MARKMAN also join, there is no majority to overrule Karaczewski in its entirety. We note that Chief Justice KELLY concurs with this opinion in part and dissents in part because she would in fact completely overrule Karaczewski. Six justices have chosen not to agree with Chief Justice KELLY'S position to completely overrule Karaczewski, and as a result, the portrayal of the lead opinion contained in Justice YOUNG'S dissent is inaccurate. Karaczewski's interpretation of MCL 418.845 remains the law of this state for claims based on injuries that occurred after the date that Karaczewski was decided but before the effective date of the amendment of MCL 418.845 by enacting 2008 PA 499.
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the decision of the WCAC. We overrule this Court's decision to give retroactive effect to Karaczewski because the decision was erroneous, overruling it will not affect any reliance interests of the parties affected by our decision, and no undue hardship will occur as a result of our decision. Our holding affects claims based on injuries that occurred on or before the date this Court decided Karaczewski, as long as the claim has not already reached final resolution in the court system. Accordingly, we remand this case to the WCAC to continue proceedings consistent with its actions before the Karaczewski decision.
Reversed and remanded.
HATHAWAY, J., concurred with WEAVER, J.
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result, and I join the lead opinion in full except for part III(B). I agree that the interpretation of MCL 418.845 adopted in Karaczewski v Farbman Stein Co, 478 Mich 28; 732 NW2d 56 (2007), should only have been applied prospectively and that Karaczewski should be overruled to the extent that it held otherwise. I write separately because whereas the lead opinion applies the stare decisis approach from Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), I continue to prefer the modified version of this approach articulated by Chief Justice KELLY in Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 316-320; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (opinion by KELLY, C.J.). The result, however, is the same.
Under my preferred approach to stare decisis, there is a presumption in favor of upholding precedent that may be rebutted only if there is a compelling justification to overturn precedent. Id. at 317. In determining whether a compelling justification exists, courts may use a number of evaluative criteria if relevant but, importantly, a compelling justification requires more than a mere belief that a case was wrongly decided. Id. at 319-320. In this case, the narrow question presented is whether there is a compelling justification to overrule' the Karaczewski majority's decision to apply its interpretation of MCL 418.845 retroactively.
In Petersen, Chief Justice KELLY provided a list of criteria that courts may use to consider whether there is a compelling justification, but the list is nonexhaustive and none of the criteria are determinative. They only need to be evaluated if relevant. See Petersen, 484 Mich at 320 (opinion by KELLY, C.J.).
One criterion is particularly relevant to this question: the extent of reliance on the prior interpretation of MCL 418.845 and the extent to which overruling it might cause special hardship and inequity. See id. at 320. Although the reliance interests usually weigh against overruling a decision or, at "best, are neutral, this case presents the unusual situation in which the reliance interests weigh in favor of overruling a decision. As noted in the lead opinion, the cases that will be affected by prospective application of Karaczewski are only those involving injuries that occurred before Karaczewski was decided. In those cases, overruling Karaczewski's retroactive application and restoring the pre-Karaczewski status quo is in accordance with the reliance interests. In fact, inequity and hardship could result if the retroactivity of Karaczewski is not overturned. This is demonstrated by this case, in which the parties, relying on the pre-Karaczewski status of the law, had been litigating the merits of the case for six years when Karaczewski was decided. Thus, because I think that the reliance interests formed in this and other similar cases constitute a compelling justification to overrule precedent, I concur in the majority's decision to overrule the retroactive application of Karaczewski''s interpretation of the statute.
Indeed, the usual tensions present in a stare decisis analysis are absent in this case. Generally, stare decisis balances two concerns: "the need of the community for stability in legal rules and decisions and the need of courts to correct past errors." Id. at 314. In this case, however, both concerns are advanced by overruling the retroactive application of Karaczewski.
As stated by then Justice KELLY in Karaczewski, the essential rationale of the pre-Karaczewski interpretation of MCL 418.845 had been in place for seven decades and was an essential part of the workers' compensation regime in Michigan, such that "[a]ttorneys, employers, insurance carriers, and various employees" had relied on it for years. Karaczewski, 478 Mich at 62 (KELLY, J., dissenting).
KELLY, C.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the lead opinion that Karaczewski v Farbman Stein Co should never have been applied retroactively. I would overrule Karaczewski in its entirety because I continue to believe that it should not have overruled Boyd vWG Wade Shows and Roberts v I X L Glass Corp. As I stated in my dissent in Karaczewski, during the 74 years that Roberts was controlling law, the Legislature took no steps to change or amend MCL 418.845. Again, when this Court affirmed that interpretation of MCL 418.845 in Boyd, the Legislature did nothing.
Karaczewski v Farbman Stein Co, 478 Mich 28: 732 NW2d 56 (2007).
Boyd vWG Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515; 505 NW2d 544 (1993).
Roberts v IX L Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932).
Karaczewski, 478 Mich at 46-47 (KELLY, J., dissenting).
Only after this Court upset 74 years of law in Karaczewski did the Legislature speak, by enacting 2008 PA 499. It abrogated Karaczewski scarcely more than two years after it was decided. Although some discard any use of legislative acquiescence as a tool for interpreting legislative intent, it is difficult to take issue with the fact that the Legislature took explicit action here.
See House Legislative Analysis, SB 1596, December 11, 2008 (stating that "the Michigan Supreme Court reversed longstanding case law" in Karaczewski and "eliminated coverage for injuries that had previously been covered under the act, reducing compensation for injured workers, and causing potential problems for employers"); Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 1596, November 12, 2008 (explaining that the purpose of 2008 PA 499 is to restore the Workers' Compensation Agency's jurisdiction in response to Karaczewski).
I recognize that 2008 PA 499 ultimately expanded jurisdiction in workers' compensation cases beyond where it had been before Karaczewski. But the legislative analyses make clear that the amendment was in direct response to Karaczewski and sought to restore jurisdiction to the Workers' Compensation Agency.
Furthermore, I believe that the Robinson factors clearly call for overruling Karaczewski. First, as discussed previously, the enactment of 2008 PA 499 was a change in the law that undercut and undermined the original basis for the decision. Allowing the central, holding of Karaczewski to remain intact has a disturbing effect. It disenfranchises the unfortunate group of out-of-state workers with contracts for hire made in Michigan who were injured on the job after Karaczewski was decided but before 2008 PA 499 went into effect. I believe that 2008 PA 499 is evidence that the Legislature did not intend to arbitrarily deprive this group of benefits.
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
I remain committed to the stare decisis factors I proposed in Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 317-320; 773 NW2d 564 (2009), and I believe that this Court should adopt those factors.
Second, overturning Karaczewski Would not work an undue hardship. Reliance on it has been minimal, given that it was decided recently. Because it displaced 74 years of precedent in Michigan, it is not "so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone's expectations" that overruling it would result in "significant dislocations." Karaczewski itself displaced reliance interests by overturning a fundamental part of the workers' compensation regime, even if only for a brief period, thanks to the Legislature's quick enactment of 2008 PA 499.
Robinson, 462 Mich at 466.
See Karaczewski, 478 Mich at 51-61 (KELLY, J. dissenting) (discussing the Robinson factors as applied to Roberts and Boyd and finding that not a single factor supported overruling them).
I believe these compelling justifications necessitate that this Court overrule Karaczewski. Accordingly, while I concur with the majority that Karaczewski does not apply retroactively, I would overrule it entirely.
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I concur fully in and sign the lead opinion reversing the decision of the Workers' Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC), remanding this case to the WCAC, and overruling the holding of Karaczewski v Farbman Stein Co, 478 Mich 28; 732 NW2d 56 (2007), that gave the Karaczewski decision retroactive effect.
I write separately to correct the mistaken assertions in Justice YOUNG'S dissent, which is signed by Justices CORRIGAN and MARKMAN, including the mistaken assertions of these "remaining three" regarding my position on stare decisis.
Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN comprise "the remaining three" justices of the former "majority of four," which included former Chief Justice TAYLOR.
The dissent attempts to characterize the majority's opinions and decision not to apply Karaczewski retroactively as a decision to effectively overrule Karaczewski. This characterization is not only incorrect and inaccurate, it is misleading and intellectually deceptive.
Further, the dissent's attempt to characterize the lead opinion as being representative of a so-called new philosophical majority is also false. There is no philosophical majority in this case. While the justices forming the majority each agreed with the result in this case, each justice reached his or her conclusion based on different reasons.
The dissent attempts to make an argument that there is some sort of philosophical majority that wants to overrule Karaczewski in its entirety. However, one need look no further than the various opinions written in this case to see that there is no such majority for that proposition. When Karaczewski was decided in 2007, I concurred in the substance of the opinion, and I continue to see nothing wrong with its statutory analysis. On the other hand, Chief Justice KELLY is dissenting in part from the lead opinion in this case for the very reason that she thinks Karaczewski needs to be completely overruled. Her position is understandable, given that she dissented from the entire decision in 2007 when Karaczewski was decided. But there are currently not four votes for her position, so her position is not the majority's position. Rather, there are in essence six justices who have for whatever reason decided not'to joi n with the Chief Justice's position to overrule all of Karaczewski in this case. The dissent simply ignores that fact for the convenience of making the mistaken conclusions in the dissenting opinion seem more palatable.
It appears that the dissent is attempting to lump together the four justices who agree with parts of the lead opinion into having had some sort of previously stated fidelity to stare decisis that those justices have abandoned since former Chief Justice TAYLOR'S overwhelming defeat in the 2008 election.
The dissent quotes various past statements, made by those justices signing portions of the lead opinion, regarding stare decisis and criticizing the former "majority of four" (former Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN). With respect to myself, the dissent quotes a statement I made in response to the improper and unfair dismantling of decades of longstanding insurance contract law by the former "majority of four" in Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass `n, 473 Mich 562; 702 NW2d 539 (2005). In Devillers, I stated, "Correction for correction's sake does not make sense. The case has not been made why the Court should not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis in this case." Id. at 622 (WEAVER, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
The dissent's use of my Devillers statement appears to be a weak attempt to manufacture some sort of story to tiy to get people to believe that a philosophical majority of justices exists and is out to overrule precedent created by the "majority of four." The dissent's mistaken assertions that I have somehow changed my view of stare decisis since former Chief Justice TAYLOR was defeated and that I am part of a philosophical majority are simply incorrect.
My Devillers statement itself shows that I was criticizing the disregard for stare decisis in that specific case. My Devillers statement is an example of my service to the rule of law and a partial expression of my view of the policy of stare decisis, which is that past precedent should generally be followed but that, in deciding whether wrongly decided precedent should be overruled, each case should be looked at individually on its facts and merits through the lens of judicial restraint, common sense, and fairness.
I agree with the sentiment recently expressed by Chief Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court in his concurrence to the decision in Citizens United v Federal Election Comm, 558 US ___, ___; 130 S Ct 876, 920; 175 L Ed 2d 753, 806 (2010), when he said that
stare decisis is neither an "inexorable command,"
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U S. 558, 577 [
123 S Ct 2472;
156 L Ed 2d 508] (2003), nor "a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,"
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 [
60 S Ct 444;
84 L Ed 604] (1940). . . . If it were, segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws would be unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal suspects without first obtaining warrants. See
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 [
16 S Ct 1138;
41 L Ed 256] (1896), overruled by
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 [
74 S Ct 686;
98 L Ed 873] (1954);
Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525 [
43 S Ct 394;
67 L Ed 785] (1923), overruled by
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 [
57 S Ct 578;
81 L Ed 703] (1937);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 [
48 S Ct 564;
72 L Ed 944] (1928), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 [
88 S Ct 507;
19 L Ed 2d 576] (1967).
Chief Justice Roberts further called stare decisis a "principle of policy" and said that it "is not an end in itself." Id. at; 130 S Ct at 920; 175 L Ed 2d at 807. He explained that "[i]ts greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal — the rule of law It follows that in the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent." Id. at; 130 S Ct at 9*1; 175 L Ed 2d at 807.
Over the past decade, the principal tool used by this Court to decide when a precedent should be overruled is the set of guidelines that was laid out in Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), an opinion written by former Justice TAYLOR that Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, MARKMAN, and I signed, and that I have used numerous times. In the instant case, my lead opinion specifically, and properly, applies the Robinson guidelines. Thus, the dissent's assertion that I have changed my view on stare decisis makes no logical sense.
Furthermore, I note that my position in Devillers is in no way inconsistent with my position on stare decisis in this case, nor is it inconsistent with any position on stare decisis that I have taken in other cases, such as Robinson. Devillers involved the "majority of four" overruling precedent involving contract interpretation from a case that was nearly twenty (20) years old. In my Devillers dissent, I noted that I agreed with the majority's interpretation that the old precedent was incorrect, but given the passage of time since that specific precedent was decided, the Court should not disturb that longstanding precedent because the law had become so ingrained that to overrule it would harm the reliance interests of parties in insurance cases. My position in Devillers was entirely consistent with the reliance prong of the Robinson guidelines.
For an explanation of the various prongs of the Robinson guidelines, see the lead opinion, ante at 466.
My position in the instant case is also consistent with the reliance prong of the Robinson guidelines since Karaczewski, the case of which a portion is now being overruled, was only decided three (3) years ago. Furthermore, the portion that is being overruled is merely that decision's retroactive effect — applying the new decision to parties' past actions. My statement in Devillers is actually supportive of my position in the instant case because in both instances my position has been to apply the long-standing law that parties had relied on when their cases arose.
The dissent cannot point to a statement where I professed some sort of position regarding stare decisis as an immutable doctrine, because I have not taken that position and therefore have made no such statements. For instance, I specifically chose not to sign Chief Justice KELLY's lead opinion in Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 316-320; 773 NW2d 564 (2009), because it proposed to create a standardized test for stare decisis. There is no need for this Court to adopt any standardized test regarding stare decisis. In fact, it is an impossible task.
There are many factors to consider when deciding whether or not to overrule precedent, and the importance of such factors often changes on a case-by-case basis. The Robinson guidelines are relevant in cases such as the instant case, in which reliance interests are at risk. By no means do I consider the Robinson guidelines a "be-all, end-all test" that constitutes precedent of this Court to be used whenever this Court considers overruling precedent. I view Robinson as merely providing guidelines to assist this Court in its legal analysis when pertinent.
In the end, the consideration of stare decisis and whether to overrule wrongly decided precedent always includes service to the rule of law through an application and exercise of judicial restraint, common sense, and a sense of fairness — -justice for all.
YOUNG, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from the decision by the majority of justices to "overrule the retroactive effect of Karaczewski." Having failed to identify any flaw in the analysis of Karaczewski, overruling the application of the case is simply a means of substantively overruling Karaczewski without explicitly saying so. Karaczewski properly interpreted the plain language of MCL 418.845, and it was appropriately applied to the case at bar by the lower courts. Because the majority justices essentially render Karaczewski an advisory opinion, I dissent.
Karaczewski v Farbman Stein Co, 478 Mich 28; 732 NW2d 56 (2007).
At the time of plaintiffs injury, MCL 418.845 provided:
The bureau shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury
and the contract of hire was made in this state. Such employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation and other benefits provided by this act. [Emphasis added.]
Here, there is no question that plaintiff was not a resident of this state when he was injured. Therefore, pursuant to MCL 418.845 and Karaczewski, the magistrate correctly held that the Workers' Compensation Agency did not have jurisdiction. This Court expressly stated in Karaczewski that its decision was to be applied to all pending cases. Karaczewski, 478 Mich at 44 n 15 ("[O]ur holding in this case shall apply to all claimants for whom there has not been a final judgment awarding benefits as of the date of this opinion."). Because this was a pending case when Karaczewski was decided, Karaczewski is applicable.
It is irrelevant that defendant did not pursue this jurisdictional issue until after Karaczewski was decided. All courts "must upon challenge, or even sua sponte, confirm that subject-matter jurisdiction exists . . . ." Reed v Yackell, 473 Mich 520, 540; 703 NW2d 1 (2005) (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.). Thus, subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, even if raised for the first time on appeal. Lehman v Lehman, 312 Mich 102, 105-106; 19 NW2d 502 (1945); In re Cody's Estate, 293 Mich 697, 701; 292 NW 535 (1940); In re Estate of Fraser, 288 Mich 392, 394; 285 NW 1 (1939).
As Karaczewski noted, since the very first workers' compensation jurisdictional statute was enacted in 1921, the law consistently provided the Michigan workers' compensation system jurisdiction over out-of-state injuries when both (1) the injured employee resided in this state at the time of injury and (2) the contract of hire was made in Michigan. However, in Boyd v W G Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), this Court declined to enforce the residency requirement because to do so would be "undesirable" and "unduly restrictive" and because the requirement had been ignored by this Court since Roberts v I XL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932). Karaczewski overruled Boyd on the basis of the rather unremarkable proposition that the use of the conjunction "and" in MCL 418.845 was unambiguous and that the statute must be applied as written. Nonetheless, in order to protect the reliance interests of injured plaintiffs who had already received an award of compensation benefits as part of a final judgment, Karaczewski's holding was given limited retroactive effect, applying only to claimants who had not received a final judgment awarding benefits as of the date of the opinion. While the Legislature subsequently amended the relevant statutory provision to expand the agency's jurisdiction over out-of-state injuries, the Legislature chose not to give the amended statute retroactive application, thus leaving claimants such as plaintiff subject to the holding in Karaczewski.
Boyd, 443 Mich at 524.
However, as the dissenting justices in Boyd noted, the rationale of Roberts was based on the elective nature of workers' compensation in place at that time Roberts was decided. The dissenters noted that the analytical underpinnings of Roberts were eliminated when the Legislature made the workers' compensation scheme compulsory in 1943. Before Boyd, several Court of Appeals opinions had enforced the plain language of the statute on this basis. See Wolfv Ethyl Corp, 124 Mich App 368; 335 NW2d 42 (1983); Bell v FJBoutell Driveaway Co, 141 Mich App 802; 369 NW2d 231 (1985); Hall v Chrysler Corp, 172 Mich App 670; 432 NW2d 398 (1988).
Karaczewski, 478 Mich at 44 n 15. While I agree with the lead opinion's statement that this Court's decisions are generally given full retroactive effect, Karaczewski was explicitly given limited retroactive effect.
2008 PA 499, effective January 13, 2009.
See Brewer v AD Transp Express, Inc, 486 Mich 50; 782 NW2d 475 (2010).
The fact that the Legislature amended MCL 418.845 after this Court's decision in Karaczewski without indicating that it intended the amended statute to be applied retroactively makes this case significantly distinguishable from Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675; 641 NW2d 219 (2002), in which this Court did apply its holding prospectively only, because in Pohutski the Legislature amended the pertinent statute before this Court's decision and, thus, had no reason to indicate that it intended the amended statute to apply retroactively rather than this Court's yet-to-be-decided decision in Pohutski. Even plaintiffs counsel acknowledged as much at oral argument when he stated, "I think that is a factual difference between Pohutski and this case and consequently you'd not be — certainly not required to follow or apply Pohutski to this case . . . ."
The justices in the majority are unable to identify any analytical defect in the substantive holding in Karaczewski; indeed, Justice WEAVER explicitly concurred in Karaczewski's substantive analysis. Instead, they elect to overrule the limited retroactive application of the opinion in favor of purely prospective application. However, as Wayne Co v Hathcock explained, purely prospective opinions are effectively advisory opinions, and our constitutional authority to issue advisory opinions is limited to those circumstances set forth in Const 1963, art 3, § 8, which are clearly not applicable in the present case.
Interestingly, Justice WEAVER would have preferred to deny the benefit of the Karaczewski ruling even to the parties appearing before the Court in Karaczewski. Karaczewski, 478 Mich at 45 (WEAVER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 484 n 98; 684 NW2d 765 (2004) ("[T]here is a serious question as to whether it is constitutionally legitimate for this Court to render purely prospective opinions, as such rulings are, in essence, advisory opinions. The only instance in which we are constitutionally authorized to issue an advisory opinion is upon the request of either house of the Legislature or the Governor — and, then, only `on important questions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its effective date.'"), quoting Const 1963, art 3, § 8.
The decision in this case is another instance in which the'Court's new philosophical majority seems to retreat from its previously stated fidelity to stare decisis. Since the shift in the Court's philosophical majority in January 2009, the new majority has pointedly sought out precedents only recently decided and has failed to give effect to other recent precedents of this Court. Today, by overruling the retroactivity of Raraczewski, the Court again refuses to apply a recent precedent of this Court. Because the justices in the majority use prospectivity as a means of substantively overruling Karaczewski, I dissent.
See, e.g., Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 712; 641 NW2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 517-518; 668 NW2d 602 (2003) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) ("`We have overruled our precedents when the intervening development of the law has "removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies." . . . Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress' original intent. . . our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes.'"), quoting Neal v United States, 516 US 284, 295; 116 S Ct 763; 133 L Ed 2d 709 (1996), quoting Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 173; 109 S Ct 2363; 105 L Ed 2d 132 (1989); Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 278; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) ("`Under the doctrine of stare decisis, principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction become precedent which should not be lightly departed.'"), quoting People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61, 79; 461 NW2d 884 (1990); Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354, 365; 550 NW2d 215 (1996) ("[A]bsent the rarest circumstances, we should remain faithful to established precedent."); Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 473 Mich 562, 622; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (WEAVER, J., dissenting) ("Correction for correction's sake does not make sense. The case has not been made why the Court should not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis in this pase."); Berg, Hathaway attacks, Michigan Lawyers Weekly, October 27, 2008 ("`People need to know what the law is,' Hathaway said. `I believe in stare decisis. Something must be drastically wrong for the court to overrule.'"); Lawyers' election guide: Judge Diane Marie Hathaway, Michigan Lawyers Weekly, October 30, 2006 (quoting Justice HATHAWAY, then running for a position on the Court of Appeals, as saying that "[t]oo many appellate decisions are being decided by judicial activists who are overturning precedent").
See, e.g., Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; ___ NW2d ___ (2010) (overruling Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784); McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180; ___ NW2d ___ (2010) (overruling Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611); Lenawee Co Bd of Rd Comm'rs v State Auto Prop Cos Ins Co, 485 Mich 853 (2009) (directing the parties to consider whether Miller v Chapman Contracting, Ml Mich 102; 730 NW2d 462, was rorrectly decided); Edry v Adelman, 485 Mich 901 (2010) (directing the parties to consider whether Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53; 631 NW2d 686, was correctly decided); Lansing Sch Ed Ass'n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349; ___ NW2d ___ (2010) (overruling Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm'rs, 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900); Anglers of the Au Sable, Inc v Dep't of Environmental Quality, 485 Mich L067 (2010) (directing the parties to consider whether Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestle Waters North America Inc, 479 Mich 280; 737 NW2d 447, and Preserve the Dunes, Inc v Dep't of Environmental Quality, 471 Mich 508; 684 NW2d 847, were correctly decided); Hoover v Mich Mut Ins Co, 485 Mich 881 (2009) (directing the parties to consider whether Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521; 697 NW2d 895, was correctly decided); Colaianni v Stuart Frankel Dev Corp, 485 Mich 1070 (2010) (granting leave to appeal to consider whether Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378; 738 NW2d 664, was correctly decided).
See, e.g., Hardacre v Saginaw Vascular Servs, 483 Mich 918 (2009), in which the majority failed to follow Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008); Sazima v Shepherd Bar Restaurant, 483 Mich 924 (2009), in which it failed to follow Chrysler v Blue Arrow Transp Lines, 295 Mich 606; 295 NW 331 (1940), and Camburn v Northwest Sch Dist (After Remand), 459 Mich 471; 592 NW2d 46 (1999); Vanslembrouck v Halperin, 483 Mich 965 (2009), in which it failed to follow Vega v Lakeland Hosps, 479 Mich 243, 244-245; 736 NW2d 561 (2007); Juarez v Holbrook, 483 Mich 970 (2009), in which it failed to follow Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008); Beasley v Michigan, 483 Mich 1025 (2009), Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth, 483 Mich 1081 (2009), and Ward v Mich State Univ, 485 Mich 917 (2009), in which it failed to follow Rowland; and Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 483 Mich 1032 (2009), in which it failed to follow Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643; 391 NW2d 320 (1986), and Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454 Mich 626; 563 NW2d 683 (1997).
CORRIGAN and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J.