Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
CPLR 3216 is an "extremely forgiving" statute ( Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 503), which "never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiffs action based on the plaintiffs unreasonable neglect to proceed" ( Davis v Goodsell, 6 AD3d 382, 383; see Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp., 100 NY2d 632, 633; Gibson v Fakheri, 11 AD3d 619; Ferrera v Esposit, 66 AD3d 637, 638). Moreover, the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing a complaint based on failure to prosecute whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay and the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action ( see CPLR 3216 [e]; Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp., 100 NY2d at 633; Gibson v Fakheri, 11 AD3d 619; Ferrera v Esposit, 66 AD3d at 638).
Here, the plaintiffs presented a justifiable excuse for both their failure to timely respond to the defendants' 90-day notice and their delay in prosecuting this action through the affirmation of their attorney, who explained in detail that the delay was the result of a combination of both law office failure and his own health and personal issues ( see Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp., 100 NY2d at 633-634; Goldstein v Meadows Redevelopment Co Owners Corp. I, 46 AD3d 509, 510-511; Amato v Commack Union Free School Dist., 32 AD3d 807, 808). Furthermore, the plaintiffs' submissions were sufficient to demonstrate that they have a potentially meritorious cause of action against the defendants ( see Amato v Commack Union Free School Dist., 32 AD3d at 808; Driever v Spackenkill Union Free School Dist., 20 AD3d 384, 385). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3216 to dismiss the complaint for failure to prose-cute, and granted those branches of the plaintiffs' cross motion which were to extend their time to serve and file a note of issue, and to vacate the defendants' 90-day notice.