WOODS v. THALER

governed by Strickland v. Washington's two-part standard. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under this standard, Woods must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) this deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Id. For counsel's performance to be deficient, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" as measured by "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is no checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. Instead, the performance inquiry is on "whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances" because no checklist for counsel's conduct "can take into account . . . the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant." Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Our assessment of counsel's performance is "highly deferential." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We make every effort to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. Because of the difficulties of such analysis, we recognize a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). We will not find counsel's performance deficient "merely because we disagree with trial counsel's strategy." Crane, 178 F.3d at 312.

In a capital sentencing proceeding, "defense counsel has the obligation to conduct a `reasonably substantial, independent investigation' into potential mitigating circumstances." Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Baldwin v. Maggio, 704 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1983)). Like any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we scrutinize the reasonableness of counsel's investigation in light of all relevant circumstances and give deference to counsel's decision to pursue a sound trial strategy. But in explaining how to assess investigation choices in Wiggins v. Smith, the Supreme Court noted:

"Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any effectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments."

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-22, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

Thus, the relevant inquiry here is not whether counsel had some evidence to stop investigating, but rather (1) what evidence was already known to counsel, and (2) based on the evidence available, would a reasonable attorney continue to investigate or limit further investigation. Id.; see, e.g., Rompilla, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (holding that counsel was ineffective for deciding to forgo looking at material that the prosecution would probably rely on even though interviews with the capital defendant and members of his family suggested no mitigating evidence was available). However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that " Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing," nor "does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 532, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Rather, Strickland requires counsel to ensure their decisions to limit investigations are supported by "reasonable professional judgment." See id.

In addition to proving counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner must also show that counsel's failure prejudiced his defense. Id. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527. To establish prejudice, the "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would be different." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence. Id. In reweighing this evidence, we consider all evidence adduced at trial and at the habeas proceedings. Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495. We may approach the Strickland-Wiggins inquiry in any order; "a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

In accordance with § 2254, we must determine whether the state court's application of the precedent from the Strickland-Wiggins line of cases to the facts of this case was objectively unreasonable. We find that it is not. We agree with the CCA that trial counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in deciding not to further interview or present Woods's family members, friends, or acquaintances in light of the great amount of potentially harmful rebuttal evidence the prosecution was ready to present. As to Woods's contention that trial counsel should have further investigated the possibility of neuropsychological impairment, we find that Woods has failed to carry his burden of proving prejudice. We address each of Woods's contentions in turn.

a. Family, Friends, and Acquaintances as Potential Mitigation Witnesses

Woods argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to interview or present family members, friends, and acquaintances who could speak to his good character, his abuse — and neglect-filled upbringing, and his background. After reviewing the state court's opinions, we do not find the CCA's determination objectively unreasonable; we agree that trial counsel's decision not to present Woods's mother as a witness or interview Woods's family members, friends, and acquaintances was based on reasonable professional judgment.

In assessing whether counsel's performance was deficient in Wiggins, the Supreme Court found that trial counsel's decision to stop investigation of the defendant's background for mitigation evidence was unreasonable. There, trial counsel claimed that their decision to limit their investigation into the defendant's background to a review of the defendant's pre-sentence investigation report and Department of Social Services records reflected a strategic decision not to present mitigating evidence, and instead to prepare and pursue an alternative strategy. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 517, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The Court held that this decision was unreasonable because (1) standard practice required preparation of a social history report; (2) the limited evidence trial counsel had revealed leads to mitigating evidence of a horrible childhood filled with incidents of sexual and physical abuse that any reasonable, competent attorney would have pursued; and (3) a thorough investigation of those leads "was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses." Id. at 524-27, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The Court underscored that unlike in cases where limited investigations were reasonable, Wiggins's "counsel uncovered no evidence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless." Id. at 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527.

Unlike in Wiggins, where trial counsel had no evidence that a mitigation case would have been counterproductive or that further investigation would have been fruitless, id., the trial counsel here had been informed of an extensive amount of rebuttal evidence that the State was prepared to present if they called witnesses to speak on their personal knowledge of Woods's good character and dysfunctional upbringing. Much of this information was already documented in the medical records, which counsel reviewed with Dr. Goodness. Given this knowledge and Dr. Goodness's professional opinion that no objective expert could reach a conclusion that Woods did not pose a threat of future dangerousness, trial counsel's decision to limit their investigation and to refrain from interviewing and presenting members of Woods's family and circle of friends and acquaintances was reasonable. By pursuing a strategy of presenting the objective, clinical opinion of Robin Neely after a review of only paper records, Woods's attorneys were still able to introduce testimony about Woods's dysfunctional and abused upbringing without the possibility of witnesses being cross-examined on their personal knowledge of the defendant's bad character, traits, or acts. Thus, they were able to avoid extended questioning on Woods's involvement in Satanism, bomb-making activities, abuse of animals and his brothers, affiliation with white supremacists, and drug dealing.

The district court found trial counsel's performance deficient because they did not interview Woods's brothers to substantiate accounts that Woods had suffered abuse from his stepfather. We disagree. This contention was well-documented in the Havenwyck and St. Joseph medical records, which Robin Neely reviewed before her testimony. Trial counsel had reviewed the medical records extensively with their expert witnesses and crafted a strategy to portray Boyagian as a self-centered, uncaring mother who missed counseling appointments and failed to regularly visit Woods when hospitalized. As the district court points out in its prejudice analysis, investigating Woods's mother's calling of CPS would have run counter to trial counsel's strategy and may not have been fruitful in proving the stepfather's abusive nature given that CPS found the allegations to be unsubstantiated. Woods, 2009 WL 2757181, at *5. Given that we must be "highly deferential" in our assessment of counsel's performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 we do not find counsel's performance deficient "merely because we disagree with trial counsel's strategy." Crane, 178 F.3d at 312.

Additionally, we also agree with the state court that trial counsel's decision not to present Woods's mother or biological father was the result of reasonable professional judgment and adequate investigation. The senior Mr. Woods repeatedly refused to testify and stated that he always knew his son would end up in some kind of trouble. Cheryl Boyagian refused to cooperate with trial counsel's strategy to present her as a bad mother because she believed she was a good mother who did the best she could. Furthermore, as Adame and Moore state in affidavits found credible by the state courts, Boyagian told Adame that, "`if [Woods] did it, then he deserves what he gets'" and that "`he got himself into this mess, he's got to get himself out.'" No reasonable attorney would want their witness to make statements such as those made by Woods's parents in front of the jury.

Given that we agree with the state courts that trial counsel was effective in their performance during the punishment phase, we do not reach the prejudice prong. Because we find that the CCA was reasonable in determining that these were strategic decisions based on reasonable professional judgment, we find that its determination of these contentions is not objectively unreasonable.

b. Neuropsychological Evidence

Woods also contends that trial counsel should have investigated and presented an explanation of Woods's behavioral and addiction problems from a psychiatric/psychological perspective. Given his well-documented history of polysubstance abuse, head injury, and possible family history of mental illness, he argues that neuropsychological evaluation was warranted. He argues that such an approach could have clarified for the jury that his substance abuse problems and behavior were medical issues rather than moral failings. After reviewing the state court proceedings and the evidence in the record, we cannot determine whether trial counsel's performance was sufficient or deficient, but we find that the defendant has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's decision not to pursue a neuropsychological explanation of his addictions or his behavior. Thus, we do not find the state court's legal conclusion that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel objectively unreasonable.

The district court rejected Woods's argument regarding the investigation and presentation of neuropsychological evidence after noting that there was no indication that Dr. Kelly Goodness, a licensed psychologist, told counsel that further investigation into his psychiatric conditions was necessary. Thus, it held that it could not find that the state court was unreasonable in its conclusion that counsel's decision not to seek further neurological and mental health testing was not deficient performance. However, in our review of the state court's findings and legal conclusions and the record itself, we cannot say that we are convinced by the district court's reasoning. The state court trial judge, Judge Gabriel, made no specific finding of fact on why counsel decided not to pursue a neurological examination. The state court judge seems to have dispensed with this line of argument with his finding that any remaining contested issues were inconsequential because counsel's decision not to present evidence other than the testimony of Neely constituted sound trial strategy. The CCA opinion did not specifically discuss Woods's neuropsychological contention either. Spending most of its opinion discussing why interviews and presentation of family members and friends as potential mitigation witnesses were not necessary given the defense's sentencing strategy, the CCA merely states that "[w]hen an attorney opens Pandora's box, he is not constitutionally required to examine each and every disease, sorrow, vice, and crime contained therein before quietly and firmly closing the cover." Ex Parte Woods, 176 S.W.3d at 228.

It is not clear from the record or trial counsel's affidavits whether counsel's decision not to pursue this line of strategy was the result of reasoned judgment as required by Wiggins. The files from the Woods's stays at Havenwyck and St. Joseph Mercy document an extensive history of: substance abuse, including alcohol, marijuana, LSD, heroin, cocaine, speed, mushrooms, opiates, and ecstacy; diagnoses of depression, attention deficit disorder, and traits of borderline personality disorder; strong family history of substance abuse; possible history of bipolar disease on his father's side; and a history of frequent migraines. These indicators clearly necessitate some investigation.

It is undisputed that trial counsel hired Dr. Goodness to review these files and interview the patient. However, it is unclear whether Dr. Goodness's review included a determination of whether further neuropsychological testing or investigation was necessary or would be fruitless. Dr. Goodness stated that, in her professional judgment, she could not testify that Woods was not a future danger; but, there is no indication that her review included an evaluation of whether Woods had a neurological or psychological impairment such that it would have altered his past behavior. A copy of Dr. Goodness's report is not in the record. Neither Parr nor Adame's affidavits identify why they chose not to pursue neurological testing or a mental health evaluation despite the fact that trial counsel's billing records show that at one time early in sentencing preparation they phoned a neurological testing facility. If trial counsel's decision to stop this line of investigation was motivated by an opinion or a piece of advice given by Dr. Goodness, counsel's performance would have been the result of reasoned judgment and thus sufficient. However, if the counsel had no reasoned basis to cease this line of investigation, it would have been deficient performance. Given the paucity of information in the state court opinions and the record on counsel's motivations in deciding not to pursue neuropsychological evaluation, we cannot say whether counsel's decision was sufficient or deficient performance.

However, even assuming, arguendo, that counsel's performance was deficient, we find that Woods has failed to carry his burden of proving that the alleged deficiency prejudiced his defense. In reweighing the totality of mitigating evidence, including the neuropsychological evidence that the petitioner argues should have been presented to the jury, against the aggravating evidence, we do not find that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527.

Woods argues that Supreme Court precedent in Cone v. Bell, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009), requires the courts to focus upon the possible effect of the evidence upon each individual juror rather than focus on the jury as a whole. We agree and conduct the prejudice inquiry with the juror-agreement thresholds in mind. Under Texas state law, there are three special issues that must be addressed before the death penalty can be imposed: (1) after consideration of all the evidence, including evidence of the defendant's background, character, or the circumstances of the offense, that there were sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence less than death; (2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) whether the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased, intended to kill the deceased, or anticipated that human life would be taken. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071 § (2)(b). To return an answer of "no" to the first issue and "yes" to the last two issues, the jury must be unanimous. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071 § (2)(d), (f). Thus, we conduct this prejudice inquiry to see whether the totality of the mitigating evidence, including the neuropsychological evidence, reweighed against the aggravating evidence would be sufficient to persuade one or more jurors to vote "no" on each of these special issues.

In Cone, the jury was statutorily required to consider whether Cone's "`capacity . . . to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected his judgment.'" Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1786 (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-2-203(j)(8) (1982) (repealed)). Under Tennessee law, the imposition of the death penalty required a unanimous finding by the jury that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was at least one statutory aggravating circumstance not outweighed by the mitigating evidence. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 691, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 2-204 (1982) (repealed)). The Supreme Court, therefore, found that the district court and the Sixth Circuit did not fully consider whether the suppressed evidence might have persuaded one or more jurors that Cone's drug addiction attributable to honorable military service was sufficiently serious to justify a punishment of life imprisonment. Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1786.

The mitigation evidence that the petitioner argues should have been investigated and introduced is that (1) his drug addiction may have had short-term and long-term effects on his brain chemistry, affecting his behavior and cognition; (2) his drug abuse may have exacerbated his already imbalanced nervous system from his bipolar disorder; and (3) his polysubstance addiction problems, psychological disorders, and resulting behavioral problems may have resulted from genetic factors. Certainly, this type of information could have been mitigating if true. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) ("[E]vidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief . . . that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to . . . emotional or mental problems . . . may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse."), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). This evidence would have been in addition to the mitigating testimony given by Robin Neely, who described Woods's turbulent upbringing.

This expert opinion was provided by Dr. Paula Lundberg-Love, a licensed professional counselor and psychological associate in the state of Texas. Dr. Lundberg Love reviewed the testimony during the punishment phase and the materials collected by Woods's post-conviction team.

However, the problem with this type of evidence is that it can also be used as evidence of a probability of future dangerousness. One whose brain chemistry has been altered by prolonged substance abuse or who suffers from a mental disease because of a genetic predisposition would likely continue to pose a probability of future dangerousness. This would have undermined trial counsel's strategy to present Woods as someone who would not be a future danger once he did not have access to drugs and was shown for the first time that actions have consequences, unlike when he had nearly unrestricted access to drugs and did not experience any discipline growing up with his mother. Furthermore, the prosecution likely would have hired a mental health expert to examine Woods and potentially unearthed further aggravating evidence. See Mot. for Access, Clerk's R. vol. 1, at 20 (requesting that state trial court grant a fair opportunity to have a mental health expert examine Woods prior to testimony of any defense mental health expert testifying before jury). Such evidence could have included some of the incidents documented in the Havenwyck and St. Joseph's psychiatric records — bomb-making activities, abuse of younger siblings, statements evidencing sadistic and society-hating thoughts, inappropriate forcible touching of others, and "devil worship."

Woods's trial counsel, Adame, acknowledges a very similar line of reasoning when he discusses another potential line of mitigation testimony he had considered. Based on Woods's statements to him that he had been awake for fourteen days and high on methamphetamines and a cocktail of other drugs when the murders of Whitehead and Brosz occurred, Adame considered having Woods testify to the fact that he was not in his right mind when the murders occurred. Adame stated that Woods refused to testify, thereby preventing consideration of this mitigation strategy. However, Adame added that though this evidence would have been mitigating, it also "could certainly be used against [Woods] to prove future dangerousness, since anyone who could get that high and kill two people must certainly be considered a future danger." Adame Aff., Post Conviction Habeas Corpus R. at 572.

In his closing statement during the punishment-determination hearing, Adame stated that Woods was no longer a future danger since he (1) no longer had access to drugs; (2) was incarcerated with no freedom; and (3) was disciplined by the jury when it convicted him of capital murder. Adame argued that the conviction was a turning point and that Woods no longer posed a probability of being a continuing threat.

Additionally, the aggravating evidence presented by the prosecution was great. The government sought to prove a probability of future dangerous by presenting evidence that Woods had been involved in the murder of another victim and potentially considered murdering another woman, planned to rob a clothing store, made bombs in the past, and got into a fight with another inmate in the Denton County Jail. The prosecution also presented testimony from the victims' families to demonstrate the impact the murders had on their families, and testimony from a nurse who graphically described the nature of Brosz's injuries, including the fact that Brosz's mother saw her "daughter's brains coming out from underneath the dressing. . . ." Trial. Tr. vol. 24, 77, August 19, 2002. Given the great amount of aggravating evidence and the double-edged nature of the neuropsychological evidence, we do not find that Woods has demonstrated that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had the evidence been investigated and introduced.

Thus, we cannot find the state trial court's decision not to grant habeas relief for the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, habeas relief cannot be granted on this claim.

B. Denial of Evidentiary Hearing

Woods argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for an evidentiary hearing because (1) the state court fact-finding process, with its reliance solely on affidavits and trial testimony rather than an evidentiary hearing, was procedurally unreasonable such that it did not comport with minimal due process requirements, and (2) apart from the procedural due process requirements, there are too many unresolved factual conflicts, inconsistencies, and unexamined issues in conflicting affidavits such that the findings and resulting conclusions of law are themselves substantively unreasonable. We disagree.

Under AEDPA, requests for evidentiary hearings are to be evaluated under the provisions of subsection 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Where the habeas petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of his claim due to his lack of diligence, he is only entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the applicant can show (1) that his claim relies on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable" or "a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence," and (2) the facts underlying the claim are "sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). These exceptions, however, are only applicable when the failure to develop the factual basis is a result of the petitioner's lack of diligence. Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 815 (5th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998). Where the failure to develop the factual basis of the claim in state court is not due to the petitioner's actions, the district court retains discretion over the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing. Murphy, 205 F.3d at 815; McDonald, 139 F.3d at 1059-60. In such cases, we review a district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Murphy, 205 F.3d at 815.

The government argues that Woods is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) because Woods cannot demonstrate he was diligent in his attempt to investigate and pursue his claims in state court. Woods, however, notes that the failure to develop the factual basis of his claims in state court was not his own, but rather the result of the state courts denying him an evidentiary hearing. We agree with Woods, and thus review the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.

Both before AEDPA and after, we have consistently held that "when there is a factual dispute which if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to relief and the state has not afforded the petitioner a full and fair hearing, a federal habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing." Murphy, 205 F.3d at 815 (quoting Perillo v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation and alteration omitted); see also Moawad v. Anderson, 143 F.3d 942, 947-48 (5th Cir. 1998); Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1367 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, to find an abuse of discretion that would entitle Woods to an evidentiary hearing, "we must find that the state did not provide him with a full and fair hearing and we must be convinced that if proven true, his allegations would entitle him to relief." Murphy, 205 F.3d at 816 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

This opinion does not in any way invalidate or modify the precedent set forth in Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001). In that case, this Court held that a full and fair hearing was not a precondition to according a presumption of correctness to state habeas court findings of fact. Id. at 950-51. This precedent still stands. We merely state here that in circumstances not barred by § 2254(e)(2), a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the state court reached an unreasonable determination under § 2254 where (1) the state court proceedings were less than full and fair, and (2) where the defendant has made allegations that would entitle him to relief. Thus, for a finding that a district court abused its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must prove both prongs.

Woods argues that the district court should have granted him an evidentiary hearing since the state court fact-finding process was procedurally defective because it relied only on paper records rather than a full trial-like hearing on the factual issues underlying his claim. Woods argues that without "direct testimony by witnesses, subject to cross-examination in order to resolve inconsistencies and ambiguities of their testimony, the state habeas court was not in a position to make reliable determinations of the relevant facts to the claim." He further argues that since the fact-finding procedures were "inherently unreliable," the state courts' conclusions of law were rendered unreasonable. Thus, he argues that the district court's reliance on the state findings of fact and conclusions of law made its decision to deny habeas corpus an unreasonable application of precedent.

We disagree with Woods's assertion that he did not receive a full and fair hearing in the state habeas proceedings. Before and after AEDPA, this Court has "repeatedly found that a paper hearing is sufficient to afford a petitioner a full and fair hearing on the factual issues underlying his claims, especially where as here, the trial court and the state habeas court were one and the same." Murphy, 205 F.3d at 816 (citing Perillo, 79 F.3d at 446-47 (listing cases where presumption of correctness was established with only a paper hearing before the same state judge who presided over the criminal trial)) (emphasis added); see also Galvan v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2002).

Here, the state court judge who considered Woods's application for state habeas relief had also served as the trial judge over both the innocence — guilt phase and the punishment phase of Woods's trial. He was familiar with the parties, counsel, and the evidence presented at trial; thus he was uniquely qualified to make a credibility determination as to the veracity of the trial counsel's affidavits. Additionally, he and the CCA had the defendant's application, the state's response, and several hundred pages of affidavits, record evidence, and exhibits that had been filed in support and opposition to Woods's claims for review. Given the state trial judge's familiarity with the parties, their arguments, and the evidence, we cannot say that Woods did not receive a full and fair hearing in the state habeas proceedings. Thus, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Woods an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

AFFIRMED.