HARRIS v. SEWARD PARK

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Docket Number

No. 3763.

Attorney(S)

Lawrence J. Silberman, P.C., New York (Lawrence J. Silberman of counsel), for appellant. Fiedelman McGaw, Jericho (James K. O'Sullivan of counsel), for respondents.

Judges

Peter Tom
David Friedman
Leland G. DeGrasse
Helen E. Freedman
Sallie Manzanet-Daniels

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order entered by the Supreme Court, New York County, which denied plaintiff's motion for renewal and adhered on reargument to a prior ruling that granted defendants' motion to dismiss the first cause of action in plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff, Thorner Harris, had initially filed a complaint involving an alleged breach of contract claim against Seward Park Housing Corporation and others. The initial order of June 19, 2009, dismissed the complaint, and plaintiff did not appeal this order within the statutory 30-day period nor move for relief within that timeframe. Despite this procedural default, the court granted reargument regarding the breach of contract claim but ultimately reaffirmed the dismissal. This appeal followed, challenging the denial of renewal and the dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain an untimely motion for reargument after the dismissal of the complaint had rendered the action no longer pending.
Whether the plaintiff stated a viable cause of action for breach of contract against the defendant cooperative.
Whether the plaintiff was entitled to renewal of the motion under CPLR 2221(e).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Liss v Trans Auto Sys., 68 NY2d 15, 20	Every court retains continuing jurisdiction to reconsider prior interlocutory orders during pendency of an action, regardless of statutory time limits for motions to reargue.	Applied to explain why the court could grant reargument during pendency, but found inapplicable here because the order dismissed the complaint, ending the action and thus the court lacked authority to consider untimely reargument.
Johnson v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 303 AD2d 640	Supports the principle that once an action is no longer pending, courts lack jurisdiction to entertain motions for reargument.	Used to reinforce the dismissal of the appeal regarding the untimely reargument motion.
Sainphor v Hurtt, 302 AD2d 511	Similar jurisdictional principle regarding motions after final determination of an action.	Also cited to support the court's conclusion that it lacked authority to consider the untimely reargument request.
Morris v 702 E. Fifth St. HDFC, 46 AD3d 478	Elements required to state a breach of contract claim: existence of contract, plaintiff's performance, defendant's breach, and resulting damages.	Applied to determine that plaintiff failed to establish these elements because no enforceable contract existed between the parties.
Singh v Turtle Bay Towers Corp., 74 AD3d 568	Recognizes a cooperative's legitimate business interest in setting conditions precedent, such as board approval, to sale of units.	Used to justify the cooperative's right to require board approval before contract formation, negating plaintiff's breach of contract claim.
85 Fifth Ave. 4th Floor, LLC v LA. Selig, LLC, 45 AD3d 349	Clarifies that a contract vendee of shares, not a shareholder, lacks standing to bring breach of contract claims against a cooperative.	Applied to conclude that plaintiff, as a contract vendee rather than a shareholder, had no viable breach of contract claim.
Aridas v 244 E. 60th St. Owners Corp., 292 AD2d 325	Further supports the principle limiting breach of contract claims by non-shareholder contract vendees against cooperatives.	Reinforced the court's dismissal of plaintiff's breach of contract claim on similar grounds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the procedural issue of jurisdiction over the motion for reargument. Relying on Liss v Trans Auto Sys., it recognized that courts retain jurisdiction to reconsider interlocutory orders during the pendency of an action. However, since the June 19, 2009 order dismissed the complaint, the action was no longer pending. Consequently, the court lacked authority to entertain the untimely motion for reargument, necessitating dismissal of that portion of the appeal.

On the merits, even if considered, the court found no viable breach of contract claim. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of an enforceable contract. The plaintiff had only submitted an application to purchase an apartment, which was subject to board approval as a condition precedent—a legitimate business interest of the cooperative to secure the best price. Moreover, as a contract vendee of shares and not a shareholder, the plaintiff lacked standing to sue the cooperative for breach of contract. The court cited established precedents to support these conclusions.

Finally, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion for renewal, consistent with CPLR 2221(e), as the plaintiff did not meet the requirements for such relief.

Holding and Implications

The order of the Supreme Court, New York County, denying renewal and affirming the dismissal of the first cause of action for breach of contract is unanimously affirmed insofar as it is appealable, and the appeal is otherwise dismissed without costs.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the dismissal of plaintiff's breach of contract claim and to reject the untimely motion for reargument and renewal. No new legal precedent was established, and the ruling reinforces existing principles regarding court jurisdiction post-dismissal, the elements of breach of contract claims, and the limited rights of contract vendees against cooperatives.

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THORNER HARRIS, Appellant, v. SEWARD PARK HOUSING CORPORATION et al., Respondents.

Plaintiff did not appeal the order of June 19, 2009, which dismissed his complaint, nor did he make a motion during the statutory 30 days for such relief (CPLR 2221 [d]). Despite recognizing the untimeliness of the motion, the court granted reargument with regard to the first cause of action for breach of contract, relying on Liss v Trans Auto Sys. ( 68 NY2d 15, 20), and adhered to its prior ruling. In Liss, the Court of Appeals held that "regardless of statutory time limits concerning motions to reargue, every court retains continuing jurisdiction to reconsider its prior interlocutory orders during the pendency of the action." Nevertheless, since the underlying order of June 19 had finally determined this action by dismissing the complaint, the matter was no longer pending and the court lacked the authority to consider the untimely request for reargument ( see Johnson v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 303 AD2d 640; Sainphor v Hurtt, 302 AD2d 511), thus requiring dismissal of the present appeal to that extent.

Even were we to consider the merits of plaintiffs challenge to the dismissal of his claim for breach of contract, it is clear that he has no such viable cause of action. The elements of such a claim include the existence of a contract, the plaintiffs performance thereunder, the defendant's breach thereof, and resulting damages ( see Morris v 702 E. Fifth St. HDFC, 46 AD3d 478). There never was any enforceable agreement between these parties, but merely an application by plaintiff to purchase one of the apartments in defendant cooperative, which certainly had a right to insist — as a condition precedent to the contract — on the approval of the application by its board of directors. Defendant cooperative had a legitimate business interest in procuring the highest possible price for the sale of its units ( see Singh v Turtle Bay Towers Corp., 74 AD3d 568), and plaintiff, as a mere contract vendee of shares rather than a shareholder, did not have a cause of action for breach of contract against the cooperative ( see 85 Fifth Ave. 4th Floor, LLC v LA. Selig, LLC, 45 AD3d 349; Aridas v 244 E. 60th St. Owners Corp., 292 AD2d 325).

Finally, the motion court correctly determined that plaintiff was not entitled to renewal. ( See CPLR 2221 [e].)