IN RE ADOPTION OF CADENCE B

— with their foster family. When the children were no more than two years old, the Department had removed them from their mother's custody following reports of neglect, and it would not place the children with their father because the home in which he resided contained dangerous levels of lead. See id. at 444, 987 A.2d at 537. The juvenile court criticized the father for his failure to timely remedy his housing situation so that the children could be returned to him. See id. at 452, 987 A.2d at 542. Yet, it also recognized that the father had acquired appropriate housing and had satisfied other Department requests by the time of the hearing. See id. The court simply considered these efforts to be too late:

[T]he Court finds that it was really within [the father's] control . . . to be able to take care of this. It was within his control to take the parenting classes to do what was required, to fix the housing to do what was required. . . .

And what is of concern to the Court as far as length of time was that it was so much within his control to take care of this. [H]e took care of things, but he took care of them late. . . . There's a clock ticking and . . . it was almost as though [the father] sort of woke up at some point and said he was going to take care of this, but in the meantime, these children have been living with [their foster mother] for a long time.

Alonza, 412 Md. at 452-53, 987 A.2d at 542. We vacated the juvenile court's decision, explaining that the court incorrectly "focused primarily on the length of time [the children] had been in foster care and the apparent bond that had developed between [the foster mother] and the children" without making any findings as to "how a continued parental relationship would have caused a detriment to the children[.]" Alonza, 412 Md. at 468, 987 A.2d at 551.

Similarly, in McDermott, the circuit court awarded custody of the son to the maternal grandparents because the father's career as a merchant marine required him to spend months away at sea, resulting in what the court considered to be an unstable living situation that was contrary to the best interests of the child. McDermott, 385 Md. at 324, 869 A.2d at 753. The circuit court did not find the father to be an unfit parent, but found his "relationship with [the son] to be wanting [because of] his absences from the child's life while at sea." Id. at 419, 869 A.2d at 809. We reversed, holding that

under circumstances in which there is no finding of parental unfitness, the requirements of a parent's employment, such that he is required to be away at sea, or otherwise appropriately absent from the State for a period of time, and for which time he or she made appropriate arrangements for the care of the child, do not constitute `extraordinary or exceptional circumstances' to support the awarding of custody to a third party.

Id. at 325-26, 869 A.2d at 754.

In relying on Alonza and McDermott, Mr. B. ignores a glaring distinction between those parents and himself, and misses the mark as to the juvenile court's rationale in this case. Here, Mr. B. made the choice to absent himself from Cadence's life. He had been living in Maryland prior to his incarceration, yet he moved into a home in Pennsylvania upon his release "despite his family, other five children, and Cadence being in Charles County, Maryland." The father in Alonza, on the other hand, had already been living in a home plagued with lead and could only correct the situation by moving to a new home or paying for lead abatement, a costly procedure. Even so, by the time of the hearing in Alonza, the father had "taken care" of his living situation by moving into a suitable home in Maryland so that his children could immediately join him. Id. at 452, 987 A.2d at 542.

Moreover, in this case, even though the Department "ha[d] worked with Mr. B. to the extent [it had] been able to with him living in Pennsylvania . . . even giving him gas vouchers[,]" Mr. B. visited Cadence only 18 out of 561 days, visits that never lasted longer than four hours. Put another way, Mr. B. spent, at most, 72 hours with his daughter over this year and a half period. This means that on 62 weekends, out of roughly 80, Mr. B. decided not to travel to Charles County to see Cadence. Indeed, the juvenile court found that "Mr. B's choice to absent himself from being available for meaningful, more frequent contact with Cadence ha[d] been the biggest impediment to reunification." In contrast, the juvenile court in Alonza found that "[t]he visitation that [had] been provided by the Department appeared] to have been taken up readily by both parents, there [hadn't] been any hesitation on their part." Alonza, 412 Md. at 448, 987 A.2d at 539-40. The father in McDermott was equally proactive, even flying his son and his son's maternal grandparents "to Texas . . . to spend a week aboard [the] ship [where he was stationed] to celebrate [his son's] birthday." McDermott, 385 Md. at 329 n. 6, 869 A.2d at 756 n. 6.

Consideration of FL § 5-525(f)(1) Factors

To be sure, the juvenile court in this case did consider the length of time that Cadence had been in the care and custody of the Z. family, as it was required to do under FL Section 5-525(f)(1)(iv): "the length of time the child has resided with the current caregiver[.]" Specifically, the court explained that "the only life [Cadence has] known and has any memory of is here, in Maryland, in the home of the Z.s. . . . [T]his chunk of time over a year, more than half of her life, is critical." Yet, the court's analysis did not stop there; it also addressed the remaining statutory factors. As the Court of Special Appeals aptly explained, the "court's finding regarding `the child's ability to be safe and healthy in the home of the child's parent,' FL [Section] 5-525(f)(1)(i), could not have been more explicit: `The [child] cannot be safely returned home at this time, and to do so would be contrary to her welfare as her parents are unable to properly care for her.'" The juvenile court also considered Cadence's attachment to both of the parties, thereby satisfying FL Section 5-525(f)(1)(ii) (iii). Regarding subsection (f)(1)(ii), "the child's attachment and emotional ties to the child's natural parent[,]" the court found, following testimony and its own observations during the hearing, that "Mr. B. [was] more in the position of a beloved uncle, . . . another kind of family member, than a father." The court explained that "[t]he child's father, from her point of view, is Mr. Z." In addressing subsection (f)(1)(iii), the court observed that the Z.s had provided Cadence "a safe and stable and loving home" and that Cadence had "clearly bonded to the family." With an open adoption, Cadence would benefit from a continued relationship with her "beloved uncle", Mr. B., while also retaining the safe stability of her home with the Z.s.

In an effort to counter the court's finding that Cadence could not be safe and healthy in his home, Mr. B. points to the fact that he had been allowed "liberal and unsupervised" visitation for up to four hours as evidence that the Department did not have any safety concerns with his home. We, however, do not find his reasoning persuasive. We think it "telling[]" that this visitation could never take place in Mr. B.'s Pennsylvania home, nor last longer than four hours. Mr. B. had yet to keep Cadence for the weekend, or even overnight. As the caseworker testified, the Department was unwilling to extend the hours of visitation because it could not monitor Mr. B.'s Pennsylvania home to make sure that his interactions with Cadence were positive. She also testified that she had concerns about Cadence's welfare while the child was in Mr. B.'s care. This, combined with Mr. B.'s past history of neglect and his continued willful absence from Cadence's life, supplied the evidence to support the court's decision.

The court also looked at "the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm to the child if moved from the child's current placement[,]" FL Section 5-525(f)(1)(v). It explained that "separating Cadence from the Z.s would be traumatic and detrimental to her well-being" because that family "is the stability that she knows." Finally, in considering subsection (f)(1)(vi)("the potential harm to the child by remaining in State custody for an excessive period of time"), the court determined that Cadence "need[ed] permanence" and that adoption was "necessary in order to move towards permanency." The Department caseworker testified that any path to reunification would require a gradual increase in the hours of permissible visitation so that the Department could monitor the interactions until it was satisfied that Cadence would be safe in her father's custody. Thus, reunification was unlikely to occur in the near future. Unless the court changed the permanency plan to open adoption, Cadence would almost certainly remain in foster care limbo for an excessive period of time, one that would be detrimental to her best interests.

Conclusion

Ultimately, we are not persuaded that the juvenile court abused its discretion in changing the permanency plan to open adoption. Mr. B. is a father of six children, yet none of them are in his custody, and his parental rights as to three of those children have been involuntarily terminated. He has a history of drug abuse and neglect. Currently, he chooses to reside in Pennsylvania, at least four hours away from Cadence, even though he knows that Cadence cannot visit his home because the Department is unable — and Pennsylvania unwilling — to monitor her safety while there. Furthermore, he has only visited Cadence 18 out of 561 days, despite the Department's attempts to facilitate more frequent visits. As the juvenile court recognized, Mr. B.'s greatest impediment to developing a meaningful relationship with Cadence was him-self:

[T]he biggest clincher of this case that makes it not a difficult decision is that Mr. B. has made his choice and chosen to stay away despite having no support up there, other than [his fiancé]. All of his family being [here], all of his children being here. And being, essentially assuring that he would have limited contact with Cadence by living there.

The juvenile court kept in mind the constitutional right of Mr. B. to parent Cadence, yet it understood that Mr. B. had not overcome his tendency to neglect his children. Thus, as it could not consider Mr. B. as a placement resource, the court had to determine whether it was in Cadence's best interest to remain, perhaps indefinitely, in foster care. Generally, courts and legislatures attempt to limit the amount of time a child is in foster care, citing its detrimental effect on a child's well-being:

According to FL Section 9-101(b), "[u]nless the court specifically finds that there is no likelihood of further . . . neglect by the [parent], the court shall deny custody or visitation rights to that [parent.]"

For children in foster care, . . . the court must consider whether the individual child's health and safety is being compromised by the long term effects of foster care. Federal and state governments have recognized that long periods of foster care may harm the very children whom the foster care system is designed to protect. They have undertaken reasonable steps to prevent childhoods spent in "foster care drift" — the legal, emotional, and physical limbo of temporary housing with temporary care givers.

In re Adoption/Guardianship of Victor A., 157 Md.App. 412, 427-28, 852 A.2d 976, 985 (2004); See also In re Abiagail C, 138 Md.App. 570, 584, 772 A.2d 1277, 1286 (2001) (explaining that the General Assembly revised the adoption and guardianship laws "to speed up the guardianship and adoption process so that children no longer would be consigned to foster care limbo for years."). Here, the court understood that unless it changed Cadence's permanency plan, she would remain in foster care and could not achieve the permanence that it deemed to be in her best interest. The court needed to fashion an alternative plan, and we find no error in its decision to change Cadence's plan to open adoption.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.

Judge HARRELL joins in judgment only.