Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing that the joint defense agreement in question was protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The agreement is not a communication from an attorney to a client "made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal advice or services, in the course of a professional relationship" ( Rossi v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 73 NY2d 588, 593; see Muriel Siebert Co., Inc. v Intuit Inc., 32 AD3d 284, affd. 8 NY3d 506). Rather, it is a statement of the parties' intention that all information they share with each other remain subject to the attorney-client privilege, despite their disclosure to each other. Its drafter is not identified, and it specifically states that it creates no attorney-client relationship. Furthermore, in the absence of an attorney-client privilege, the common-interest rule does not apply ( U.S. Bank N.A. v APP Int'l. Fin. Co., 33 AD3d 430, 431; United States v Schwimmer, 892 F2d 237, 243-244; see Pern-America, Inc. v Sunham Home Fashions, LLC, 2007 WL 3226156, *2, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 80548, *5-6 I'SD NY 2007]).
Although the motion court did not reach this issue, we further find that the work-product doctrine would not preclude discovery. There is no indication that the agreement was prepared by counsel acting as such, and it contains only standard language not uniquely reflecting a lawyer's learning and professional skills, including legal research, analysis, conclusions, legal theory or strategy ( see Plimpton v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 532, 533; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v American Home Assur. Co., 23 AD3d 190).
[Prior Case History: 2010 NY Slip Op 31309(U).]