Summary : The Plaintiff appealed the magistrate judge's order denying the Plaintiff's motion to recuse himself. The Court denied the appeal, finding that the magistrate judge's order was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL FROM MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER
DANIEL HOVLAND, Chief Judge
Before the Court is Plaintiff Thomas Bray's "Objection to Refusal of Recusal by Magistrate Miller and Demand for Recusal by Magistrate Miller" filed on July 23, 2010. See Docket No. 122. Bray appeals from Magistrate Judge Miller's order denying Bray's request to recuse himself, dated July 6, 2010. See Docket No. 108.
Bray contends Judge Miller should recuse himself "for causes of judicial misconduct, coercion, ultra-vires, violation of Code of Judicial Conduct and extreme bias and prejudice." See Docket No. 122. According to Bray, Judge Miller forced Bray into swearing or affirming to tell the truth at the beginning of his deposition in violation of his religious and spiritual beliefs. Bray further contends that Judge Miller is biased against him and offers several examples of this alleged bias including: (1) Judge Miller imposing several discovery limitations; (2) Judge Miller commenting during a scheduling conference that in cases where money and mortgages are concerned, banks usually come out ahead; (3) both Judge Miller and the Defendants' attorney being members of the State Bar Association of North Dakota; and (4) the Clerk of Court sending Bray a notice that if he did not file an answer to the counterclaim within 20 days, judgment by default would be taken.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. . . .
"Whether a judge actually has a bias, or actually knows of grounds requiring recusal is irrelevant." Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648 (8th Cir. 2002). The issue is "`whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned by the average person on the street who knows all the relevant facts of the case.'" Id. (quoting In re Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1358 (8th Cir. 1996)).
The United States Supreme Court has held that "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541 (1994). Recusal is required only when the judicial rulings "evidence such deep-seated favoritism or antagonism as would make fair judgment impossible." Id. Further, "opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring during current or prior proceedings are not grounds for a recusal motion unless they display a similar degree of favoritism or antagonism." Id.
In accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.1(D)(2), a Magistrate Judge's order will be set aside only if it is found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Having carefully reviewed the pleadings and Judge Miller's order, the Court finds that the decision was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to the law. All of Bray's examples of coercion and bias occurred in the course of judicial proceedings and consisted of "judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary admonishments." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 541. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff's appeal (Docket No. 122).
IT IS SO ORDERED.