The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
llahermosa was one of the candidates for this position. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 58; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 58; Docket No. 85-13 at 237.) Davila supported another candidate for that position, Jose Ortiz ("Ortiz"). (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 59; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 59; Docket No. 81-2 at ¶ 22; Docket No. 85-13 at 122, 159-61.) Villahermosa ultimately won the election. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 60; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 60; Docket No. 81-2 at ¶ 22.)
Pursuant to a stipulation that had been signed on January 16, 1996, between the SIF and the Management Employees Federation related to the Classification and Retribution Plan of the managerial employees, the Administrative Officer position could only be subject to a Norm Reclassification up until level III and to higher levels by means of a Study Reclassification from level III onwards. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 64; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 64; Docket No. 81-2 at ¶ 13; Docket No. 81-18 at ¶ 15.)
On April 24, 2005, Acosta visited Davila's office and inquired as to Davila's reasons for reversing a direct order that he had given to Cruz, the Bayamon CSC. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 71; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 71; Docket No. 85-13 at 133, 183-186; Docket No. 85-47 at 52-65.) The order reversed pertained to emergency preventive measures related to a mercury spill in the region. Id. Davila claims that Acosta's visit was motivated by her political affiliation on the sole basis that it occurred after the February 2004 elections during which she supported Ortiz rather than Villahermosa. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 72; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 72; Docket No. 85-13 at 188-89.)
An exchange of interdepartmental communications is customary when an employee files an internal complaint. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 74; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 74; Docket No. 85-13 at 173-74.) Davila has admitted that no reference was made to her political affiliation in the internal interdepartmental communications she read. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 75; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 75; Docket No. 85-13 at 175.)
On November 7, 2005, Villahermosa addressed a memorandum to William Carreras-Irizarry, Director of the Labor Relations and Equality in Employment Area. (Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 84; Docket No. 118-1 at 71; Docket No. 113-4.) That memorandum indicates that it responds to a request from Carreras-Irizarry for the description of the duties of Davila's position as Administrative Officer I in the CSA. (Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 85; Docket No. 118-1 at 71; Docket No. 113-4.) Villahermosa informed Carreras that a study had been conducted regarding Davila's position, concluding that the duties of that position were "of an administrative assistant capacity" and did not include any supervisory duties. (Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 86; Docket No. 118-1 at 71; Docket No. 113-4.) On November 21, 2008, Villahermosa wrote another memorandum regarding Davila's duties and responsibilities at the request of Attorney Hilda Colon-Navarro ("Colon"), Director of the Labor Relations and Equality in Employment Area. (Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 89; Docket No. 118-1 at 72; Docket No. 113-5.)
3. Equal Pay Act Claim
Davila admits that she does not have the academic credentials or work-related experience to qualify for the CSC position. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 81; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 81; Docket No. 85-13 at 73-75.) All of the CSC's were qualified for the CSC position when they were selected for the position. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 82; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 82; Docket No. 85-13 at 74.) The CSC's duties and functions include the supervision, coordination, and implementation of the norms, measures, and security controls necessary to protect the life of the employees and visitors as well as the property and equipment of the SIF. (Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 83; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 83; Docket No. 81-18 at ¶ 5; Docket No. 85-13 at 74-75.) The CSC's also supervise and assign the investigation of complaints and reports involving damages to the property of the SIF and acts of violence that involve employees, visitors, or the general public. Id.
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court's discretion to grant summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states, in pertinent part, that a court may grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Once a properly supported motion has been presented, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the Court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l., Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000).
In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be "material" and the dispute must be "genuine." Material means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. The issue is genuine when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is well settled that "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. It is therefore necessary that "a party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).
In making this assessment, the Court "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). The court may safely ignore, however, "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
B. Statutes of Limitations
Defendants argue that Davila's claims pursuant to Title VII and section 1983 are barred by their respective statutes of limitations. (Docket No. 81 at 14-16.) Reading Davila's opposition generously, she offers two theories to escape the effect of those limitations period. (See Docket No. 99 at 12-16.) First, Davila claims that the discriminatory conduct based on her gender constituted a single hostile work environment, thus making her claims timely so long as one part of the alleged hostile work environment falls within the statute of limitations. Id. Second, Davila argues that the discriminatory conduct based on her political affiliation constituted a pattern of similar political discrimination. Id. The Court addresses each theory in turn.
1. Hostile Work Environment under Title VII
With regard to plaintiff's Title VII claims, defendants claim that because Davila filed her administrative charge on February 4, 2008, any claim arising from discriminatory acts prior to June 7, 2007, are time barred. (Docket No. 118 at 2.) Davila responds by arguing that because her claims are based upon an alleged hostile work environment, any discriminatory conduct occurring outside of the statutory limitations period may be anchored to conduct within that period. (Docket No. 99 at 12-14.) Davila specifically identifies that anchoring conduct as a complaint made on February 9, 2009, by Claudio to the newly appointed Director of the Corporate Security Area, Pedro Cortes-Peña ("Cortes"). Id. at 16.
"A plaintiff who brings a hostile work environment claim under Title VII must file her claim within 300 days of an act of discrimination, and in general cannot litigate claims based on conduct falling outside of that period." O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 713, 730 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Provencher, 145 F.3d at 13).
"The Supreme Court has distinguished between claims involving discrete incidents of discrimination and retaliation from hostile work environment claims." Ruiz-Sulsona v. University of P.R., 334 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Nat'l. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-16 (2002)). "`Hostile work environment claims do not turn on single acts but on an aggregation of hostile acts extending over a period of time.'" Id. (quoting Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2002)). "Consequently, the statute of limitations `will not exclude acts that are part of the same unlawful employment practice if at least one act falls within the time period.'" Id. (quoting Dressler v. Daniel, 315 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2003)).
In order to take advantage of the continuing violation doctrine in this context and avoid the effect of the statute of limitations, "[h]owever, the plaintiff must still show that `the employer has engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable hostile environment claim.'" Malone v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 09-2060, 610 F.3d 16, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13063, at *22 n. 12 (1st Cir. June 25, 2010) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117). In order to establish an actionable hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show: "`(1) that she (or he) is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established.'" Agusty-Reyes v. Dep't. of Educ. of P.R., 601 F.3d 45, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2010) (quotingValentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2006)). "Because the inquiry is fact specific, the determination is often reserved for a fact finder, but summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for `polic[ing] the baseline for hostile environment claims.'" Pomales v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2006) (quotingMendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999)) (citing Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 19 (1st Cir. 2002)) (internal citations omitted).
As to whether she can maintain an actionable hostile work environment claim, Davila makes no attempt to explain to the Court why the particular facts or evidence presented support that claim. (See Docket No. 99.) Instead, Davila points out that employers may be held liable for harassment perpetrated by coworkers and that harassment based on gender need not be sexually charged. See id. at 16-19. Davila concludes by stating that "the question thus becomes if based upon the record a jury can conclude that Defendants' behavior towards Davila-Feliciano . . . was triggered by her gender."Id. at 18. This conclusion, however, completely glosses over the rather important question of whether a reasonable jury could find that defendants' alleged conduct "`permeated [Davila's workplace] with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that [is] sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of . . . [Davila's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'"See Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Based on the record on summary judgment in this case, the Court must agree with defendants that the Davila cannot establish the requisite severity or pervasiveness to maintain a hostile work environment claim.
Davila points to no evidence on the record demonstrating severity or pervasiveness with regard to the alleged conduct of any of the defendants. (See Docket No. 99.) Nor does she specifically identify the conduct she contends formed a hostile work environment for the purposes of her Title VII claim. See id. at 18. Davila only generally alludes to "the CSCs, Villahermosa, Acosta-Jusino and Ruiz-Nazario's failure to act." Id.
Even reviewing the evidence presented by Davila, there does not appear to be any conduct rising to the level of severity and pervasiveness necessary to establish a hostile work environment claim. When considering whether alleged conduct is severe or pervasive, courts look to: "`the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'"O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 728-29 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998)). The most that can be said of defendants' conduct from the evidence presented properly by Davila is: (1) that the CSCs wrote memoranda to Davila's supervisor complaining about alleged interference with their supervisory duties by Davila and stating that Davila did not have the necessary experience or qualifications to perform those duties; (2) that the CSCs filed a judicial complaint alleging that Malave assigned their supervisory duties to Davila because of her gender; and (3) that on one occasion, a CSC refused to allow Davila to conduct a security personnel inspection. Davila makes no attempt to explain why these incidents are sufficiently severe or pervasive to maintain a hostile work environment claim. (See Docket No. 99 at 16-19.) None of the conduct appears physically threatening, particularly humiliating or severe and there is very little evidence demonstrating any unreasonable interference with Davila's performance at work. Furthermore, the conduct gleaned from Davila's evidence is far from that found by other courts to be sufficiently severe and pervasive. See, e.g.,Rosario v. Dep't. of the Army, 607 F.3d 241, 249 (1st Cir. 2010);Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2002);cf. Rigau v. Pfizer Caribbean Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 272, 284 (D.P.R. 2007). Accordingly, it is clear that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the evidence presented on summary judgment demonstrates a hostile work environment.
Davila refers to other incidents alleged in her internal SIF administrative complaint, but provides no evidence regarding those incidents with her response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (See Docket No. 118-1.)
Having found no actionable hostile work environment claim, the Court is left with two conclusions. First, Davila cannot rescue alleged discriminatory conduct prior to June 7, 2007 from the statute of limitations. Second, any conduct not barred by the statute of limitations is insufficient to support Davila's hostile work environment claim. Given that Davila's primary Title VII discrimination claim and her Title VII retaliation claim are both based on the alleged hostile work environment, (see Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 5.1-5.7, 8.1-8.5.), neither can survive summary judgment.
2. Political Discrimination Claim under Section 1983
Davila alleges political discrimination pursuant to section 1983 against Villahermosa, Ruiz, and Acosta based on her requests for reclassification of her position. Davila bases her section 1983 claim primarily on Villahermosa's alleged refusal to consider "plaintiff's reiterated requests for a reclassification of her position." This statutory provision "affords redress against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another person of any federal constitutional or statutory right." Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285 F.3d 646, 650-51 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir. 2000). It is well-settled that in order for a claim to be cognizable under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove three elements: (1) that the defendants acted under color of state law; (2) that plaintiffs were deprived of federally protected rights, privileges or immunities; and (3) that the defendants' alleged conduct was causally connected to the plaintiff's deprivation.Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 558 (1st Cir. 1989).
Although Davila makes no mention of the incident in her response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, (See Docket No. 99), the evidence she presents seems to indicate that she considers her meeting with Acosta regarding reversal of his orders to be an example of political discrimination. (See Docket No. 99-1). Even if this could be considered an incident of political discrimination, that meeting occurred well before May 4, 2008, and Davila refers to no similar incident to anchor it within the statute of limitations. Furthermore, as discussed below, Davila may not rely on the continuing violation doctrine because she considered the alleged conduct to be discriminatory shortly after it occurred. See Windross v. Barton Protective Servs., Inc., 586 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 2009); Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2000).
Section 1983 does not set forth a limitations period, but instead borrows the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-241 (1989); Rosario Rivera v. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. of P.R., 472 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.P.R. 2007) (citing Wilson v. García, 471 U.S. 261, 276-278 (1985); López-González v. Municipality of Comerío, 404 F.3d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 2005); Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir. 1997)). Under Puerto Rico law, the applicable limitations period for personal injury actions is one year. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298 (2006);Carreras-Rosa, 127 F.3d at 174. Accordingly, the one-year term applies for section 1983 actions in Puerto Rico. Torres v. Superintendent of the Police of P.R., 893 F.2d 404, 406 (1st Cir. 1990). "The underlying premise for the limitations period is to protect both the defendants from having to defend from distant events as well as those affected individuals who timely prosecute their claims." Del Carmen Rodríguez v. Trujillo, 507 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.P.R. 2007) (citing Vistamar, Inc. v. Fagundo-Fagundo, 430 F.3d 66, 70-71 (1st Cir. 2005); Morris v. Gov't. Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 750 (1st Cir. 1994)).
"Although the limitations period is determined by state law, the date of accrual is a federal law question." Carreras-Rosa, 127 F.3d at 174. The accrual period "`ordinarily starts when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know of the injury on which the action is based.'" Id. (quoting Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 353 (1st Cir. 1992)). Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations for actions brought under section 1983 "begins running one day after the date of accrual, which is the date plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury".González García v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 214 F. Supp. 2d 194, 200 (D.P.R. 2002); Benítez-Pons v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1998).
Davila does not contest the limitations period, but rather argues that the continuing violation doctrine precludes the straightforward application of that period because she alleges a pattern of political discrimination including conduct that falls within the statute of limitations. Specifically, Davila argues that any alleged discriminatory conduct not within the statute of limitations is related to a September 2008 incident in which "Villahermosa `once again intervened from his official position in the Human Resources [sic] to illegally change the responsibilities of plaintiff's position, by specifically taking away her supervisory functions and in such manner unilaterally altering the official description of plaintiff's duties.'" (Docket No. 99 at 15.)
It is true that "the continuing violation doctrine has been widely applied to § 1983 cases within the First Circuit."Ayala-Sepulveda v. Municipality of San German, No. 09-1471, 2010 WL 2991422 (D.P.R. Aug. 2, 2010) (citing Ruiz Casillas v. Camacho Morales, 2004 WL 3622480, at *5 (D.P.R. 2004)). Villahermosa's alleged refusals to consider Davila's reclassification requests, however, are clearly discrete acts, not components of a hostile work environment. From the evidence on the record, the requests for reclassification appear to be essentially a failure to promote, because the successful result of such a request is the assignment of different responsibilities and a corresponding increase in pay. (See Docket No. 81-1; Docket No. 99-1.) A failure to promote is a prototypical discrete discriminatory action and, for that reason, Davila's allegations regarding ignored requests for reclassification are each independently subject to the year-long statute of limitations period for section 1983 claims. See Ruiz-Sulsona, 334 F.3d at 160 (citingMorgan, 536 U.S. at 110-16).
Even if the alleged refusals to consider Davila's reclassification requests could be considered a pattern of discrimination for the purposes of the continuing violation doctrine, that doctrine is only available where a plaintiff was unaware of the discriminatory nature of otherwise time-barred conduct at the time that it occurred. See Windross, 586 F.3d at 103; Williams, 220 F.3d at 21. It is clear that Davila considered Villahermosa's alleged conduct with regard to her reclassification requests to be discriminatory, because she described that conduct as political discrimination in her ADU complaint on February 4, 2008. (See Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 56; Docket No. 85-15.) Accordingly, Davila may not take advantage of the continuing violation doctrine and any claims based on discrete acts related to her reclassification requests occurring prior to May 4, 2008, are barred by the statute of limitations applicable to section 1983.
C. Political Discrimination
The only remaining allegation related to political discrimination is Davila's claim that Villahermosa somehow intervened to alter her job description or responsibilities in September, 2008. (See Docket No. 1 at ¶; Docket No. 99.) Claims alleging political discrimination in employment pursuant to section 1983 seek to vindicate the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and association, which provides non-policymaking public employees with protection from adverse employment decisions based on their political affiliation. Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 516 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 354 (1976). A plaintiff alleging political discrimination bears the threshold burden of producing sufficient evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that he or she engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the challenged employment action. Gonzalez-Blasini v. Family Dept., 377 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2004); Rodriguez-Rios v. Cordero, 138 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1998). "The
plaintiff must point to evidence on the record which, if credited, would permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that the challenged personnel action occurred and stemmed from a politically based discriminatory animus." Gonzalez-Blasini, 377 F.3d at 85 (quoting LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 661 (1st Cir. 1996)).
Davila has completely failed to present properly, or even identify, any evidence that Villahermosa's memorandum was motivated by political animus. (See Docket No. 99 at 19-21; Docket No. 99-1.) Without that evidence, Davila cannot establish a prima facie case of political discrimination. See Gonzalez-Blasini, 377 F.3d at 85. Accordingly, Davila's only timely political discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment.
D. EPA Claim
Although Davila includes an EPA claim in the complaint with regard to an alleged disparity in pay between her own position and that of the CSC's, she makes no attempt to support her EPA claim. (See Docket No. 99.) In order to maintain a claim under the EPA, Davila "must first establish a prima facie case by showing that the employer paid different wages to specific employees of different sexes for jobs performed under similar working conditions and requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility." Ingram v. Brink's, Inc., 414 F.3d 222, 232 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)). Davila points to no comparative evidence to establish a disparity in the wages of her position and that of the CSC's. (See Docket No. 99.)
Furthermore, in considering whether jobs are of equal skill, "[s]kill includes consideration of such factors as experience, training, education, and ability . . . measured in terms of the performance requirements of the job." 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a). It is an uncontested fact that the CSC position requires a degree in Criminal Justice or Criminology from a recognized university or college, two years of experience in work related to the protection of life, property and equipment which included supervisory responsibilities, or a bachelor's degree from a recognized from a recognized college or university and three years of experience in work related to the protection of life, property and equipment which included supervisory functions. (See Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 80; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 80; Docket No. 118 at 71.) Davila recognizes that all of the CSC's referred to in the complaint possessed those qualifications and that she does not possess those qualifications. (See Docket No. 81-1 at ¶ 81-82; Docket No. 99-1 at ¶ 81-82; Docket No. 118 at 71.) Given the lack of evidence presented by Davila and her admission that she does not possess the requisite qualifications for the CSC position, the EPA claim alleged in the complaint cannot survive summary judgment.
E. Supplemental Claims
Davila also alleges claims under Puerto Rico Law 100 and Law 69. (See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 5.1-9.5.) The jurisdictional basis to maintain the Law 100 and Law 69 claims in this Court has been undermined by the dismissal of Davila's federal claims. Accordingly, those supplemental claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 81). Davila's federal claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Davila's supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Given the dismissal of all claims in this case, the motions to dismiss, (Docket Nos. 21 34), are MOOT.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.