upporting medical opinion, Resort primarily criticizes the medical panel's assessment of Dr. Mooney's and Dr. Braun's evaluation of Jones and reiterates both of those doctors' general recommendations against surgery. Resort argues, in essence, that the findings in this case are arbitrary and capricious because the Commission adopted the findings of the medical panel recommending surgery rather than the opposing recommendations of Resort's medical experts.
¶ 29 The Commission, in deciding to adopt the medical panel's findings, considered the evidence, which included reports in conflict with the medical panel's recommendations, before it adopted the findings of the medical panel. The medical panel similarly considered all of the evidence, including reports from Dr. Mooney, Dr. Braun, and Dr. Hood, each recommending against surgery for Jones, and conducted its own evaluation of Jones, before giving its opinion that surgery is reasonable and necessary. The medical panel, in its March 24 report, explained the reasons it disagreed with the recommendations against surgery. The Commission considered all the evidence, as it is required to do, and ultimately found that the medical panel's opinions were more persuasive and that Jones is entitled to the recommended medical care as outlined in the medical panel's report. The record makes it clear that the Commission properly considered the differing recommendations regarding surgery and resolved these differences in Jones's favor. The record contains substantial evidence supporting the Commission's findings. We therefore affirm the Commission's factual findings.
The medical panel report discussed Dr. Mooney's report and explained that
[t]he above listed findings on her radiologic diagnosis demonstrate there is significant back pathology, so I feel that the caution that is indicated by [Dr.] Mooney is certainly indicated, but in view of the fact that he was under the impression that she had minimal problems, I feel that one would have to reconsider his recommendations.
The medical panel further considered the uncertainty in Dr. Braun's recommendation against surgery. Dr. Braun, in his report, opined that
[w]eighing all the factors available to me presently, I do not find Donna Jones to be a good surgical candidate at this time. Certainly this should not condemn Donna Jones to nonoperative treatment or to any specific form of treatment, as she has the right to pursue additional surgical opinions. I would be happy to discuss the above with Donna and additionally to provide her with the names of both orthopedic and neurosurgeons in this community that would be able to provide her with appropriate additional opinions and recommendations regarding her condition.
It is the Commission's responsibility "to consider not only the report of the medical panel, but also all of the other evidence and to draw whatever inferences and deductions [that] fairly and reasonably could be derived therefrom." Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d 748, 753 (Utah 1985).
IV. Commission's Denial of Resort's Motion for Remand
¶ 30 Resort next argues that the Commission erred in refusing to grant Resort's request to remand this matter to the ALJ for an additional hearing concerning Jones's current medical status to determine if any physician was actually willing to perform the surgery. "A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion for Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of [Utah Code s]ection 63G-4-302." Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1(0); see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-302 (2008) (providing parties twenty days after the date an order is issued to file a written request for reconsideration with the agency and stating that the agency shall issue a written order granting or denying the request and if no order is issued within twenty days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered denied). The standard governing our review has been set out in Kent v. Department of Employment Security, 860 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). "[A]ppellate courts should employ an intermediate standard, one of some, but not total, deference, in reviewing an agency's application of its own rules." Id. at 986. We review the Commission's application of its rules for reasonableness and rationality. See id.
¶ 31 In its motion for reconsideration, Resort offered a new, more recent medical opinion from yet another doctor, Dr. Warren Stadler, recommending against surgery. Resort argued that because three years had passed since the Commission awarded benefits, including a finding that spinal surgery was needed, more recent information from Dr. Stadler indicated that Jones's circumstances might have changed and, as such, the Commission should order a new evidentiary hearing to decide whether Jones still required surgery. The Commission reviewed the new medical opinion and determined that "the medical consultant based his opinion on the medical evidence that the medical panel already had reviewed." In other words, there was no new medical information, but simply a new opinion based on information already reviewed by the medical panel and the Commission. As a result, the Commission "decline[d] to reopen the evidentiary record to include [Dr. Stadler's] recent medical opinion on issues already decided."
¶ 32 The Commission's decision to deny a new evidentiary hearing following a new medical opinion on issues already decided is within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. If the process of determining benefits were to require a new hearing following each new opinion, without requiring actual new information or status, the process would potentially never end. The Commission did act reasonably in reviewing the new medical opinion and then determining that the opinion did not provide new information regarding Jones's current status sufficient to necessitate a new evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.
CONCLUSION
¶ 33 Resort argues that the Commission erred by affirming the ALJ's decision to admit Dr. Hood's late-filed first report. The ALJ found that good cause existed for the admission of the late-filed medical report. The ALJ determined that based on the circumstances surrounding the filing of the medical report and medical exhibit that it was appropriate to admit the late-filed evidence. The ALJ acted reasonably, in the exercise of sound discretion, and we hold that it was not unreasonable or irrational for the Commission to conclude that the ALJ acted within the provisions of Utah Administrative Code rule 602-2-1(H)(5). As such, we affirm the Commission's determination to allow the late-filed medical report.
¶ 34 Resort further argues that the Commission erred by affirming the ALJ's decision in violation of administrative rules and Resort's due process rights. Resort did not raise these particular arguments in proceedings before the administrative agency. Nor did Resort argue that plain error or exceptional circumstances exist to permit review. We therefore decline to reach these issues.
¶ 35 Resort asserts that the Commission erred by affirming the ALJ's decision to submit the matter to a medical panel. In undertaking a review of the Commission's findings of fact, "[we] will not overturn the Commission's factual findings unless they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly without cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence." McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 10, ¶ 25, 41 P.3d 468 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the time the ALJ referred the matter to the medical panel, there were conflicting medical reports in the record. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission's decision does not exceed the bounds of reason and rationality.
¶ 36 Resort next argues that the Commission erred in adopting the medical panel report, which recommended surgery, as part of its factual findings. Resort's argument centers around the fact that the report was not supported by the other medical opinions in evidence that recommended against surgery. The Commission, however, considered all of the evidence regarding the conflicting recommendations and found the medical panel report persuasive. We conclude that the record contains substantial evidence to affirm the Commission's adoption of the medical panel report and we decline to overturn the Commission's findings. See id.
¶ 37 Resort argues that the Commission erred in refusing to remand this matter to the ALJ concerning Jones's current medical status. In considering Resort's motion for reconsideration, the Commission reviewed the new medical opinion Resort filed and determined that it did not provide new information regarding Jones's current status sufficient to necessitate a new evidentiary hearing. The Commission's decision to deny Resort's motion for reconsideration was within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Accordingly, we affirm the actions and decisions of the Commission.
¶ 38 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and STEPHEN L. ROTH, Judges.