Ordered that on the Court's own motion, the notices of appeal and cross appeal are treated as applications for leave to appeal and cross-appeal, and leave to appeal and cross-appeal is granted ( see CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court conducted, in effect, a nonjury trial with respect to the issue of standing. In reviewing the Supreme Court's findings of fact, this Court's authority "is as broad as that of the trial court" and includes the power to "render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, taking into account in a close case the fact that the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses" ( Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc., v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Campbell v Campbell, 50 AD3d 614; O'Brien v Dalessandro, 43 AD3d 1123). In seeking judicial dissolution of Corfian Enterprises, Ltd. (hereinafter Corfian), and Epiros Realty, Ltd. (hereinafter Epiros), it was incumbent upon the petitioner Theano Pappas (hereinafter Mrs. Pappas) and the respondent Theodore Kalogiannis to establish, prima facie, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mrs. Pappas's late husband, Eleftherios Pappas, and Kalogiannis were each the holders of at least 20% of the shares of Corfian and Epiros ( see Business Corporation Law § 1104-a; Shea v Hambros PLC, 244 AD2d 39, 52-53; Matter of Jordan v Arvin Signs, 203 AD2d 366; Matter of Gunzberg v Art-Lloyd Metal Prods. Corp., 112 AD2d 423, 424-425). On this record and in light of the Supreme Court's opportunity to hear and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, we find no basis to disturb the Supreme Court's determination that Mrs. Pappas and Kalogiannis each have standing to seek judicial dissolution of Corfian, but that each lack standing to seek judicial dissolution of Epiros.
The remaining contentions of Corfian, Epiros, and Paul Fotinos relating to the issues of the statute of limitations, laches, and waiver are not properly before this Court ( see Amex Assur. Co. v Kulka, 67 AD3d 614, 616; Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536).