EDWARD LODGE, District Judge
Pending before the Court in the above-entitled matter is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 7). Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, this matter shall be decided on the record before this Court without oral argument.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mabon Cornwell ("Plaintiff" or "Cornwell") underwent a left total hip replacement on May 23, 2003 wherein a Trident System with metal acetabular cup and femoral stem was implanted. The Trident Hemispherical Cup implanted in Plaintiff is serial number 502-01-54E. It is undisputed that the Trident System implanted in Plaintiff was manufactured by Defendant Stryker Corporation. After surgery, Cornwell continued to experience pain and he underwent a revision of his total hip replacement on April 22, 2008, during which his Trident acetabular cup was revised. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in federal court against Stryker Corporation, Stryker Sales Corporation, Howmedica Osteonics Corp. d/b/a Stryker Orthopaedics (collectively referred to as the "Defendants") alleging defects in the Trident acetabular shell prevented the bone in his hip from growing into the cup to secure it and led to the need for revision surgery.
It is undisputed that on January 22, 2009, Defendant Stryker Corporation initiated a recall of certain Trident PSL and Hemispherical Shells (the acetabular cups) manufactured in their Cork, Ireland facilities between January 2000 and the end of December 2007. Plaintiff alleged the Trident implanted in his body was manufactured at the Cork, Ireland facility. Discovery completed in this matter has now established the acetabular shell implanted in Plaintiff was not manufactured in Cork, Ireland and was not the subject of any recall or other regulatory action.
Defendants argue in the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that Plaintiff's claims are all preempted by the express preemption provision of the Medical Device Amendments ("MDA") to the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq., which preempts product liability claims in the case of medical devices approved by the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA's") pre-market approval ("PMA") process. Plaintiff does not dispute that if a medical device was approved by the FDA's PMA process, the alleged product liability claim would be preempted. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the Trident metal acetablular cup was approved via a less rigorous § 510(k) process and his claims are not therefore preempted. Defendants argue the entire Trident System, including all components, was approved via the PMA process.
Alternatively, Plaintiff claims he has also plead manufacturing defects that are premised on alleged FDA regulation violations and these claims parallel the requirements of the MDA so they are not preempted. Defendants argue Cornwell has failed to state a parallel claim for violations of federal law since Cornwell's implant was not manufactured at the facility the subject to the FDA's warning letter and Defendant Stryker Corporation's voluntary recall.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F. 3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). All allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has held that "in dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). While amendments are liberally permitted under Rule 15(a), the district court may deny leave to amend when there has been an undue delay in bringing the motion, and the opposing party would be unfairly prejudiced by the amendments. See United States v. Pend Oreille Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544, 1552-53 (9th Cir. 1994).
Generally, the Court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). If materials outside the pleadings are considered, the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. See Jacobsen v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995).
But as Branch makes clear, there are times when documents other than the pleadings can be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. "[D]ocuments whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Branch, 14 F.3d at 453.
ANALYSIS
1. Preemption under the MDA
The MDA authorizes the FDA to regulate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. The MDA also contains an express preemption clause which provides:
no State or political subdivision may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
"In 1996, the Supreme Court held that lawsuits brought under state law against medical device manufacturers who submit `premarket notification' to the Food and Drug Administration are not preempted by
While the power of attorney was executed contemporaneously with the first deed, it is unclear whether a fiduciary relationship existed at that time because it is not stated when the grant was made known to Defendant Craddock. Cf. In re Estate of Ferguson, 135 N.C. App. 102, 105, 518 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1999) (rejecting argument that fiduciary relationship existed when power of attorney was made contemporaneously with will, as evidence showed testator delivered power of attorney to named attorney-in-fact 18 months after executing her will and there was no proof that grantee served as attorney-in-fact at time testator executed will). The relevant paragraph in Plaintiff's affidavit, however, provides that the power of attorney was executed six days prior to the making of the second deed and avers that Defendant Craddock was indeed serving as Mary Lambeth's attorney-in-fact when the 99% remainder interest was transferred. Plaintiff thereby forecasted evidence that Mary Lambeth's only asset of substantial value passed to Defendant Craddock outside the will, damaging the estate by depleting the same, at a time when Defendant Craddock was her mother's fiduciary. Plaintiff's allegations tend to show not only a confidential or fiduciary relationship, but also that Defendant Craddock, the superior party, obtained a benefit, which raises a presumption that constructive fraud occurred. See Forbis, 361 N.C. at 530, 649 S.E.2d at 389 (holding allegation that fiduciary benefitted as result of abusing the confidential relationship entitled plaintiff to the legal presumption). As such, the specific facts in Plaintiff's affidavit produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that he can at least establish a prima facie case for a constructive trust at trial. Cf. McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 25 S.E.2d 615 (1943) (presuming fraud in two deeds making defendant grantee and will making him sole executor and primary beneficiary, where power of attorney was in effect and defendant was general agent and manager of principal's affairs); Sorrell v. Sorrell, 198 N.C. 460, 152 S.E. 157 (1930) (presuming fraud in conveyance from grantor to attorney-in-fact); Seagraves v. Seagraves, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 698 S.E.2d 155, 163-64 (2010) (reversing grant of partial summary judgment for defendant who was his mother's attorney-in-fact pursuant to power of attorney at time she granted him tract of land that was devised to different child in her will).
Where Defendant Craddock presented no evidence to rebut the presumption, she failed to prove the absence of a genuine issue of fact; thus, the trial court erred in ruling she was entitled to summary judgment. Our holding, however, does not preclude Defendant Craddock from attempting to rebut the presumption of constructive fraud. For example, she may be able to show that the confidence reposed in her was not abused by presenting evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deeds. Alternatively, or in combination therewith, the power of attorney document itself might detail Defendant Craddock's scope of authority or even define the extent to which she may receive gifts as Mary Lambeth's attorney-in-fact, evidencing that her acquisition of the Property was not contrary to the duties she owed her mother. Without limiting the rebuttal evidence Defendant Craddock may offer, we hold only that the weight of the presumption, in light of whatever proof she may present on remand, is a jury issue.
We briefly address Defendants' argument that even if there was a sufficient forecast of evidence to show a genuine issue of wrongdoing, summary judgment must be granted because Plaintiff could not be the beneficiary of a constructive trust anyway. For, we acknowledge that justification for a constructive trust would be irrelevant if the party bringing the action could not benefit therefrom, essentially lacking standing. See Scott v. United Carolina Bank, 130 N.C. App. 426, 432-33, 503 S.E.2d 149, 153-54 (1998) ("`No one except a beneficiary or one suing on his behalf can maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the trust or to enjoin or obtain redress for a breach of trust[;] . . . only beneficiaries have standing to sue to enforce a trust.'").
Here, while Plaintiff admitted that he was intentionally excluded from Mary Lambeth's 1998 will, he introduced a paper writing dated 17 August 2001 and sought resolution thereof as a codicil to his mother's will. Accepted as an exhibit, the document is hand-written in letter form and begins, "I in my right mind w[a]nt to make a little change in my last will and testimony. . . . I left my son Baxter out of it." The letter then provides that any funds remaining from the sale of the Property shall be divided "between the five," naming "Baxter[,] Louise[,] Lois[,] Bonnie[,] Jay B." The document is signed, "Love to you all. From Mom." Defendants argue that this document could not be a valid holographic codicil because it "is not subscribed, nor does the name of the purported testator appear in the document" such that "the statutory requirements of a valid holographic codicil are not met as a matter of law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-3.4(a)(2) (2009) (requiring a holographic will or codicil to be "[s]ubscribed by the testator, or with his name written in or on the will in his own handwriting"). However, there is direct precedent — which has not been overruled — indicating that the signature on the letter is not fatal to Plaintiff's ability to meet this requirement. See In re Southerland, 188 N.C. 325, 328, 124 S.E. 632, 633 (1924) (holding signature of the word "Mother" to a paper writing offered as a holographic will "is sufficient if the maker adopted it as her own for the purpose of executing the instrument"). Where Defendants' only challenge to treating the document as a codicil — and thereby negating Plaintiff's standing as a real party in interest — rested on the words used in the signature, we merely conclude that the closing "From Mom" is insufficient to show there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mary Lambeth amended her will to include Plaintiff. We render no opinion as to whether Mary Lambeth "adopted it as her own for the purpose of executing the instrument" or whether the remaining requirements of § 31-3.4 have been satisfied.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that summary judgment is affirmed as to Defendants Lois and Allen Levine. We reverse the grant as to Defendant Craddock, however, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part; Reversed in part.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).