U OF M REGENTS v. TITAN INS

HATHAWAY, J. (concurring).

I fully concur with Chief Justice KELLY'S analysis and conclusion in this matter and support overruling Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006). I also fully concur with Justice WEAVER'S stare decisis analysis in her concurring opinion. I write separately to express my own thoughts on the doctrine of stare decisis.

Given the debate amongst the justices of this Court concerning what constitutes the proper stare decisis analysis, I find it insightful to review how our United States Supreme Court has treated the doctrine. Stare decisis is a principle of policy that commands judicial respect for a court's earlier decisions and the rules of law that they embody. See Harris v United States, 536 US 545, 556-557; 122 S Ct 2406; 153 L Ed 2d 524 (2002); Helvering v Hallock, 309 US 106, 119; 60 S Ct 444; 84 L Ed 604 (1940). " Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhancled, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 827; 111 S Ct 2597; 115 L Ed 2d 720 (1991). However, when balancing the need to depart from precedent with the need to adhere to established precedent, it is important to bear in mind that stare decisis is neither an "inexorable command," Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 577; 123 S Ct 2472; 156 L Ed 2d 508 (2003), nor "a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision," Helvering, 309 US at 119. "If it were, segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws would be unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal suspects without first obtaining warrants. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 [ 16 S Ct 1138; 41 L Ed 256] (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U S. 483 [ 74 S Ct 686; 98 L Ed 873] (1954); Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U.S. 525 [ 43 S Ct 394; 67 L Ed 785] (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 [ 57 S Ct 578; 81 L Ed 703] (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 211 U S. 438 [ 48 S Ct 564; 72 L Ed 944] (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 [ 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576] (1967)." Citizens United v Fed Election Comm, 558 US ___, ___; 130 S Ct 876, 920; 175 L Ed 2d 753, 806 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

I too believe that stare decisis is a principle of policy. As stated in Helvering:

We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence

involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.

I do not agree with any approach to stare decisis that suggests or implies that it is a "rule" or "law" subject to a particularized test to be used in all circumstances. Any particular approach to stare decisis, such as the one taken in Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), is not "law" or "established precedent" that would require us to overrule, reject, or modify its analysis. The Robinson approach to stare decisis, just as the one taken in Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300; 773 NW2d 564 (2009), is one among many varying approaches, and no particular approach, in and of itself, is inherently superior to another. As with any policy determination, the approach taken in any given case will depend on the facts and circumstances presented.

Historically, the United States Supreme Court has utilized many different approaches to stare decisis, including such approaches as those involving a "compelling justification," "special justification," and a determination that a case was "wrongly decided." Each of these approaches is valid and offers a different nuance to stare decisis consideration. However, because stare decisis is a policy consideration, which must be considered on a case-by-case basis, the particular analytical approach will differ from case to case. Most importantly, the critical analysis should be on the rationale regarding whether or not to change precedent.

It is also worthy to note that not only has the United States Supreme Court historically not taken one single approach to the application of stare decisis, the Court has not felt compelled to discuss stare decisis in all cases when precedent is being overturned. Many landmark cases that overruled well-established precedent did not discuss or even mention the phrase "stare decisis." For example, Brown overruled Plessy, thereby ending segregation in our public schools, without mentioning the phrase "stare decisis," much less articulating and following a particularized test. Similarly, Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), which established the rights of indigents to have counsel in all criminal cases, not merely capital offenses, overruled Betts v Brady, 316 US 455; 62 S Ct 1252; 86 L Ed 1595 (1942), again without mentioning "stare decisis" or a particularized test. Instead, both of these cases focused on the important policy considerations that weighed in favor of overruling precedent.

With these principles in mind, any analysis of the impact of stare decisis must focus on the individual case and the reason for overruling precedent. Thus, the reasons for overruling Cameron are paramount to any articulated test and the special and compelling justifications to do so are overwhelming in this case. As I agree with the well-articulated reasons expressed by Chief Justice KELLY, I will not repeat them here.

KELLY, C.J. (concurring).

I authored the majority opinion in this case and therefore join it in its entirety. I write separately because Justices YOUNG and CORRIGAN continue to misleadingly refer to a statement I made off the bench nearly two years ago that was published by the Detroit Free Press. They seem to believe that this statement provides them insight into my motivation for voting as I have in every subsequent case that has come before the Court. They are manifestly incorrect. To be clear, my remark reflected my desire to "undo . . . the damage" done to the good reputation of this Court as an institution during the former majority's tenure. My only "agenda" was and is to restore nationwide respect to this Court and to chart a new course of civility Of course, I do not control Justice YOUNG'S pen. His dissenting opinion demonstrates that my efforts in the area of civility have not yet been as successful as I hoped.

Written opinions serve an important function in the judicial process: they provide a forum in which the majority and dissenting justices debate the legal issues raised in cases. Sometimes that debate focuses on a narrow question. Other times, the debate extends to broader legal questions with wider implications, such as the doctrine of stare decisis, a particularly controversial matter.

It is no secret that the philosophical divisions among the justices on this Court are deep. For some years now, our disagreements on legal questions have erupted in occasionally heated and unpleasant personal recriminations. This case is a perfect example.

I know that, if asked, both Justices YOUNG and CORRIGAN would agree with my sentiments and would deplore these outbursts. Both justices fully understand that personal recriminations reduce the public's confidence in the objectivity and wisdom of judges and in the Court as an institution.

With these reflections in mind, I urge them to reevaluate the utility of their ad hominem attacks and eliminate them. Surely each has significant confidence in the strength of their legal arguments to allow those arguments to stand on their merits, absent distracting attack props. Moreover, their personal assaults do nothing to resolve the legal issues before us; they do not benefit the parties to a case or the citizens of Michigan whom we serve.

I sincerely regret having to address these matters in the first place and would prefer that this opinion were not necessary. But I cannot stand passively by and allow Justices YOUNG and CORRIGAN to accuse me and the justices in the "new majority" of being unprincipled and driven by inappropriate motives. Their attacks wrongly accuse Justices CAVANAGH, WEAVER, HATHAWAY, and me of reaching predetermined outcomes in many, if not all, cases rather than following the law, as we are sworn to do.

People respect the judiciary only insofar as they believe that judges decide cases impartially and without ulterior motives. Justices YOUNG'S and CORRlGAN's assertions in this and previous cases that we have an "agenda" that involves selecting and overturning certain precedents is unfair and untrue. Furthermore, it undermines respect both for the justices attacked and for those making the unwarranted accusations. Most importantly, it reduces public confidence in the judiciary as a whole.

YOUNG, J. (dissenting).

Evidently, the governing standard is to be what might be called the unfettered wisdom of a majority of this Court,

revealed to an obedient people on a case-by-case basis. This is not only not the government of laws that the Constitution established; it is not a government of laws at all.

— Antonin Scalia, in Morrison v Olson

I agree entirely with Justice MARKMAN's dissenting opinion in this case. I write separately only to note that, today, the decade-long shrill pretense of several of my colleagues' adherence to "preserving precedent" is over. The concurring opinions of Justices WEAVER and HATHAWAY make clear that there is no longer any need for them to pretend that "precedent" is anything sacred for the "new majority" of this Court. That mask has now been cast aside. After a decade of dissents in which Justices CAVANAGH, WEAVER, and KELLY played the recurrent theme that they were hawk-like adherents to stare decisis, attacking the then majority — Justices TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, MARKMAN, and me — for failing to preserve cases with whose results they agreed, today precedent is no longer an "issue." Nor is precedent now an issue for my newest colleague, Justice HATHAWAY, although her campaigns for election to the Court of Appeals and this Court featured prominently her position adamantly proclaiming an absolutist support for stare decisis.

The new majority, being a majority, is now free to do as it pleases. And it pleases the new majority to honor the agenda to which our new Chief Justice pledged them after the defeat of Chief Justice TAYLOR in 2008:

We the new majority [Chief Justice KELLY and Justices CAVANAGH, WEAVER, and HATHAWAY] will get the ship off the shoals and back on course, and we will undo a great deal of the damage that the Republican-dominated court has done. Not only will we not neglect our duties, we will not sleep on the bench

The new majority has not been shy about acting on its agenda to "undo" the precedents of the "Republican-dominated court." In the 18 months of its existence, the new majority has moved muscularly in making good on this promise. Just in this term alone, the new majority has overturned the following cases recently decided by this Court:

1. In People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010), the new majority overruled People v Derror, 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006).

2. In McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180; ___ NW2d (2010), the new majority overruled Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004).

In Lansing Sch Ed Ass'n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349; ___ NW2d ___ (2010), the new majority overruled (at least) the following cases:

3. Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm'rs, 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 (2001);

4. Crawford v Dep't of Civil Serv, 466 Mich 250; 645 NW2d 6 (2002);

5. Nat'I Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608; 684 NW2d 800 (2004);

6. Associated Builders Contractors v Dep `t of Consumer Indus Servs Dir, 472 Mich 117; 693 NW2d 374 (2005);

7. Mich Chiropractic Council v Comm'r of the OfficepfFin Ins Servs, 475 Mich 363; 716 NW2d 561 (2006);

8. Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Sch, 479 Mich 336; 737 NW2d 158 (2007);

9. Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestle Waters North America Inc, 479 Mich 280; 737 NW2d 447 (2007); and

10. Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637; 753 NW2d 48 (2008).

11. In Bezeau v Palace Sports Entertainment, Inc, 487 Mich 455; NW2d . (2010), the new majority expressly overruled the limited retroactive effect of Karaczewski v Farbman Stein Co, 478 Mich 28; 732 NW2d 56 (2007).

12. And in this case, the new majority now overrules Cameron v Auto Club InsAss'n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006).

And this list is separate and distinct from those cases in which the new majority has ignored or otherwise failed to follow other recently decided precedents of this Court, or the case that the new majority implicitly overruled by enacting a contradictory court rule. Several justices have even gone so far as to call into question the continued validity of precedents that are in no relevant way before the Court. Indeed, by expressly overruling cases this term when, last term, it simply ignored or implicitly overruled them, the new majority has become more aggressive in achieving its policy agenda.

It is a touch more than ironic that Justices WEAVER and HATHAWAY now argue that well-established principles of stare decisis must give way to a justice's subjective view of a case. This process produces a result whereby the parties and the public will never know what criteria or standards several justices on this Court will employ until after the decision has been made. This ad hoc, subjective process is the very antithesis of the "rule of law" and instead denotes a system hijacked by the concurring justices, who appear to be guided and constrained only by their personal beliefs. That stare decisis is a "principle of policy," as Justice HATHAWAY repeats many times, does not mean that analysis of a case pursuant to the doctrine should be driven by each judge's personal policy choices. Nor does the fact that stare decisis is a "principle of policy" mean that judges need not announce a fixed set of principles that will-guide their decisions. Yet this is precisely what char acterizes Justices WEAVER and HATHAWAY's unique brand of feckless jurisprudence announced today.

The rule of law, by definition, requires judges to decide cases on the basis of principles, announced in advance, rather than on a personal or subjective preference for or against a party before them. This ensures stability in the law despite the diversity of judges' personal beliefs. Whether we, as judges, "like" the outcome is, quite simply, irrelevant to whether it reflects a correct conclusion of law. It is harrowing that Justices WEAVER and HATHAWAY either do not understand this concept or refuse to subscribe to it, preferring to base their decisions on subjective "policy consideration [s]."

Finally, Chief Justice KELLY has tried on several occasions to explain away what, she meant when she said the "new majority" would "undo . . . the damage [of] the Republican-dominated court," as she again attempts today. Chief Justice KELLY finds it disquieting that I quote her remarks about the "new majority's" agenda. She should. Her remarks are as disquieting as they are scurrilous. What is noteworthy is that Chief Justice KELLY has never repudiated what she said, apologized for it, or sufficiently explained why that statement doesn't mean what it plainly says. Instead, she merely prefers that I not repeat it for reasons that are obvious to all. Rare is it that a judge publicly tells the public that she has an agenda and what it is. I am glad that the Chief Justice was so candid because everyone can examine her conduct in light of her statement. Her motivations for making this dreadful remark and whether her subsequent resolution of cases is consistent with her remark are questions for the public to decide.

Moreover, after being the target of much uncivil criticism by then Justice KELLY over the years, I am nonplussed by the Chief Justice's pique at the passion of my dissent and the tone in which I have expressed it. One need only review the Chief Justice's dissenting opinions over the years to acknowledge that her views on civility have conveniently changed as quickly as the new majority's view regarding the importance of preserving precedent. Now that she is part of this Court's philosophical majority, her criticism of my impassioned tone recalls a line from Shakespeare: "The lady doth protest too much, methinks."

Moreover, the Chief Justice's calls for civility are especially hypocritical given the very ugly reference she made to the false "sleeping judge" ads that played so prominent a role in the campaign to defeat Chief Justice TAYLOR in 2008. Given the context that this remark was made just after the defeat of Chief Justice TAYLOR in the last election, Chief Justice KELLY'S final comment that "we will not sleep on the bench" was a particularly uncivil reference denigrating our distinguished former colleague. Chief Justice KELLY was present during the arguments of the case in which it was falsely asserted that Chief Justice TAYLOR fell asleep, and she knew, or should have known, that the claim was false. These facts are impossible to square with her current desire to improve civility among members of the Court.

The public should be just as indignant as I am — not only regarding the hypocrisy of the new majority's radically changing views on the question of preserving precedents, but also with its equally radically subjective approach to the law. I will continue to strive to bring such issues to the public's attention. The public may judge whether the former majority's or this new majority's opinions provided greater predictability in the law and were more faithful to the actual language of the statutes, or whether the legislative "work product" was disregarded for the pet policies of the several justices who formed these respective majorities. Indeed, in a constitutional republic where judges are elected, it is the obligation of the public to do just that. Otherwise, for the foreseeable future, the public can look forward to more "damage control" in the form of brash judicial activism from the new majority.

CORRIGAN, J., concurred with YOUNG, J.

MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).

I dissent from the instant decision overruling Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006), which held that the no-fault automobile insurance act's one-year-back rule, MCL 500.3145(1), is a damages-limiting provision, not a statute of limitations, and Liptow v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 272 Mich App 544; 726 NW2d 442 (2006), which held that MCL 600.5821(4) does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule.

MCL 500.3145(1), part of the no-fault automobile insurance act, provides, in pertinent part: "[T]he claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced." (Emphasis added.) This is known as the one-year-back rule. MCL (500.5821(4), part of the Revised Judicature Act (RJA), provides, in pertinent part:

Actions brought in the name of . . . any political subdivision of the state of Michigan . . . for the recovery of the cost of maintenance, care, and treatment of persons in hospitals . . . are not subject to the statute of limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the provisions of any statute notwithstanding. [Emphasis added.]

In Cameron, this Court held that the minority/insanity tolling provision of the RJA, MCL 600.5851(1), which addresses when one may "bring [an] action," does not preclude the application of the no-fault automobile insurance act's one-year-back rule because the latter only limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered, i.e., the one-year-back rule is a damages-limiting provision rather than a statute of limitations. See also Howard v Gen Motors Corp, 427 Mich 358, 385-386; 399 NW2d 10 (1986) (lead opinion by BRICKLEY, J.) (explaining that the one and two-year-back rules of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act are not statutes of limitations). I continue to believe that Cameron was correctly decided.

The one-year-back rule "limits the amount of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits recoverable to those incurred within one year before the action was commenced." Cameron, 476 Mich at 58 n 1. As Cameron explained:

By its unambiguous terms, MCL 600.5851(1.) concerns when a minor or person suffering from insanity may "make the entry or bring the action." It does not pertain to the damages recoverable once an action has been brought. MCL 600.5851(1) then is irrelevant to the damages-limiting one-year-back provision of MCL 500.3145(1). Thus, to be clear, the minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1) does not operate to toll the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1). [ Id. at 62.]

That is, the one-year-back rule by its straightforward language serves only as a limitation on the regovery of benefits; it does not define a period within which a claimant may file a cause of action. Therefore, the one-year-back rule is not a statute of limitations, and it lies outside the scope of what is affected by the RJA's minority/insanity tolling provision.

The tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) tolls the limitation that applies to the "bring[ing of an] action"; however, it does not toll the limitation that applies to the "recover[y of] benefits," in particular the limitation set forth in MCL 500.3145(1). Accordingly, although a plaintiff may not be prohibited from "bring[ing] the action," a plaintiff is prohibited from "recover[ing] benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced." [ Id. at 77 (MARKMAN, J., concurring).]

The majority, apparently believes that it is appropriate to overrule Cameron because Cameron overruled Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982). First, Geiger was a Court of Appeals decision, and thus not binding upon this Court. Catalina Mktg Sales Corp v Dep't of Treasury, 470 Mich 13, 23; 678 NW2d 619 (2004). Second, as Cameron itself explained:

In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals [in Geiger], looking behind the language of the statute and focusing on its understanding of the Legislature's purported intent, determined that the legislative purpose behind the minority/insanity tolling provision for periods of limitations was to preserve not only a person's cause of action during the period of disability but also the person's damage claims. It opined that to not read the statute in this fashion would "severely limit the utility" of the minority/insanity tolling provision. The Court then concluded that, "[i]n order to advance the policy of RJA § 5851," the minority/insanity tolling provision applies to prevent the capping of damages under the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1).

We believe this ruling was erroneous for the most uncomplicated reason; namely, that we must assume that the thing the Legislature wants is best understood by reading what it said. Because what was said in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) is clear, no less clear is the policy. Damages are only allowed for one year back from the date the lawsuit is filed. We are enforcing the statutes as written. While some may question the wisdom of the Legislature's capping damages in this fashion, it is unquestionably a power that the Legislature has under our Constitution. Thus, because Geiger's conclusion that the minority/insanity tolling provision applies to extend the one-year-back rule is contrary to what the Legislature clearly directed in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1), Geiger is overruled. [ Cameron, 476 Mich at 63-64.]

The majority here commits the same error that Geiger committed. That is, the majority believes that it can somehow discern the purpose of the statute from something other than its actual language, despite the fact that this Court has repeatedly held that this constitutes an improper approach to statutory interpretation. As I explained in my concurring opinion in Cameron:

In Geiger v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch, 114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982), the Court of Appeals held that the minority/insanity tolling provision does toll the one-year-back rule of the no-fault automobile insurance act. However, the only reason it gave for reaching such a conclusion is that "[a] contrary rule would severely limit the utility of the minority saving provision . . . ." Id. at 291. I do not necessarily disagree with Geiger that not tolling the one-year-back rule may well "limit the utility" of the tolling provision, perhaps even "severely," but that is often what happens when there are statutes that are in tension with one another. It can be argued just as easily that to do the opposite, to toll the one-year-back rule, would be to "severely limit the utility" of the one-year-back rule. In-deed, it can be argued that to toll the one-year-back rule is not merely to "severely limit its utility," but to do it even greater damage by vitiating its language altogether. In the end, the Geiger rationale is not even a legal rationale at all; rather, it is little more than a statement by the majority in Geiger that it preferred a different statute than the one actually enacted by the Legislature. [ Id. at 83-84 (MARKMAN, J., concurring).]

The majority criticizes Cameron on the basis that "[t]he only authority cited for [its] interpretation was in Justice MARKMAN's concurring opinion, which relied on dicta from Justice BRlCKLEY's lead opinion in Howard v Gen Motors Corp." This statement very much illustrates the flaw in the majority's approach to statutory construction — it fails to recognize that the best indicator of the Legislature's intent is the language of the statute itself. That is, the best "authority" cited in either the majority or concurring opinions in Cameron for their interpretation is the actual language of the statutes at issue. That the majority fails to apprehend this first principle of statutory interpretation sufficiently speaks to the shortcomings in its analysis.

Finally, with regard to the majority's apparent belief that it is somehow appropriate to overrule Cameron because Cameron overruled Geiger, even if Geiger were controlling precedent — which it is not — the majority errs by conflating all precedents as deserving of equal respect, However, as I explained in my concurring opinion in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 226; 731 NW2d 41 (2007), "not all precedents are built alike . . . ." Indeed, "some are better reasoned than others,. . . some are grounded in the exercise of discretionary judgments and others in the interpretation of plain language, [and] some are thorough in their analyses and others superficial." Id. As discussed earlier, while Cameron entailed a serious effort to interpret the language of the law and to render our caselaw consistent with this language, Geiger, as also explained earlier, was principally grounded in a desire to advance the policy of the minority/insanity tolling provision over the policy of the one-year-back rule of the no-fault act. For these reasons, Cameron's overruling of Geiger can hardly be equated with the majority's overruling of Cameron. The former entailed an effort to render the caselaw of our state more consistent with the intentions of the Legislature, while the latter renders it less consistent. The majority has never quite grasped that the issue of stare decisis is one that cannot be viewed exclusively in quantitative terms, but must also be viewed in qualitative terms. By indiscriminately placing on equal footing all decisions of this Court that overrule precedent, without considering whether each does so in order to further the intentions of the lawmaker or to further the intentions of the judge, the majority communicates well the flaws in its understandings of stare decisis and of the judicial role itself.

In Liptow, the Court of Appeals, relying on this Court's decision in Cameron, held that MCL 600.5821(4) does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule because MCL 600.5821(4) only exempts the state and its political subdivisions from a statute of limitations and the one-year-back rule is a damages-limiting provision, not a statute of limitations. This Court denied leave to appeal in Liptow, 478 Mich 853 (2007), and I agree with the Court of Appeals' decision. As the Court of Appeals explained in Liptow:

MCL 600.5821(4) provides that actions brought by the state or its subdivisions to recover the cost of maintenance, care, and treatment of persons in state institutions "are not subject to the statute of limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the provisions of any statute notwithstanding." We conclude that, by the plain import of this language, the Legislature intended to exempt the state from statutes of limitations when bringing an action to recover public funds. The language refers to statutes of limitations and provides that an action may be brought at any time. But the statute does not address damage limitation provisions or any other limiting provisions. In other words, like the minority tolling provision, MCL 600.5821(4) concerns the time during which the state may bring an action; it "does not pertain to the damages recoverable once an action has been brought." Cameron, supra, 476 Mich at 62. Accordingly, we conclude that MCL 600.5821(4), like the minority tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1), does not operate to toll the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1). Cameron, supra, 476 Mich at 61-62. [ Liptow, 272 Mich App at 555-556 (emphasis in the original).]

While the RJA, specifically MCL 600.58:21(4), states that an action by the state or one of its political subdivisions "may be brought at any time without limitation," the no-fault act, specifically MCL 500.3145(1), states that the claimant "may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced." (Emphasis added.) Having the right to bring a cause of action is not the equivalent of having the right to recover an unlimited amount of damages. Therefore, when these two provisions are read together, it is clear that while a political subdivision may bring an action at any time, it cannot recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. In other words, MCL 600.5821(4), which pertains only to when an action may be commenced, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which only limits how much can be recovered after the action has been commenced.

The majority overrules Liptow simply because it relied on Cameron. Because I believe that Cameron was correctly decided and that Liptow appropriately relied on Cameron, I would not overrule either Cameron or Liptow. As is obvious from the flood of opinions that the majority has recently overruled, the majority justices' repeated self-proclamations of adherence to stare decisis were merely a reflection of the fact that they agreed with the particular decisions that were being overruled. For a more thorough discussion of the majority justices' past expressions of fealty toward stare decisis, see my dissent in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 262-279; — NW2d — (2010). However, the lead opinion's reliance on Chief Justice KELLY'S opinion in Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300; 773 NW2d 564 (2009), which only Justice CAVANAGH joined, rather than the majority opinion in Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), should not go unnoticed. For a thorough discussion of Chief Justice KELLY'S Petersen standard for overruling precedent, see my dissent in Petersen, 484 Mich at 350.

What also cannot go without comment; is the lead opinion's conclusion that "upholding Cameron is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests" and, thus, that "this [ Petersen] factor weighs heavily in favor of overruling Cameron." Given that the lead justices believe that it is appropriate to consider their own conceptions of "public interests," their relative silence is telling with regard to the "public interest" in the viability of our state's no-fault system. It has been repeatedly recognized that because of the mandatory nature of no-fault insurance, the Legislature" intended that it be affordable. The lead opinion gives little heed to the fact that its decision will once again raise the premiums of all insured drivers in this state.

The majority also asserts that because "MCL 600.5821(4) lists the costs [for which recovery may be sought] as those for the `maintenance, care, and treatment of persons in hospitals, homes, schools, and other state institutions,'" it "supersedes all limitations in MCL 500.3145(1), including the one-year-back rule's limitation on the period of recovery." In other words, the majority contends that MCL 600.5821(4) provides an absolute right to recover the enumerated costs. The problem with this argument, however, is that the statute says no such thing. The statute does not say that there is an unfettered right to recover the enumerated costs. Instead, MCL 600.5821(4) says only that "[a]ctions brought . . . for the recovery of the [enumerated] cost[s]. . . are not subject to the statute of limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the provisions of any statute notwithstanding." That is, the reference to "the recovery of the cost[s]" is in the context of describing what types of actions are not subject to the statute of limitations — those "[a]ctions brought. . . for the recovery of the [enumerated] cost[s] . . . ." Nowhere within the statute is there any indication that the Legislature intended to preclude any and all limitations on the amounts of money the state and its political subdivisions can recover. Instead, because MCL 600.5821(4) only pertains to when an action may be brought, it "is irrelevant to the damages-limiting one-year-back provision of MCL 500.3145(1)." Cameron, 476 Mich at 62.

Plaintiffs also argue that Liptow was inconsistent with Univ of Mich Regents v State Farm Mutlns Co, 250 Mich, App 719; 650 NW2d 129 (2002), in which the Court of Appeals held that MCL 600.5821(4) in the RJA exempts the state and its political subdivisions from the no-fault act's statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1). Specifically, the Court held:

The language of the statute clearly indicates that the Legislature intended to exempt the state and its political subdivisions from all statutes of limitation. Thus, [MCL 600.5821(4)] exempts plaintiff from the statute of limitations contained in [MCL 500.3145(1)]. [ Id. at 733 (emphasis added).]

However, as the Court of Appeals explained in Univ of Mich Regents v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 12, 2009 (Docket No. 281917):

[T]he decision in Univ of Michigan Regents [v State Farm Mut Ins Co] concerned "statutes of limitation," not "the damages-limiting portion of MCL 500.3145(1), the one-year back rule." Consequently, there is no conflict between. Univ of Michigan Regents and Liptow.

As this Court has explained, "MCL 500.3145(1) contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered[.]" Cameron, 476 Mich at 61, citing Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 473 Mich 562, 574; 702 NW2d 539 (2005). First, "an action for PIP benefits must be commenced within a year of the accident unless the insured gives written notice of injury or previously received PIP benefits from the insurer." Cameron, 476 Mich at 61. Second, "[i]f notice was given or payment was made, the action can be commenced within one year of the most recent loss." Id. Third, under the one-year-back rule, "[r]ecovery . . . is limited to losses incurred during the year before the filing of the action." Id. Univ of Mich Regents v State Farm concerned the statute of limitations portion of MCL 500.3145(1), not the one-year-back rule. Therefore, there is utterly no inconsistency between Univ of Mich Regents v State Farm and Liptow.

The Court of Appeals dissent stated, "I believe that the holding in Liptow takes an irrationally and improperly narrow view of this statute by holding that it exempts entities like plaintiff[s] from a one-year limitation on bringing an action but not from a one-year limitation on recovering in such an action." Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket No. 276710) (DAVIS, P.J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original). Cameron involved a very similar situation. In my concurring opinion in Cameron, I indicated that I was concerned because

although the tolling provision instructs minors and insane persons that they are entitled to wait until one year after their legal disabilities have been removed to bring their civil actions, if they do-wait, they will only be allowed to recover what may be a portion of the total damages incurred. [ Cameron, 476 Mich at 73 (MAEKMAN, J., concurring).]

However, I concluded that, regardless of my concerns about the wisdom (or lack thereof) of the statute, a judge is bound to follow this language. The same remains true here. Although to some it may seem less than optimal to exempt entities such as plaintiffs from a one-year limitation on bringing an action, but not also from a one-year limitation on recovery in that an action, that is clearly what the Legislature has done, and it is entitled to act in a way that is viewed with disapproval by members of the judiciary.

Nor is this, assuming arguendo that such is a relevant consideration, an "absurd result." Even to the extent that an "absurd result" doctrine exists in Michigan, a result is only "absurd" if it is "`quite impossible that [the Legislature] could have intended the result. . . .'" Id. at 85 n 9 (MARKMAN, J., concurring), quoting Pub Citizen v United States Dep't of Justice, 491 US 440, 470-471; 109 S Ct 2558; 105 L Ed 2d 377 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). It is entirely possible that the Legislature could have intended the result reached in Liptow. For example, the Legislature " might have intended these results in order to make no-fault insurance more affordable." Cameron, 476 Mich at 80 (MARKMAN, J., concurring) (emphasis in the original), citing Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521, 539; 697 NW2d 895 (2005) (stating that this Court has always been cognizant of the potential problem of "cost containment for this mandatory coverage" when interpreting the no-fault act), citing Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 599; 267 NW2d 72 (1978) (holding that "[i]n choosing to make no-fault insurance compulsory for all motorists, the Legislature has made the registration and operation of a motor vehicle inexorably dependent on whether no-fault insurance is available at fair and equitable rates"). Conceivably, as well,

a reasonable lawmaker might have intended to maintain the solvency of insurers, and to enhance their ability to undertake future planning, by protecting them from multimillion dollar lawsuits filed many years after medical expenses have been incurred, and only after relatively manageable month-to-month expenses have been allowed to develop into more extraordinary decade-to-decade expenses. [ Cameron, 476 Mich at 81-82 (MARKMAN, J., concurring) (emphasis in the original).]

That is,

[s]uch a lawmaker might have sought to obligate those who have incurred medical expenses to seek reimbursement on a relatively ongoing basis, rather than allowing them to wait for many years before seeking compensation. Indeed, it is conceivable that a reasonable lawmaker might have wished to incentivize earlier, rather than later, causes of action in order to encourage those who have incurred medical expenses to act in a manner consistent with their own financial self-interest, and to ensure that their medical expenses were reimbursed expeditiously. [ Id. at 82 (emphasis in the original).]

"Finally, a reasonable lawmaker might have concluded that practical problems pertaining to evidence and proofs in old claims required some balance between the interests of the [claimant] and those of the insurer." Id. (emphasis in the original).

As the majority acknowledges, "if the one-year-back rule applies to [plaintiffs'] claim, plaintiffs are entitled to no damages," because all of their losses were "incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced," MCL 500.3145(1). Indeed, all of plaintiffs' losses were incurred in 2000, and yet plaintiffs waited until 2006 to file this cause of action. Because I believe, for the reasons set forth above, that the one-year-back rule does apply to plaintiffs' claim, I conclude that plaintiffs' damages are not recoverable. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

CORRIGAN and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.