It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted and the amended complaint is dismissed.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this Labor Law and common-law negligence action seeking damages for injuries sustained by Nathan Pfaffenbach (plaintiff) when he fell from a ladder while installing plywood in defendants' home. We conclude that Supreme Court erred in denying those parts of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6). Those statutes require "[a]ll contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one[-] and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work," to comply with certain safety requirements (§ 240 [1]; § 241). We agree with defendants that they are "entitled to the homeowner exemption because they neither directed nor controlled plaintiffs work" ( Schultz v Noeller, 11 AD3d 964, 965).
Further, we conclude that the court erred in denying those parts of defendants' motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the common-law negligence cause of action and the Labor Law § 200 claim. "It is settled law that where the alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from the contractor's methods and the owner[s] exercise[] no supervisory control over the operation, no liability attaches to the owner[s] under the common law or [Labor Law § 200]" ( Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 295; see also Affri v Basch, 13 NY3d 592, 596). Here, "both the method and the manner of plaintiffs work were left to his judgment and experience" ( Affri, 13 NY3d at 596). Inasmuch as defendants did not supervise or control "the manner in which plaintiffs work was performed, and there is no evidence that [defendants] had either actual or constructive knowledge of any alleged dangerous condition" on the premises, they are not liable for any such condition ( Chapman v Town of Copake, 67 AD3d 1174, 1176). Defendants also are not liable for defective equipment, i.e., the ladder, because they exercised no supervisory control over the injury-producing work ( see Sponholz v Benderson Prop. Dev., 273 AD2d 791, 792; Farrell v Okeic, 266 AD2d 892; see also Santangelo v Fluor Constructors Int'l., 266 AD2d 893).